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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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HEARING AND MARKUP

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met at 2 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron and Hon. Stephen J. Solarz presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. If people can, please, take their seats we will get the show on the road.

The Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations meet today to review recent political developments in the Republic of Korea, and to examine the policy implications of those developments for the United States.

In recent weeks the political opposition in Korea has mounted a petition campaign for revision of the Constitution that would allow direct election to choose a successor to President Chun Doo Hwan. In rallies in several cities it has drawn crowds in the tens of thousands.

The Government's initial response to the petition drive was less than tolerant. More recently, it has permitted signature solicitation and public meetings. The Government, nonetheless, still holds firmly to its intention to hold an indirect election, and has warned the opposition not to let the rallies degenerate into disorder.

We may never know what caused the Chun government to soften its approach to the petition campaign. I do, however applaud the Reagan administration for having stated publicly that the right of Koreans to petition their government is a fundamental, democratic right. Perhaps that statement made a difference.

Having returned recently from a visit to the Republic of Korea, however, I fear that the Government and opposition are like two trains headed toward each other down the same track on a collision course. Both sides know that the struggle over election arrangements is more than a scholastic debate over constitutional minutiae. The very nature of the Korean political system is at stake.

Both sides know that if the Korean people are given a genuine chance to freely elect the next president, fundamentals of democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press will probably follow.

The opposition does not wish to miss an opportunity for fundamental reform. The Government cites the need for unity and vigilance in the face of the threat from the North. Each side suspects that the other has a hidden agenda.

On first glance, the Republic of Korea presents the most difficult test of reconciling our security interests and our political values of democracy and human rights. There is no question that we have a vital stake in the continued security of South Korea. With a large North Korean army poised offensively north of the demilitarized zone, we cannot rule out the possibility of another war on the Korean peninsula.

The United States has 40,000 troops stationed in the South, and has a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea. We would inevitably be involved in any conflict on the Korean peninsula should deterrence fail.

There is also no question but that we have an interest in the political stability of South Korea. Since, in the event of disorder in the South, Kim Il Sung might miscalculate and launch an attack in an effort to consummate his lifelong dream of re-unifying Korea under Communist control.

Under these circumstances it would seem clear that the prospects for stability would be enhanced if there were progress toward pluralism rather than a retreat toward repression. There seems to be no doubt, objectively speaking, that the Korean people are ready for democracy. They are relatively prosperous, and they are very well educated.

It is also clear from the results of the National Assembly elections that the more affluent and more educated segment of the population wants democracy.

President Chun has taken a significant step in pledging to step down at the end of his term, which would represent the first peaceful transfer of power in recent Korean history. It is my impression that the great majority of Koreans believe he will make good on that pledge.

It is also my strong impression, however, that this commendable act will not be sufficient by itself to still the demands for democracy by the Korean people. The future peace and prosperity of the Republic of Korea at this critical juncture in its history appears to require a creative compromise on constitutional and electorial issues between the Government and the opposition in order to facilitate procedures for the Presidential elections in which both sides have confidence, and which will reflect the will and wishes of the Korean people.

It is often said with respect to Korea that the United States must choose between our strategic concerns and our hopes for democracy. Perhaps, however the choice is not either or. Perhaps one of the best ways to protect our security interests in Korea is to promote our political ideals.

To assist us in exploring these profoundly important questions we have a number of distinguished witnesses with us today. First of all, we will hear from our eminent colleague from Pennsylvania, the Honorable Thomas Foglietta, who has taken a special interest in the situation in South Korea, and who has recently returned from a visit to that country.

Second, we will hear from a panel of private witnesses which will include Richard Allen the president of Richard V. Allen Co. and a former National Security Advisor to President Reagan.

We will also hear from Prof. Chong Sik-Lee from the University of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Edward Baker of Harvard University who comes before us today as a representative of Asia Watch.

Finally, after we have benefited from the wisdom of our private panel, we will hear from two officials of the executive branch, the Honorable Gaston Sigur, a newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs who will be making his debut before this subcommittee in his new position; and Rear Adm. Edward Baker, who is the regional director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Bureau of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense.

At some point in the proceedings when a quorum is present of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, our subcommittee, with the kind permission of my able associate who is cochairing these hearings today, will consider a resolution relating to its investigation of the hidden wealth of the Marcos family in the United States having to do with the contempt citation against the Bernstein brothers.

I am pleased to note that present at the hearing today is a delegation of members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. The delegation is composed of members of the New Korea Democratic Party, which is the opposition party in South Korea, and which is in the United States on a program sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Just 2 weeks ago I had the pleasure of visiting the Korean National Assembly and of watching some of them debate in the chamber. I did not understand it too well since my Korean leaves something to be desired, but I did enjoy talking with the leaders of both the NKDP and the ruling Democratic Justice Party.

I know my colleagues who are here today for this hearing join with me in welcoming our fellow parliamentarians to the U.S. Congress.

I will yield now for an opening statement by a very distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, my cochairman for these hearings, Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank my esteemed colleague, Chairman Solarz, for his active role in putting together this joint hearing on political developments and human rights in the Republic of Korea. I also want to commend the gentlemen from Ohio, Mr. Feighan, for his leadership and very worthwhile efforts toward promoting human rights in South Korea.

Reviewing the human rights situation in this Asian county and determining what measures our Government, and specifically Congress, should take are timely and warranted.

Congress plays an important role in promoting United States concern for human rights by evaluating the human rights records of recipient countries when considering allocations for economic and military assistance. But monitoring human rights and encouraging democratic political structures throughout the world is an ongoing process which always factors into Congress' view of U.S. foreign policy.

The Republic of Korea has made some improvements to
more democratic process. Recently, President Chun pe
50,000 people to conduct an antigovernment rally. The
regime has in the past sanctioned the National Assembly El
and restored the civil rights of hundreds of political prison
attempting to comply with Western ideas.

However, despite guarantees of human rights in the const
and President Chun's proclamation about defending and st
ening freedom, South Korea is neither fully democratic, n
from repression. Reports of daily arrests continue, as do a
ernment protests. The opposition, once comprised of studen
laborers, now includes many mainstream Koreans, as well as
al leaders of the Catholic and Protestant churches.

Until there is a free press, independent labor unions, fr
fair elections, and an independent judiciary, President Chun
lating both domestic and international human rights law.

In addition to human rights considerations, there are legi
concerns for a strategic interests involving both the military
ty of the United States, as well as the internal security and
tion of the South Korean people against North Korean aggr
It is this bond that has linked our two countries in the pa
will continue to do so in the future.

In the Republic of Korea, as elsewhere, the U.S. Gover
faces a dilemma: how best to serve our own legitimate secur
terest while encouraging a friendly government to move
quickly to promote human rights and social justice.

With this dilemma in mind, I look forward to hearing the
monies of our knowledgeable witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chai

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Yatron. I will now
to my very good friend and frequent defender these days, th
tleman from New York, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, since we are friends, and since we are on
minute rule I will not object to the this committee meeting
even though all of us should be on the floor fighting for the
dom fighters in Nicaragua as we fought with our allies in Ko
stop the spread of international deadly communism many
ago. I will not object out of courtesy to you and to the people
are testifying here today.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to join both you and Chai
Yatron in welcoming our witnesses today. I am particularly pl
to have Richard Allen testifying. He is a man that I deeply re
and who is deeply respected in this country. And, of course, t
Assistant Secretary Sigur's first appearance before this comm
He replaces Paul Wolfowitz, who was outstanding in his job.

Mr. Chairman, more than 33,000 young Americans laid
their lives in Korea during the war 35 years ago and it was a
It was not a police action. I was very proud and privileged to
served in the U.S. Marine Corps during that time. And I, like
Americans, have always followed the events in South Korea w
very keen interest because of the price we have paid on beha
the cause of freedom, and because stability on the Korean p
sula is essential to American interests, and to the stability of
East Asia.

Let me say at the outset that I believe we would be very well advised, well advised, to avoid drawing hasty and half-baked analogies between the respective situations in the Philippines and South Korea. Any parallels to be drawn between the two are superficial at best, and seriously misleading at worst. And that is the last thing in the world this committee ever wants to do.

Despite the massive American commitment to a free Korea, which means a free United States of America incidentally, the Republic of Korea did not come to independence in 1948 with the same political advantages and cultural preparations that the Philippines had when they came into nationhood.

In the case of the Philippines, the Government has moved the country away from the democratic traditions and institutions that we bequeathed to them. And moreover, the Philippines has all these years been sliding into economic chaos, which you and I, and other members, have often discussed.

In South Korea, by sharp contrast, the problem is defined in terms of how the country can establish a political system that is commensurate with the dramatic economic and social progress that has given South Korea one of the highest standards of living, and one of the most equitably distributed national incomes, in all of Asia.

Despite the great progress that has made South Korea the envy of the developing world, the country has never established the kind of political continuity that can enable transitions of power to take place peacefully. And this is precisely what is at stake here now. Can the Republic of Korea stage a nonviolent and plausible transition of power in 1988 when President Chun's term of office expires? That is the question.

I hope that from this hearing will come positive suggestions on how the United States can encourage our South Korean friends to move in that direction, the right direction. America' interests depend on it, Mr. Chairman, and so do the long-range interests of 43 million free Koreans.

I will conclude by making just two points of which I am absolutely certain. First, American interests in South Korea can best be served by helping the Koreans do for themselves what they must do on their own. It is not for us to make their decisions for them, or to embrace the career or agenda of any one political party or figure.

Second, I would just hope that we can avoid the kind of hypocritical breast beating that demands of other countries and governments the observance of standards that we do not have here in America ourselves. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I am speaking of the demand made in some quarters that the South Korean presidential election in 1988 be conducted by a direct popular vote. Sounds good, doesn't it?

Let me remind all of my colleagues, all of you here, that our own Founding Fathers established an indirect method of electing American Presidents. I think we still observe that. The electoral college was established precisely for the reason of discouraging the sort of political demagoguery and polarization that undermines a free society.

But I am also thinking of the demands for a right of petition. Very few States in our country permit the kind of direct citizen action that is being demanded by some in South Korea. Mr. Chairman, I ought to know, because as a member of the New York State Assembly a number of years ago in the 1970's I fought hard to establish the right of petition and referendum in the State of New York. I was opposed every step of the way by then Gov. Hugh Carey and the liberals. And I think even, Mr. Chairman, you were there if I am not mistaken, I am not sure of that.

So if I could offer one word of counsel as this hearing begins it will be this: Let's not overdo it. There are some problems in South Korea, to be sure. There are some problems in the United States to be sure, but there is also a movement and an openness in the South Korean political scene today that would have been thought impossible only 6 or 7 years ago. And I commend the South Koreans and the South Korean Government for the progress they have made.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Solomon, for a mostly thoughtful statement. I must say I agreed with much of what you had to say. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Feighan has a few observations.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me salute you and the gentleman from Pennsylvania for convening this hearing today. One which has, I think, significant timeliness. As we are all aware, there has been a dramatic increase and intensity of political activity in Korea over the past few months. That intensity of activity obviously is going to lead to either the opportunity for reform or the opportunity for repression. I think all of us today regardless of our individual views about the specifics of the operation of politics in Korea would agree that we would hope that that opportunity will be seized for those who are seeking true, meaningful reform that can lead to a lasting and strong democracy in Korea.

The focus of United States foreign policy toward South Korea, I think it should be stated, has to be focused at the people of South Korea, not at a particular government, not at a particular political party, not at particular individuals. Hopefully, the United States Government can be of assistance to the people of Korea, to its leadership in trying to fashion a direction over the next crucial 2 years as they try to establish a government that will ensure democracy and ensure the kind of freedom that all of us are hoping can be a part of that society.

Whether we are concerned about specific issues, I think, individually as Americans, we have to recognize that we have to accept the Korean people's judgment as to the determination of issues, including the direct election of president. We have to leave to the Korean people their best judgment as to the distribution of political power as to whether or not they will entertain a strong right of petition to their Government. All of those are issues that rightfully belong exclusively to the best judgment of the Korean people.

I am hopeful and confident, in fact, that this hearing today and that the debate that has taken place in the Congress and will continue over the next several months will help in the effort, at what I

think must be a reshaping, a redirecting, a refashioning of American foreign policy to be supportive toward those ends.

Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Feighan.

Mr. Foglietta.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Please forgive me. I did not know that you wanted to say a few words. The gentleman from California was another recent visitor to South Korea. I was there checking up on him myself. Mr. Dymally.

Mr. DYMALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be brief as usual.

In the last 5 years I have had the dubious distinction of having visited Korea more often than the prolific and ubiquitous chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. In fact, I believe I have been there about a dozen times in the last 5 years. In each visit I take great care in meeting with both the Government and opposition party; having lunch in the Assembly with the Foreign Affairs Committee and having dinner with the opposition.

And I think I have gotten to understand just a little bit the problems that the Koreans now face in trying to pursue democracy. Historically, the government parties have said in effect that to expedite democracy would be to bring instability to Korea. That is in its simplistic term what is being said.

The opposition, on the other hand, says if you want stability then you should expedite democracy. And I hope that the witnesses, the learned witnesses today would respond to that obvious conflict which exists in Korea today.

In conclusion, let me say I agree with my friend the champion of civil liberties from New York, Mr. Solomon, that a comparison between Korea and the Philippines is not well taken, but his further comparison of petitioning in New York and petitioning in Korea is also not well taken, because in New York he was endeavoring to change the statute of the Constitution by permission. In Korea this is simply a citizens petition which has an advisory nature, not a statutory or constitutional nature.

And this is where the conflict arises. Whether the people shall have the right to voluntarily petition without being oppressed by the police or suppressed by the Government. And I think what we have at stake in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is whether the expediting of democratic institutions in Korea will bring instability as the Government says, or whether bringing democracy with full speed ahead before the Olympics, or before the next Presidential election will bring more stability to Korea. I hope the witnesses will address that question.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I hope so too. And let me say to my colleagues on the committee that I do not think I have ever heard such a series of eloquent opening statements on the part of the members. I think this augers well for what I trust will be the high level of debate which we will be giving to what is obviously a very important issue and problem confronting our country.

Let me add further that I very much hope that as a result of this hearing and any further hearings we may have that we can forge a

genuine consensus in terms of how best to promote and to protect both our strategic interests and our political values in South Korea. I think all of us in a way approach this from a similar prospective. And I think, therefore, it ought to be within the realm of possibility to forge a consensus.

And that, I think, will ultimately serve the best interest of America, because we are always more effective abroad when we are united at home. And now we call on our leadoff witness, one of our colleagues who has taken a great interest in the affairs of the Republic of Korea and who has recently returned from a visit there, Mr. Foglietta.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. FOGLIETTA. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity and I thank members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to be here to offer what little bit of information that I have or opinions I have to the great job that this committee is doing in attempting to promote democracy throughout the world, and especially in Southeast Asia.

I would like, first of all, to comment on some of the remarks that have been during the preliminary statements of the members of the committee. One was addressed by my good friend and colleague, Mr. Dymally, the gentleman from California when he talked about the right to petition your government. I think there is a distinction to be drawn there as he so ably stated, between the formality of petition whereby a certain number of legitimate signatures would direct a government to perform or not to perform a particular action.

That is not the type of petition that we are talking about in South Korea, but merely the right of people to assemble and to petition, with a small 'p' their government to ask their government for the right to make certain changes, to express their opinions as to whether or not these changes should be make, whether or not these matters should be taken under consideration by their parliamentary body.

Second, when we talk about direct elections, sure we have an indirect election system in this country but I think our indirect election system in this country is mere formality, because we know really that those electors who are voted on by the electorate will cast votes as they are directed for the person receiving the highest number of popular votes.

We understand that there is a possibility theoretically that it can happen, but we know in practicality that it won't happen that way. That is not the same situation in South Korea. There is a system of indirect election which, number one, would allow electors to be elected in various districts who, No. 1, would not necessarily vote the will of the majority of the people, and not necessarily guarantee that the majority of the people will elect the person that they want to elect as president of that nation.

Third, there is another concept which I sort of sense from hearing certain statements both at this hearing and while I was over in Korea from certain quarters, namely that the Korean people are a

little bit different than American people in some way shape or form in that they are not ready for some reason to accept the benefits and the advantages of democracy, that they are a little bit different and they have to wait a while longer, sometime in the future when they have to be ready to accept a democratic form of government. I do not accept this. I believe that the people of Korea, as people all over the world, are ready right now to accept a democratic form of government.

I am happy to be here before you today to discuss with you my observations on the current situation in the Republic of Korea. I have prepared a rather lengthy statement for the record which I have asked unanimous consent to present to this body, which is specifically concerned with the military situation in Korea today. With your permission I will insert that in the record.

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply concerned by the situation today in Korea. America has no closer friend than Korea. The people there are like the people of so many nations around the world, see in American democracy their hope for the future. That hope is being peacefully expressed in Korea through the petition campaign for constitutional change, the vehicle being used to express popular will. The campaign, which aims to collect 10 million signatures calling for free Presidential elections, is an extraordinarily peaceful expression of the desire for change. I believe it deserves the support of this Nation.

The petition campaign is a moderate political movement. To date I have been greatly encouraged by the moderation which has been similarly demonstrated by the government of Chun Doo Hwan in responding to the campaign. The United States must do everything within its power to encourage both sides to continue down this path. While I have no doubt as to the commitment to peaceful change of the New Korea Democratic Party, I certainly have my doubts about the limits of that commitment by Chun Doo Hwan.

To this end, I am greatly concerned by the direction and the leadership of our policy in Korea. In contrast to the statement made by my good friend Mr. Dymally that he spoke to on his various visits to the Republic of Korea, to both the existing Government and leaders of the opposition. In contrast to that kind of a policy, the head of our current diplomatic team there has held the post of Ambassador since 1981. In that time, as I was shocked to learn, he has never met with Kim Dae Jung. He has never met with Kim Young Sam, two of Korea's most prominent opposition figures.

He has never met, and this is another shocking statement, he has never met with the head of the Catholic Church in Korea, Cardinal Stephen Kim. This does not reflect an adequately balanced policy. Our team must approach all sides to the Korean political spectrum. A failure to meet with all responsible figures in Korea does not serve the interest of the United States of America.

I was further disturbed by an ABC News report of a few weeks ago on the subject of censorship, not Korean censorship mind you, but American censorship. As you know, the United States operates the Armed Forces Korean Network of American programming in Korea. That program traditionally broadcasts unedited American television programming. But until the ABC News report, the

AFKN censored many of the stories which our networks run in Korea. We were denying the Korean people, as well as our own servicemen and their dependents, news about their own nation, the nation of Korea. According to ABC, the man with authority to make these censorship decisions is the United States Ambassador to Korea.

Censorship inside Korea is, of course, much harsher. I happened to have been in the cathedral attending Sunday mass when during a homily I heard a tremor running through the cathedral, and I heard voices at the end of this homily, which was spoken in Korean. I had no idea what was going on, and I asked Kim Dae Jung, who was sitting next to me, what had happened. And he said that Cardinal Kim at the end of his homily had endorsed the constitutional change, and endorsed that constitutional change to take place immediately.

This was a monumental statement by the leader, spiritual leader of some 2 million Koreans. And naturally as an American, being used to the freedom of the press when I left that cathedral and walked out into the highways and byways of Korea, and meeting places I just assumed and expected that the people of Korea would have known, had some knowledge of the fact that the leader of 2 million people had made this statement.

And I was sort of shocked to find out 24 hours later nobody knew that he had made that statement because the television cameras did not carry that statement, nor did the printed media carry that statement. Although it made the front page of the New York Times, it merited no coverage whatsoever in the Republic of Korea.

The Korean Government argues that Korea is not yet quite ready for democracy. These things take time I was told. Well, it has been 33 years and from what I can see that is time enough. Korea is a politically mature nation, fully capable of carrying the heavy burden of democracy. There is no reason to delay, as the Government wants, to 1988 or 1989 a transition to one man, one vote politics. As I said in South Korea when I was there, democracy delayed is democracy denied.

We in the United States are not accustomed to repression, and to such things as house arrest. But the situation in South Korea is filled with it. I was witness to Mr. Kim Dae Jung being placed under house arrest for an afternoon, when a rally was taking place, for an hour when he wanted to go to mass, for several weeks during February or March. The presence of hundreds of plain clothed goons, uniformed police, and riot police surrounding Mr. Kim Dae Jung's house or present at peaceful rallies is a sobering experience, and an intimidating one. It is a fact of life, however, in Korea.

There is a deep and dangerous misunderstanding about the United States military role in Korea. It is popularly believed there that the United States released ROK forces to quell the Kwangju uprising. According to our commanders on the ground, that is not true. The ROK has the authority to detach units on its own, which it did. Many people in Korea are looking to the United States support in encouraging the military to stay in the barracks and let the political process evolve on its own. We did not do that under two previous military takeovers. I believe we must do that now.

The Olympic games in Seoul raise the stakes in Korea. The next 2 years are terribly important, and highly volatile. The United States must act as a moderating influence in Korea. We must be ever vigilant of the threat to the north. We need to be more aware than ever because the north is fully capable of taking destabilizing actions aimed at the south. The threat from the north, however, must not be allowed to interfere with the process of democratization in the south. There are many people, some in power, some in the military, who would like to use the threat of North Korea as a catapult to the blue house.

The best assurance of peace in Korea, and of stability is the free expression of political will. It is in our best interest to let this play out freely, and to encourage the Government to be flexible, in moving toward democracy in Korea.

I would be very happy to answer any questions from the committee.

[Mr. Foglietta's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: It is a pleasure to be here with you today to discuss a subject of great importance to the United States and to me personally. I would like to express my appreciation to you for allowing me to share my thoughts with you on the prospects for democracy in Korea, and on the role we in the United States, and specifically we in the Congress, can and should play in Korea's future.

As you know, I was in Korea for the second time early last month. While I began my trip to Asia with you, Mr. Chairman, in the Philippines, I went on to Korea to try and gain a better understanding of the situation there. What I learned was both encouraging, and disturbing. Because you have an expert and distinguished panel of witnesses before you today, I will not take the committee's time with a discussion of the entire situation in Korea. Instead, let me concentrate my remarks on a few areas.

First, there is the military situation to consider. Over the past thirty years, the United States most visible, and important, role in Korea has been the defense of the Republic of Korea from Kim Il Sung. Today, the north maintains a massive military presence poised to strike on the border. American commanders in the field have expressed the view that we would have, at best, twenty-four hours alert to an invasion from the north. It is almost universally accepted that the presence of 40,000 American servicemen are the only thing forestalling a second initiation of hostilities. Irrespective of the situation in South Korea, it has always been, and should always be, clear that the United States maintains an indivisible, and inseparable, commitment to the defense of the south. That commitment is further demonstrated by the fact that the U.S. maintains operational command of ROK forces in time of conflict. Yet while that interrelationship sends a clear signal to the north, it has often sent a confusing signal to the south. In 1981, ROK forces under the nominal command of American authorities were detached and sent to the southern city of Kwangju. Those forces were employed in the brutal suppression of students and demonstrators protesting the seizure of power by Chun Doo Hwan, Korea's current President. In the violence of the Kwangju riot hundreds, possibly thousands, of people were killed by military units. The Kwangju riot was used as the pretext to arrest, try and condemn to death Kim Dae Jung, Korea's most popular opposition figure. To this day there is no evidence that Mr. Kim had any involvement whatsoever in the Kwangju protests, and it was only through the intervention of American authorities that he is alive and free today.

The relationship between the U.S. and ROK military is not clearly understood here, or in Korea. The United States is widely viewed by Koreans to have authorized the detachment of ROK forces during the Kwangju riot. As such, they are seen as having been in agreement with, or at least neutral to, the suppression of the Kwangju protest. American military commanders on the ground in Korea maintain that this is not true. According to our forces there, the military command arrangement between U.S. and ROK forces does not include control over the internal move-

ment of ROK forces. These commanders maintain that we did not, and could not, have released the ROK forces because we do not maintain that kind of peacetime control over ROK forces. Koreans do not see it that way. The Korean on the street, and most of the educated politicians in the country, believe that the U.S. maintains ultimate authority over the ROK military. This confusion has, in the case of the Kwangju riot and, to a lesser extent the military takeovers of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, negatively impacted U.S.-Korean relations. This is not true at the executive level, where the last two regimes have been the beneficiaries of the use of military force, but at all levels below it.

While this history is important as a backdrop, its real significance is in what it portends for the future. The current situation in Korea, with the petition campaign for constitutional change, the rise of the New Korea Democratic Party (and thus the resurgence of Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam), the 88 Seoul Olympics, the Presidential elections next year and the assembly elections in 88, is highly unstable. Too many mistakes by any of the antagonists could easily lead to violence. Within that context there is the clear precedent of political ambition within the senior military command of the ROK. Korea's last two leaders have come to power with blood on their hands, and there is little reason to believe it could not happen again. Because of the real and perceived roles and responsibilities of the U.S. political and military commands in Korea, many people are looking to America to keep the military at bay. This fact raises difficult questions for U.S. policymakers concerned with Korea. The overt U.S. mission on the Korean Peninsula is to help protect the South from the North. Many people in the South, however, are looking for America to protect the South from the South, to influence not just the Chun regime, but the ROK military, to stay out of politics. There are those who feel we have the capability to keep the military in the barracks in a crisis, much, they feel, as we did in the Philippines. Every member in this room understands that we did not keep the military in the barracks in Manila, but what we see is not what is important here, it is what the Koreans see that matters. I believe there is a great deal of confusion, and a dangerous misperception by both sides in the political tug-of-war in Korea, over what the U.S. role in Korea is. I further believe that that confusion is exacerbated by a lack of clarity among responsible Americans themselves over how to respond to Korean events, particularly those which involve possible, or probably, military intervention.

There are many pressing questions which we must soon address. Some, but by no means all, of them, are:

(1) The U.S. has stood by twice before when the military went into the streets to install a new dictator. Is there any reason to believe that we will not do so again? And, more importantly, what is the perception of the ROK commanders on this issue? Will they be emboldened by past U.S. silence to act again should events in Korea reach a crisis point, or will they perceive a new, more unyielding mood in the American command, one that will push them to stay out of politics, as the military here does.

(2) What about the perceptions of the New Korea Democratic Party, and other responsible opposition parties, about the relationship of the U.S. and the ROK military? Many figures in the opposition are counting on the U.S. to act as a moderating influence on the military and the government over the next few years. They worry, rightfully, that if the U.S. is silent on this question, that it will give encouragement to the military, and to the Chun government, on the question of suppression. In the worst case, they are concerned—and I agree—that U.S. silence, particularly as the election gets closer and the temperature rises in Korea, may make it easier for history to repeat itself for a third time, and for the military to once again violate the principles of a free people by seizing power. This, in my opinion, would be a tragedy.

(3) What impact does this entire question have on our primary mission in Korea, that of protecting the South from the North? This, in my view, is a larger question than just one of military intentions. But it is inextricably locked into this question. The North has never hesitated to subvert ROK politics, and to try to destabilize the ROK internally. Few things could appeal more to Kim Il Sung than to provoke violent confrontations in the South as the Olympic Games approach. Violence, inspired by whatever means, endangers the games, and provides the military and the Chun government with the pretext to stage a military action. Should such an event occur, the only winner will be North Korea. I believe that the way in which the U.S. conducts its foreign policy, and its military policy, over the next two years, will significantly impact the prospects for violence in Korea.

I have no doubt but that the NKDP seeks only peaceful change. Theirs is a strongly committed non-violent campaign. I believe the Chun regime, too, seeks to

avoid violent confrontation. If they did not, the petition campaign would have been suppressed in its infancy. I am less sanguine about the intentions of the military. Too much strength by the NKDP, or too much weakness on the part of the Chun government, as seen by the military, will heighten the danger of military action. At this date, I believe the only reasonable action which the U.S. can take is to support moderation by both sides, making it clear that the penalty for a failure to practice moderation is an increased risk of military intervention. Moderation does not mean telling the NKDP to back off. They have a legitimate aim, and a legitimate timetable for the achievement of that aim. Moderation means adhering at every turn to the non-violent, change through popular support, campaign they are now practicing. Similarly, it means working with the Chun government to allow change, to seek a compromise acceptable to both sides. Chun is a President who enjoys very little support at home. He could never succeed himself—the military would not allow it. As such, he, too has much to gain through compromise.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. role in discouraging the military from involving itself in Korea's political situation is both terribly important, and terribly difficult. We must determine the extent to which we can become involved, and the consequences of that involvement. We must, similarly, make clear to the Koreans that our capabilities are limited—we cannot lock the ROK military in their barracks. At the same time it must also be clear that we have a great deal of influence in Korea, more than any other external power. To disavow those capabilities would send the worst possible signal to the North, and to those in the ROK military who fancy themselves in the Blue House.

I believe that the question of U.S. involvement with the ROK military, and the associated question of ROK military involvement with Korean politics, to be the paramount question surrounding Korea today. Another coup d'etat is the outcome which must be avoided. As such, we must seek to work backward from that outcome to determine the routes which we in the States must take to see that it never comes to pass. Intervention by the ROK military will set back the cause of democracy in Korea for many years, and damage the relations of this country, not with the rulers of Korea, but with the people of Korea. In the end, it is the people to whom we must address ourselves in Korea, as we in Congress must address ourselves to our constituents.

Korea is a nation on the verge of economic greatness. The chance for political greatness in the form of democracy has never been better. Your subcommittee, as well as the Congress as a whole, will play an important role in nurturing that process. Thank you for your time, and your attention to this issue.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Foglietta. The members will note there is a vote in progress, but I have no questions myself. I want to thank you, however, for taking the time to appear before our subcommittee.

Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I want to commend our colleague from Pennsylvania on an excellent statement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. No questions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Dymally.

Mr. DYMALLY. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. You got off lightly. Thank you very much. The committee will recess for approximately 10 minutes while we vote on the Hamilton amendment. And when we come back we will resume with our panel of private witnesses.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. SOLARZ. The subcommittee will come to order. If our next panel of witnesses can take their seats at the witness table we will proceed.

Our first witness will be Richard Allen. Mr. Allen I want to thank you very much for taking the time to be with us this afternoon. I know this is a week in which you have some pressing per-

sonal and family engagements, and we certainly are grateful to you for your willingness to share your accumulated wisdom on the Republic of Korea with us this afternoon.

Your testimony will be included in the record as it was submitted and I hope you will feel free to summarize your views in approximately 10 minutes if that can be done so that we can have the maximum time for questioning.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD V. ALLEN, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; CURRENTLY PRESIDENT, RICHARD V. ALLEN CO.

Mr. ALLEN. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and with the distinguished members of this subcommittee. In my statement I indicate that my first visit to Korea occurred in late 1967 at a very interesting time. The second in 1968, and a series of visits over the years. One last week, and one again in 2 weeks. I was deeply impressed by those first visits to Korea, in an academic capacity and in a political capacity.

One thing I learned, clearly, was that the concept of security has a very special meaning for the people of Korea. Based on those early experiences just after the attack on the Blue House in early 1968, and on subsequent visits, I understood how national security had come to have that special meaning for so many Koreans. But, of course, the concept of security can never be used as a mask to justify any action at all.

The Republic of Korea has had ups and downs in this century. With the experience of decades of Japanese occupation, the sharp and the complete division of the peninsula in 1945, the unremitting hostility of Pyongyang, and the Korean war itself, one could say that the experience of Korea is unusual in the annals of modern history. It has had a number of setbacks, but a great deal of progress as well.

In the years that I have been visiting Korea, per capita income rose from $200 a year to $2,000 a year plus. This is, indeed, an impressive and important accomplishment.

Mr. Chairman, you asked that the witnesses today address 11 questions that you put to us. I should like to answer them systematically.

On the subject of FMS credits to Korea, I believe that the maintenance of peace and stability in northeast Asia, which has been a traditional goal of American policy, must remain just that. We have a bilateral security treaty with the Republic of Korea, and for more than 30 years this treaty has succeeded in keeping the peace and deterring aggression from the north.

We must consider the dimensions of the military threat in context of the anticipated political evolution in the south over the next 2 years. We must also be mindful that the Republic of Korea has borne the extraordinary burden of devoting 6 percent of its gross national product in its own defense.

The $230 million in FMS credits, which you are now considering, amounts to about 5 percent of Korea's defense effort. It is a loan, virtually on commercial terms, for the defense of an ally that is strategically placed in a vital part of the world. The threat from

the north increases. I believe that any activity of the U.S. Congress in reducing the elements of the FMS program could be destabilizing both militarily and politically. Therefore, I urge the Congress to approve the full $230 million request.

I believe that this would be a contribution to peace and stability, and I believe it is extremely important that we provide this level of support for the Republic of Korea at this time, especially in light of the military situation. Indeed, it would be ironic if this committee and the Congress were to embrace a $550 million FMS package to the People's Republic of China but find itself unable to vote affirmatively on a $230 million package for the Republic of Korea.

You ask if the Republic of Korea is a democracy; my response is that it is not a democracy in any full Western sense of the word, but the Korean people, as you and your colleagues have noted, do enjoy many basic freedoms. In these conditions, economic stability enhances the wellbeing of the Korean people and promotes the process of internal democratization.

It would be cynical to deny that the trend toward democratization is alive and well in Korea. This trend emanates from the strong desires of the highly motivated and the hard-working Korean people. It reflects the inevitable desire for a full flowering of democracy. The Korean people are highly educated; and the educated elites that are working both in the Government and the private sector are a contributing factor to the spread of democracy.

I believe that democratic evolution is on the march in Korea. It is difficult to predict, with any degree of accuracy, when full democracy, as we know it, will be reached in Korea. But it is important to recognize that the basic trend is there, and that this trend appears to be continuing with the encouragement of the present government.

You have asked about human rights and movement toward a more open political system. It is reassuring that Members of Congress recognize that President Chun's regime has, in fact, moved toward a more open political system and greater respect for human rights in the recent past. We can take encouragement from this.

President Chun, for example, recently met with opposition leaders at the Blue House on February 24. We could also cite the ability of those who are committed to constitutional reform to gather and to demonstrate and to express their demands in the rallies that have been referred to in this hearing.

The coverage that is afforded the opposition parties in the Korean press and other media is a good example; the relative effectiveness of the opposition parties in the National Assembly is also something to be noted, as well as the growing awareness on the part of all Koreans that their country will be the venue for the Asian games in September 1986 and the Olympics in 1988.

One can cite the growth potential for economic friction with major trading partners as a good example of why the process of democratization has momentum. Moreover, Korea's special relationship with the United States is from time to time threatened, and perhaps increasingly so, as protectionist forces gather in the Congress and elsewhere throughout our country. These economic problems could spill over into areas of our political relationship with Korea and, I think, could have a deleterious effect.

Finally, and most important as you yourself have noted, Mr Chairman, there is an awareness that there will be a new era in Korea in 1988 as the Presidential term of Chun Doo Hwan comes to an end. He will preside over the first successful, peaceful politi cal transition in Korean history.

You also asked about human rights in the North and South. I would simply say that the difference is like that of day and night In fact, the difference between North and South is so profound that an attempt at comparison is simply demeaning to the Republic of Korea. It may be that the record of the Republic of Korea is defi cient by our standards or by other standards, but the record of North Korean human rights violations is so grotesque, so systemic and so institutionalized that one hardly knows how to begin to de scribe it.

Is the government of President Chun Doo Hwan stable, and what about the impact of the Philippines? I believe the Chun govern ment is essentially stable today, and we must recognize at the same time that Korean politics are of a different order then ours or of other Western democracies. It would be interesting to compare stability in Korea with that of some other fully democratic West ern countries today.

As to the impact of events in the Philippines upon Korea, I think it is clear that Koreans of all persuasions watched the Philippine drama with intense scrutiny and drew a variety of conclusions from those events. The opposition parties clearly sought to seize upon this important upheaval in the Philippines as a warning to the government. And for its part, the leadership recognized that comparisons, however invalid or invidious, would necessarily be drawn, and that further accommodation to the opposition should be the order of the day.

I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that my colleague Dar rell Plunk of the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center out lined this in a very interesting piece which, without objection, I would like to submit for the record. It is entitled, "Memo to U.S Policy Makers: South Korea is No Philippines."

And if you permit, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to suggest for inclusion in the record an article from the Economist of March 22 entitled "A Long Way From Manila"; as well as one from the Wall Street Journal of March 27, entitled "The Korean Campaign."

The occupation of the USIS Library in May 1985 was of obvious significance, but I do not believe that its significance should be overstated, at least not in terms of growing anti-Americanism in Korea. Student opposition to the regime in power in Korea is a long and encrusted tradition, as it is in many other countries. The issues involved in the sit-in were eventually resolved largely through the fine work by Ambassador Richard L. Walker and his staff. And I might say at this point that it has been my privilege to know Ambassador Walker for more than 25 years.

I have watched his service in the Nation as the President's repre sentative in the Republic of Korea. I have visited with him there and I have had long discussions with him. I would say that we are indeed fortunate to have a fine public servant and scholar like Dr Richard Walker serving our interests on the scene in Korea, and I would like to commend him for his 5 years of successfully conduct

ing American foreign policy there. I am sure you will want to discuss this in greater detail, and I certainly am prepared to do so.

I mention it only because Congressman Foglietta in his earlier testimony implied, at least, criticism of Ambassador Walker, and want to point out that I believe he has done a fine job.

Anti-Americanism is not a fundamental problem in Korean politics, and is not as widespread as some would have us believe. We cannot dismiss the importance of student unrest, but then there is student unrest throughout the world. In a very interesting document prepared recently by the Democratic Justice Party, entitled "Our Stand on the Constitutional Revision" there is a very interesting statement:

> The younger generation's values are quite different from those of the older generation. Their political views are becoming more and more progressive and liberal. We hold that even the idealistic political views and concepts of the younger generation should be embraced.

This is an interesting statement, Mr. Chairman. I ask that it be entered into the record in its entirety, and that it be made available to members of this committee for further study.

As to the status of Kim Dae Jung, everyone knows that Kim Dae Jung's full political rights have not been restored. In the Western press he is described as a leader of the opposition forces, but he is just an element, albeit an important one, of a combined opposition. He is an interesting individual. I had the opportunity to meet with him before he left the United States and I have met with other of his deputies as have members of the Embassy and members of this Government.

There can be little doubt that while his conviction on sedition charges remains controversial, he was an active participant in the events of 1979 and 1980. I am not persuaded that Kim Dae Jung is as politically popular in Korea as he is made to be in the Western press. He certainly is a symbol for opposition forces, but apart from his obvious rivalry with other leaders it has not been demonstrated that he is the odds on-favorite of the younger generation or of any other major segment of the opposition. It is not entirely clear to me in my discussions with young people of all persuasions in Korea, including oppositionists and those who support the Government, that Mr. Kim represents the generation of leaders that the younger people in Korea look forward to having as leaders of the future.

As to the constitutional revision petition drive, 10 million signatures is a very tall order. I do not believe that 10 million signatures will be acquired, but it is not important whether it is 8 or 7 or 6 or 11; what is important is that this movement is clearly in place, and that it reflects the yearning for democracy to which I have alluded.

The numbers of individuals jailed for political reasons was a question that you raised, and I think that the numbers are significant. Constant persuasion from the United States, in my view, has to be a factor in the reduction of such jailings and the ultimate elimination of incarceration for any political reason whatsoever.

You have asked if a congressional resolution on democracy would be helpful. At present I do not think it would be; I think it would be harmful. Whatever the intent, that such a resolution would justifiably be interpreted as a significant intervention in the domestic

affairs of the Republic of Korea. It would, in effect, be a slap in face of a valued friend, an ally and a partner of the United Sta

Moreover, at a time when trade frictions between the two co tries are growing, and this spectre of protectionism looms a factor of growing importance, our Korean friends would inter such a resolution in the worst possible way.

Should we really attempt to inject a dose of destabilization the Korean political situation? Should not we have due regard the impact of our actions in the strategic context of our own l range national interests? Would we not run the risk of encoura North Korea in its aggressive posture toward the South? Why to undermine the prestige if not the legitimacy, of the Chun ernment, especially as it enters this delicate period of the ne years?. These and many other questions spring to mind when question of a congressional resolution is raised.

Mr. Chairman, you asked about the North-South dialog. I bel that this has become an important ingredient in the policie both South Korea and North Korea, as well as a factor contri ing to regional peace and stability. The process is fascinating, a broad range of initiatives designed to engage the North is see some as a way to warm the atmosphere. This process certainly flects the maxim that it is better to talk than it is to fight.

I do not believe that any genuine, fundamental underl progress has been achieved. But I do think the process is impor and that its continuation serves Korean interests as well as own. Even though these talks are occasionally set back by a leged provocation from the south or by the United States, it is possible that persistence may pay off.

I would like to believe that the ultimate reality of reunif families is a noble goal; it is something to which we should give maximum support. I happened to be in Seoul on the occasio those first family reunions, and I must say that one could n underestimate the emotion, much less the international poli significance of these encounters.

After four decades of really ingrained hostility and total i tion, we cannot expect North Korea to thaw very quickly. This complicated process. I also believe that we do not have an i pendent mission to establish a separate bilateral relationship the North, as some have suggested. A move of this type woul resented and misunderstood, and North Korea would attem exploit it to the detriment of both the Republic of Korea and United States. At present, North Korea is engaged in a serious substantial attempt to undermine the 1988 Seoul Olympic spreading uncertainty about the prospects for the safety of the ticipants.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the Rep of Korea is a valued friend of the United States. It is not a pe democracy and does not claim to be, but it actively seeks wa increase and deepen the relationship between itself and this c try. The tradition of Korean-American friendship is more than years old. During the Korean war more than 50,000 American were involved in that resistance against Communist aggression

During the Vietnam conflict, Koreans fought alongside Ame troops and suffered substantial and proportionate losses. We

maintain 40,000 troops in Korea, and these are a visible guarantee for Korea's security and for our own security interest in northeast Asia.

By virtue of hard work and sheer diligence, Korea has become our seventh most important trading partner. Strains in relationship are likely to increase, particularly in the trading sector, and we will need patience to resolve these questions. The relationship between our countries is maturing and the persuasive appeal of democracy is having an impact. I do not believe we should artificially force this pace, but neither should we dismantle our drive to expand and deepen the roots of democracy.

What will eventually emerge in Korea will be a real democracy, although it may not resemble in every detail the democracy that we enjoy in the United States. I believe that the policies of the Reagan administration have been working, that the stability on the relationship between the countries has been enhanced, that the military balance can best be kept through continued FMS support to the Republic of Korea, and that there will be a historic peaceful political transition in March 1988. And, as Korea enters the decade of the 1990's, we will be able to look back with considerable pride upon having assisted a nation once virtually destroyed, overrun, and occupied by hostile powers, to enter upon the world as an important actor on its stage.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Allen and other documents follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD V. ALLEN *

Mr. Chairman, you have invited me to present testimony to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and to respond to a series of questions pertaining to political developments and human rights matters in the Republic of Korea. I am pleased to be with you this afternoon to discuss Korea in the context of its recent past, the present and its prospects for the future.

My first visit to Korea was in late 1967 while I was directing a project at The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. I was both deeply impressed with that introduction to a land that had been through so much misery in this century, and somewhat disillusioned by the level of its economic development at that time. Politically, there was not much to comment upon in Korea, since the more overt signs of democracy were simply absent.

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* Formerly Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Now Chairman of the Advisory Board, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation; Senior Counsellor for Foreign Policy and National Security Affairs, The Republican National Committee; President, The Richard V. Allen Company, an international trade and economic policy consulting company. Among the firm's clients in Asia are U.S. and European companies engaged in commercial trading activities, and representation in the United States includes the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, sponsor of the 1988 Olympic Games.

A few months later, in early 1968, as Coordinator of Foreign Policy for then-candidate Richard Nixon's presidential campaign, I again visited Korea for discussions with government officials and scholars. This time my purpose was to gather information for the policy positions of the 1968 campaign, and my perspective was more attuned to the political implications of Korea's domestic and foreign policies. This visit came just days after the North Korean attack on the Blue House, an attempt by a highly trained death squad to enter the Blue House for the purpose of murdering President Park Chung Hee. The attack was thwarted, as we know, but only at the gates of the Blue House itself.

If initial impressions tend to condition one's longer term views, then I admit to being surprised by the intensity of feeling about that nation's security, especially after retracing the route of the North Korean squad from the region of the Demilitarized Zone to Seoul. In the wake of the assassination attempt a curfew was imposed upon Seoul, further contributing to the prevailing sense of unease. That curfew would be lifted only years later, by the present government.

These early impressions helped me to understand why the notion of "security" is so deeply imbedded in the consciousness of Koreans. Even today, while some observers feel that Korean leaders unjustly cite security as a reason for certain actions and policies, one has the sense that the Republic of Korea is confronted with a unique and important threat from the North.

Combined with the experience of decades of Japanese occupation, the sharp and total division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, the Korean War and the unremitting hostility of Pyongyang for forty years since the end of

World War II, the experience of Korea is unusual in the annals of modern history.

The Republic of Korea has weathered a series of setbacks and a range of adverse conditions to become one of the fastest-growing nations of the world. From the time I first visited Seoul in 1967, per capita income has risen tenfold, from just $200 a year to more than $2,000. By virtue of the resolute policies of the United States over the years, aggression from North Korea has been deterred, but the threat of aggression remains and helps condition the pace of political evolution in South Korea.

Because you have asked that I address eleven questions in this statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond by amplifying each with some personal views. After some twenty years of experience with and travel to Korea, and based on the combined perspectives of scholar, Administration official and businessman, I feel reasonably qualified to offer these observations to you and to the Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.

1. **FMS credits to Korea:** The maintenance of peace and stability in northeast Asia has been a traditional goal of American policy, and the role of Korean armed forces is central to this task. Apart from our bilateral security treaty with the ROK, which for more than thirty years has succeeded in keeping the peace, the threat posed to the South from the North has increased incrementally, to a point at which the numerical superiority of the North is a cause for great concern. We should consider the dimensions of this pure military threat in the context of the anticipated political evolution in the South over the next two years, and we must also be mindful that the Republic of Korea has borne the extraordinary burden of devoting six percent of its Gross National Product to its defense. The $230

million in FMS credits amounts to about five of Korea's defense effort; it is a loan virtually on commercial terms for the defense of an ally strategically located near Japan and the Pacific sea lanes. As I mentioned, the threat from the North has increased in recent months and any major surgery on the U.S. FMS program could be destabilizing, militarily and politically. I urge the Congress to approve it in full. Any sign that the United States intends to alter its strong support for Korea's security position could actually jeopardize the prospects for peace and stability on the peninsula. I believe you also find that Japan and the People's Republic of China, were they to express views on the matter, would strongly prefer no significant diminution of assistance to the ROK. It would be ironic, indeed, if this Committee were to embrace a $550 million FMS package to the PRC but choke on a $230 million program for a long-time ally.

2. **Is Korea a Democracy?** The Republic of Korea is not a democracy in any full, Western sense of the word, but its people enjoy many basic freedoms. In these conditions, economic stability enhances the well-being of the Korean people and promotes the process of internal democratization. From close observation, especially over the life of the present Fifth Republic, I can attest to the steady growth of democratic activities, and have had the opportunity personally to encourage further growth of such desirable trends. It would be cynical to deny that these trends are alive and in motion; they emanate from the strong desires of the highly motivated and hard-working Korean people, and reflect the inevitable desire for the full flowering of democracy. The Korean people are highly educated, and the educational elites working both in Government and in the private sector are also a contributing factor to the spread of democracy. Some may argue that whatever democratic gains occur in

Korea come only in response to a combination of pressures from within and from without; if this is so, what does it matter where the pressures originate? Others insist that progress toward democracy is in form only, and not in substance, and that Korea's leaders are essentially interested only in perpetuating their own tenure and extending their power. This is but an ideological point of view that does not reflect reality. Continued progress toward democratization will come with time, especially if Korea's first peaceful political transition takes place on schedule in March 1988.

3. **Human Rights and Movement toward a more open political system:** The Republic of Korea has in fact moved toward a more open political system and greater respect for human rights in the recent past, although full rights of political expression are not in place. As evidence of this, one can cite the growing dialogue between the Government and the opposition parties, typified by the February 24th meeting between President Chun Doo Hwan and opposition leaders at the Blue House; the ability of those committed to constitutional reform before 1988 to gather, demonstrate and express their demands in a series of recent rallies in various cities; the coverage afforded the opposition parties in the press and other media; the relative effectiveness of the opposition parties in presenting their case in the National Assembly; the growing awareness that the world is beginning to focus on the Republic of Korea as the venue for the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988, and the implications of that process for future political developments; the growth potential for economic friction with major trading partners, and especially with the United States, which some believe could spill over into the political and defense sectors, causing uncertainty and perhaps instability; and, finally,

pages tightly bound

the recognition that significant political change will take place in early 1988 as the term of President Chun comes to an end.

4. **Human rights in the North and South:** You have asked me to compare the human rights situation in the Republic of Korea to that of North Korea. The difference is like that of day to night; in fact, the difference is so profound that an attempt at comparison is simply demeaning to the Republic of Korea. Its record may be deficient, but the record of North Korean human rights violations is so grotesque, systemic and institutionalized that one hardly knows how to begin to describe it.

5. **Stability of the Chun government; impact of the Philippines:** The government of President Chun Doo Hwan is essentially stable, although Korean politics are of a different order than ours or of other Western democracies. A tradition of periodic Cabinet shuffles has developed, and it is certainly true that factionalism and interest group politics permeate the system. While this is not the time for such comparisons, I think it would be interesting to compare stability in Korea with that of some other fully democratic Western countries today; several candidates come readily to mind. As to the impact of events in the Philippines upon Korea, I think it can be said that Koreans of all political persuasions watched the Philippine drama with intense scrutiny and drew a variety of conclusions from those events. The opposition parties clearly sought to seize upon this upheaval as a stern warning to the Government; for its part, the leadership recognized that comparisons, however invalid or invidious, would necessarily be drawn, and that additional accommodation to the opposition should be the order of the day. I am sure you will want to discuss this in greater detail, Mr. Chairman, but at this point I should like to ask that three items be inserted into the Record: first, an excellent

Background Paper by Daryl M. Plunk of the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, entitled "Memo To U.S. Policymakers: South Korea Is No Philippines;" an article from **The Economist** of March 22, entitled "A Long Way From Manila;" and an editorial from **The Wall Street Journal** of March 27, entitled "The Korean Campaign." These three pieces make the case succinctly and convincingly.

6. **The occupation of the USIS library:** The May 1985 occupation of the USIS library in downtown Seoul was certainly of significance, but it should not be overstated. Student opposition to the regime in power is a solid tradition in Korea, and was also an expectable phenomenon for many years in Japan and many Western countries. The issues involved in the sit-in were eventually resolved, largely through the fine work by Ambassador Richard L. Walker and his staff. At one point, when the students were prepared to leave, the crisis was suddenly and unexpectedly prolonged by Mr. Kim Dae Jung's attempt to deliver a letter to them. We are not exercised when Mexican, French, German or even U.S. students stage sit-ins, occupations, sleep-ins or other forms of protest; then why should we infer that growing anti-Americanism is widespread in Korea because of this incident? I would look for more deeply rooted signs of anti-Americanism than in the actions of students in Spring. At the same time, I do not dismiss lightly and as without consequence such occurrences, but I do see it in the context of the present composition of Korea's population, which has been growing at a rate of 1.6 percent for the past several years. This means that more than 60 percent of the current 39 million residents are under the age of 24 years. This fact was acknowledged quite recently in an interesting statement by the ruling Democratic Justice Party entitled "Our Stand On The Constitutional

Revision." The document stated, in part: "The younger generation's values are quite different from those of the older generation. Their political views are becoming more and more progressive and liberal. We hold that even the idealistic political views and concepts of the younger generation should be embraced." Mr. Chairman, I ask that this statement be entered into the Record in its entirety, with the recommendation that it be studied with care by Members of the Subcommittee.

7. **Status of Kim Dae Jung:** The status of Mr. Kim Dae Jung is one in which his full political rights have not been restored, and this as a consequence of events that are well known to all. In the Western press, Mr. Kim is often described as the "leader" of the opposition forces, but in fact he is just one element – albeit an important one – of the combined opposition. A fiery speaker with a charismatic style, Kim frequently takes one tack with Westerners, especially the Western press, and quite another when attempting to stir Koreans with his political appeal. It is important whether he supports political reform by peaceful, democratic activities, or whether he seeks to promote discord, dissension and civil disturbances. There can be little doubt that while Kim's conviction on sedition charges remains controversial, he was an active participant in the events of 1979-80. The United States Ambassador to Korea at that time, during the Carter Administration, criticized Kim's "lack of restraint" and his refusal to call for moderation among dissident elements." (For additional detail on Kim, see Daryl M. Plunk's Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 22, The Heritage Foundation, January 25, 1985, "Kim Dae Jung Tests Seoul and Himself.")

I am not persuaded that Kim Dae Jung is as politically popular as he is made to be in the Western press. He is certainly a symbol for some of the

opposition forces, but apart from his obvious rivalry with other leaders, among them Kim Young Sam and Lee Min Woo, it has not been demonstrated that he is the favorite of the younger generation or of other segments of the opposition.

8. **Petition drive for constitutional revision:** The opposition's petition drive for 10 million signatures on behalf of constitutional reform continues. The issue is clearly drawn, and just last week I had the opportunity to discuss the matter with both sides in Seoul. I do not think the opposition will gather 10 million signatures, but the fact that the drive got under way and continues seems significant. The ruling party states flatly that it will not countenance reform in the two years remaining before President Chun's term expires; its reasoning is contained in detail in the document I cited a few moments ago. On the other hand, the numbers of individuals jailed for political reasons is significant, and constant persuasion from the United States will be a factor in the reduction of such jailings and the ultimate elimination of incarceration for political reasons.

9. **A Congressional Resolution on democracy:** At present, a Congressional Resolution on the subject of democratization in Korea would be harmful, and not helpful. Whatever the intent, I believe such a Resolution would justifiably be interpreted as a significant intervention in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Korea. It would, in effect, be a slap in the face of a valued friend, ally and partner of the United States. Moreover, at a time when trade frictions between the two countries are growing and the specter of protectionism, especially in Congress, looms as a factor of growing importance, our Korean friends would interpret it in the worst possible way. Should we attempt to inject a dose of destabilization into the Korean political situation? Shouldn't we have due

regard for the impact of our actions in the strategic context of our own long-range national interests? Would we not run the risk of encouraging North Korea in its aggressive posture toward the South? Why try to undermine the prestige, if not the legitimacy, of the Chun government? These and many other questions spring to mind when one suggests such a Congressional Resolution; if one believes in the efficacy of such resolutions, why not direct them toward the People's Republic of China, Vietnam or North Korea, countries where there isn't a scintilla of evidence that democracy in any form exists and murderous regimes systematically visit state tyranny upon their peoples, and which certainly are countries within the purview of this Subcommittee and the Congress.

10 and 11. The North-South dialogue has become an important ingredient in the policies of both South Korea and North Korea, as well as a factor in regional peace and stability. The process is a fascinating one, and has its own internal dynamics. As far as Seoul is concerned, a broad range of initiatives designed to engage the North is seen as a way to warm the atmosphere, and this process certainly reflects the maxim that it is better to talk than to fight. I do not believe that any genuine progress has been achieved, but I do believe the process is important and that its continuation serves Korean interests as well as our own. Even though the talks are occasionally set back by a North Korean refusal to meet because of an alleged provocation, such as the recent postponement because of the Team Spirit joint military exercise between U.S. and R.O.K. military forces, it is just possible that persistence may pay off and the North may negotiate seriously on one or more issues, such as family reunification.

I was in Korea to witness the first shipments of "flood relief" supplies to the South in September 1984, and I happened to be in Seoul on the

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occasion of the first "family reunions" in the two capitals. One cannot underestimate the emotional, much less the international political significance, of such encounters. After forty years of ingrained hostility and total isolation, we should not expect North Korea to thaw quickly. The process is complicated and tortuous, and while the United States can encourage and assist, it must do so in full, complete and honest consultation with our Korean partners in Seoul. We do not have an independent mission to establish a bilateral relationship with the North, as a few have suggested; such a move would be resented and misunderstood, and North Korea would attempt to exploit it to the detriment of the Republic of Korea and the United States.

At present, North Korea is engaged in a serious and substantial attempt to undermine the 1988 Olympics to be held in Seoul by spreading uncertainty about the prospects for the safety of the participants. In a series of broadcasts and articles, as well as by an activist diplomacy aimed at East and West alike, Pyongyang has developed a bizarre line of argument which the Members of the Subcommittee may already have heard and seen. I offer a copy of a recent Pyongyang broadcast to that effect, but I do not suggest its inclusion in the Record.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, the Republic of Korea is a valued friend of the United States. It is not a perfect democracy and does not claim to be, but it actively seeks ways to increase and deepen the relationship between itself and this country. The tradition of Korean-American friendship is more than one hundred years old; during the Korean War, more than 50,000 American lives were sacrificed in the resistance against Communist aggression; during the Vietnam conflict, Koreans fought alongside American troops, and suffered substantial losses.

We now maintain 40,000 highly trained troops in Korea, and these serve as the visible guarantee for Korea's security and that of northeast Asia.

Korea has, by virtue of hard work and sheer diligence, become this country's seventh most important trading partner. Strains in the existing relationship are likely to increase in this sector in the future, and we will need patience to resolve them. Korea now has a trade surplus with the U.S., but it does not even approach that of Japan's surplus, and in the case of Korea is offset by other current account items (investment income, etc.) in our favor. By the same token, many sectors of Korea's economy remain closed, or fortified by obstacles, to increased U.S. market access.

The relationship between our countries is maturing, and the persuasive appeal of democracy is having an impact. I do not believe we should artifically force this pace, but neither should we dismantle the drive to expand and deepen the roots of democracy. I believe that what eventually will emerge in Korea will be a real democracy, although it may not resemble in every detail the democracy that we enjoy.

I also believe that the policies of the Reagan Administration have been working; that stability on the relationship between the countries has been enhanced; that the military balance can best be kept through continued FMS support to the ROK; that there will be an historic peaceful political transition in March 1988; and that as Korea enters the decade of the 1990s, we will be able to look back with considerable pride upon having assisted a nation once virtually destroyed, overrun and occupied by hostile powers to have entered upon the world stage as an important actor.

Witl. patience and understanding, coupled with a farsighted policy, this will be the future for our friends in Korea.

The Heritage Foundation **Backgrounder**

214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202)546-4400

3/5/86 Number 7

MEMO TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS: SOUTH KOREA IS NO PHILIPPINES

(Updating Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 22, "Kim Dae Jung Tests Seoul and Himself," January 25, 1985)

Escalating political tensions between the ruling and opposition parties in the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) have led some Americans to draw an analogy between the ROK and the Philippines and to call for U.S. intervention to promote greater democracy in South Korea. However, fundamental differences between the political situation in South Korea and the Philippines argue against direct U.S. involvement in the South Korean political debate.

In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos was president for twenty years and demonstrated in the February 7 elections that he had no intention of relinquishing power. The hallmark of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan's administration, by contrast, has been his often repeated pledge to step down at the end of his seven-year term in 1988. This would allow the first peaceful transfer of executive power in South Korea's 38-year history.

In stark contrast to the corruption, cronyism and economic mismanagement of the Marcos government, Chun is given credit by supporters and critics alike for the honesty of his Administration and for his effective economic policies. While the Philippine gross national product (GNP) has shrunk 6 percent since 1981, and Filipinos bring home an annual per capita income of only about $600, South Korea's GNP has grown by over 27 percent during the same period, and its people enjoy a per capita income of more than $2,000. Indeed, the vigor of South Korea's economy and the quality of its products worry even Japan.

Another key difference between the Philippines and ROK is that there is no communist insurgency in South Korea drawing strength from popular dissatisfaction with corrupt authories.

For the above and other reasons, the U.S. would be ill-advised to use a Philippine model to devise policy options toward the ROK.

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

The current debate in South Korea, that has attracted attention, has focused on whether to amend the constitution. The main opposition New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) demands a constitutional amendment mandating direct election of the president in 1988. Chun and his backers favor retaining the current constitutional provisions for an electoral college system. This debate over the upcoming presidential election process, however, is just part of a larger political drama. The NKDP hopes to use the issue to win popular and foreign support for its efforts to revise the entire constitution.

The Chun administration claims, with some justification, that the ROK's history of political confrontation stems largely from the frequency with which Korean constitutions have come and gone. Indeed, the current constitution is the fifth in fewer than four decades. Chun wants to bring order and stability to South Korean politics and to avoid the chaos that has characterized power transitions in the past.

Last month, Chun proposed that the question of constitutional revision be postponed until after the 1988 election. He recommended that his government and opposition leaders concentrate instead over the next three years on issues such as economic development, the ongoing reunification talks with North Korea, the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, and the peaceful transition of power in 1988. He called for the immediate creation of constitutional revision committees in the National Assembly and within the government to study and recommend constitutional changes which could be considered after the 1988 election.

Although at present the ROK government and the NKDP seem to be at an impasse over these issues, a compromise package likely will emerge in the future. As important as the outcome of the ongoing dispute is the negotiation process itself. As events in the Philippines have shown, a direct presidential election does not in itself guarantee "democracy." Neither is democracy simply a political system spelled out in a detailed constitution. It is, rather, a process that allows citizens to choose fairly their leaders. And it is a state of mind that allows differing views to achieve consensus on important national issues. This is the real challenge facing the ROK.

The next several years will be crucial to South Korea's political development. But the U.S. must give the South Koreans the freedom to resolve their own political differences. Washington's policy should be to continue to encourage dialogue between the government and the opposition. Unnecessary U.S. involvement could jeopardize a peaceful resolution because both sides might harden their positions in expectation of American support. Quite unlike the last days of the Marcos era, this is a situation calling for U.S. patience and noninvolvement.

Daryl N. Plunk
Policy Analyst

THE ECONOMIST
22-28 MARCH 1986

A long way from Manila

President Chun's South Korea is not as precarious as Mr Marcos's Philippines was

Great cases made bad law, said Oliver Wendell Holmes. He might have been predicting last month's democratic takeover in the Philippines, a great event that has been producing a stream of bad deductions about other countries. The "next Philippines" most widely talked about is South Korea. The comparison does not, except in one way, make sense. But it has fired the South Korean opposition and visiting American congressmen, and has rattled the government of President Chun Doo Hwan.

What makes people think Manila when they hear Seoul is the lack of a democratic hand-over in South Korea for the past quarter of a century. President Chun took power in a military coup in 1980, a year after his predecessor was murdered by his intelligence chief. In 1981 Mr Chun was confirmed in office in an indirect election that the press could not report accurately because it was censored, and his main opponents could not contest because they were in jail, in exile or banned from politics. The president now has students demonstrating in the streets and an opposition-led campaign for the direct election of the next president in 1988.

Like the Philippines, and unlike other authoritarian regimes in East Asia, South Korea has a plausible (if divided) democratic opposition waiting in the wings. Its Christian churchmen, following the Philippine example, are pressing the government to accept the opposition's demands. And, if President Reagan's recent words about right-wing dictators are any guide (see page 24), South Korea might soon feel some American heat. How like Mr Marcos is President Chun?

Not much. The first difference is that Mr Chun's government has not lost its credibility. There is no cronyism in South Korea and little corruption. A straitlaced society, South Korea has none of the gross inequalities that were graphically brought out in the Marcoses' home videos. Mr Chun's early years in power, 1980-83, were pretty brutal. But since then most political prisoners have been freed, opposition politicians (except for Mr Kim Dae Jung, who matters most) can politic, and the press can say more than it used to. Mr Chun zigzags in his observance of democracy, but he did not tamper with the results of last year's parliamentary election, which displeased both him and the army.

Generals and growth

The second difference is that Korea's army is both competent and undivided: it backs Mr Chun and deeply distrusts the democratic opposition. In North Korea, whose border is only 30 miles from Seoul, it faces one of the world's most wild-eyed and heavily-armed regimes. That fact, and the 40,000 American soldiers in South Korea, would also temper any American inclination to lean on Mr Chun.

A third difference is that South Korea's economy has gone on booming while the Philippines stumbled. Between 1962 and 1984 Korea's real GNP grew by an average of 8¼% a year. Growth slowed to 5% last year, but should bounce back to 8% in 1986 with inflation still below 5%. South Korea has made a successful transition from farm to factory, and both parts of its economy still prosper. Its GNP per person was a twentieth of Japan's only a quarter of a century ago; now Korea is ready for OECD membership.

The Korean economy has its flaws, including big companies with too much debt and banks with shaky loans. Many of these problems are the result of Korea's successful Japan-like industrialisation policy, which relied on government-directed cheap bank credit for conglomerates producing for export. Mr Chun's achievement has been to recognise that as South Korea moves out of shipbuilding and into chips it must become a more decentralised economy, with liberalised financial markets, unprotected domestic markets and a leading role for entrepreneurs.

What Mr Chun may also have grasped, but his generals have not, is the dilemma that plagues all non-democrats, in Seoul or Moscow: that economic liberation is not divisible from political liberation. If South Korea is to keep renewing its economic miracle, the middle-class Koreans running computer companies in California need to feel just as comfortable in Seoul. The Korean opposition is not asking for Mr Chun's overthrow: it is asking for an ordinary, everybody-can-vote presidential election in 1988. President Chun and the Americans ought to be quietly telling South Korea's soldiers that the opposition is right. The country's stability, and its immunity against North Korea, will grow if the voters know that their next president will be the one they elected with their own votes. The inappropriate shadow of Mr Ferdinand Marcos will have done South Korea a service if it brings that about.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1986

The Korean Campaign

At the moment, the itinerant political reformers of the U.S. left are preoccupied trying to figure out where they stand on the invasion of Honduras and the maltreatment of Muammar Qadhafi by the U.S. Navy. But we know, just as sure as anything, that when all that dies down they will get back to a special project, South Korea.

Some of them, who seem to have formed their ideas of modern Korea by watching ancient reruns of "M*A*S*H," already have lavished attention on President Chun Doo Hwan. Robert White, the Carter-era scourge of El Salvador, and Rep. Thomas Foglietta (D., Pa.) showed up in South Korea not long ago to declare solidarity with the political opposition. In Washington, Rep. David Obey (D., Wis.) attacked an administration request for more military loans to South Korea because, he said, it doesn't meet his standards of political tolerance.

The press is playing easy analogy, meanwhile, hinting that South Korea is going the way of "the Philippines," which has now supplanted "the shah" as Washington's favorite word-association.

Forgive us if we offer a few caveats. For starters, South Korea is not the Philippines. It is not Iran. The Seoul government has been steadily liberalizing since 1981. It held a National Assembly election last year in which the opposition won 40% of the seats; the "contras" of South Korea hold elected office. Mr. Chun also promises to step down in 1988, in what would be Korea's first peaceful transition in decades.

The economy, unlike that of Mr. Marcos's Philippines, is robust and increasingly modern. It grew by some 9% last year. As for human rights, the State Department's annual report, issued in February, says this: "Koreans enjoy considerable personal freedom, including economic and religious freedom and broad rights to pursue private interests." Tell that to the Miskito Indians.

We don't want to apologize for Mr. Chun's excesses, nor do we entirely buy the line so often expressed by South Korean leaders over the years, that having a hard-line North Korean enemy a few miles from Seoul forces a certain degree of authoritarianism. Indeed, we're sure South Korea's well-educated and mostly conservative citizens could handle far more political debate than they're allowed. The problem for the U.S., however, is how best to encourage more freedom. We doubt it's by cutting military aid or raising fists with the opposition.

Mr. Chun, after all, knows what's at stake. His country is hosting the Olympics in 1988 and the Asian Games this year. The last thing he wants is riots or stories about repression. When political tension was running especially high last month, Mr. Chun met with opposition leaders and promised to consider amending the constitution to allow direct presidential elections in 1988. The opposition wants direct elections before 1988, however, so it can have a greater say in choosing Mr. Chun's successor. The two sides are going to have to work out some compromise, but this doesn't look to us like something Americans, and especially the American left, should settle.

Old "M*A*S*H" reruns to the contrary, South Korea is a dynamic society with a cautious government struggling to accommodate growing demands for political freedom. American reformers would win a great deal more sympathy from us if they focused more on regimes that rank at the bottom of the human-rights scale. But of course those just happen to be regimes of the left.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen. I appreciate very much hearing your testimony. We will now hear from Professor Lee.

STATEMENT OF PROF. CHONG SIK-LEE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me again. The next time, I wish you would tell me who your speechwriter is so that we will not have the same person write both of our speeches.

I have submitted a prepared statement, but in view of the time restrictions you have imposed I should like to summarize

The Republic of Korea is at a critical juncture today. It has been 6 years since Gen. Chun Doo Hwan assumed power, hoisting the lofty aim of creating a new society where all the corrupt practices of the past would be eradicated and mutual trust and justice would prevail. He also pledged to establish the tradition of peaceful transfer of power, and by reforming the political culture in Korea, create an environment where democracy would take root.

I shall skip the section on the nature of political struggle in Korea because you are already familiar with it. The Government has been arguing that because of the threat from the north, South Korea could not afford a full-scale democracy, and that only a restrictive democracy will guarantee the security and prosperity of Korea. And on the other hand, the opposition argues that the Korean people are sophisticated enough to rule by themselves without artificial barriers imposed by self-appointed military leaders, and that democracy is the best defense against totalitarian communism.

It should be noted that these arguments are exchanged in an atmosphere of harsh struggle. The Government employed all the means at its disposal, including police power, to suppress the opposition. The press has been hamstrung by severe restrictions imposed on it. Those opposed to the Government, of course, lack physical force, but an increasing number of them have been willing to risk arrest and confinement to confront the Government.

How can the impasse be resolved? What lies ahead? And what should be the United States policy toward South Korea under this situation?

It seems obvious to me that harsh conflict will continue for the foreseeable future unless some form of compromise is reached soon. The Government, of course, has the option of imposing martial law and cracking down against all those opposed to it. But such a measure would bring about only a temporary respite. South Korea has experienced too many martial laws, and the people are too sophisticated for naked force to be effective for long. A more fundamental solution is needed.

One of the most serious problems the Government faces is that the argument for restrictive democracy has become increasingly less credible. The people have long been tolerant of various restrictions imposed by succeeding governments because of the perceived threat from the north, but the consensus has been eroding as international environment has moderated; more and more people are becoming cynical about repeated pronouncements from the Govern-

ment, perceiving them as self-serving propaganda of those in power. This tendency is particularly pronounced among the post-Korean war generation which now constitutes a majority of the Korean population.

A more fundamental problem, however, has been that the Chun government failed to win the respect and trust of the people. President Chun and his military cohorts have not overcome the stigma of the Kwangju incident of May 1980 when a large number of demonstrators were killed. The new just society that General Chun had promised failed to materialize. In fact, there have been numerous grand scale scandals under the Chun regime. While President Park had gained respect and popularity through the recordbreaking pace of economic development, President Chun could not repeat such a feat. As the 1985 general election for the National Assembly has indicated, the voters clearly want a change. Increasing number of people are becoming more sympathetic to the students who have been presenting more and more radical slogans.

The Government's argument for restrictive democracy has lost its force also because of the tremendous socio-economic change that South Korea has experienced since the 1960's. South Korea is no longer a typical underdeveloped country where the military constitutes the best educated, best organized, and best trained in managerial skill. The days are past when the Government monopolized the best and the brightest and could overwhelm the rest of the society through prestige and power.

The country has been exposed to numerous electoral campaigns since its liberation in 1945 and the people have become politically sophisticated. They now take government pronouncements with a grain of salt, having experienced the fall of the Rhee and Park governments which were followed by an outpouring of exposures and denunciations. In short, Korea has passed the stage when the military could assert the right to guide Korea's democracy.

I believe what Korea needs now is a leadership which can stimulate creativity and build consensus rather than control and direct.

How well will democracy function in Korea when restrictions are lifted? This is a question that does not render itself to an easy answer. There are two factors to be considered, one with respect to political parties, and the other with the role of the military.

Political parties in Korea have only a fragile foundation in part because of the restrictions imposed by various regimes. The people, on the other hand, loathe political wrangling among political personalities and groups. The memory of the democratic interlude between the student revolt of April 1960 and the military coup of May 1961 is still fresh in the minds of the people. Unless the opposition leaders manage to avoid the errors of their predecessors of the early 1960's, they will quickly lose people's support once they are installed to power.

The problem is particularly serious because of the recent history of military intervention in civilian politics. As the military coups led by Generals Park and Chun clearly indicated, a significant number of professional military officers hold the civilian politicians in contempt and question their overall qualifications to be national leaders. Temptations will remain high for military officers to inter-

vene again, particularly if the Government under civilian leaders flounders.

Thus, the success of democracy in Korea will depend very much on its ability to produce effective leaders who command and sustain the respect and support of a wide segment of the population. If Korea is to avoid military coups and establish a tradition of peaceful transfer of power, the system must also be flexible enough so that a floundering leader can be replaced by another person before self-appointed leaders take the matter into their own hands.

The Koreans alone, of course, should decide the future of the political system in Korea. But it is a matter that should concern American political leaders also. Given the close alliance relationship between Korea and the United States, political stability in Korea is a legitimate concern for American leaders. But since the Kwangju incident of May 1980, many Koreans implicated the United States with various acts of the Korean military, giving rise to anti-Americanism among certain segments of the Korean population. President Reagan's unqua'ified support for President Chun also created the impression that the United States is impervious to whatever injustice the Korean people may suffer as long as its security and business interests are protected.

The arson incident at the USIS in Pusan in March 1982 and the occupation of the USIS Library in Seoul in May 1985 must be seen in this light. Repeated assertions by U.S. representatives to the contrary have had little effect so far. This is why I believe the United States should play a more active role in the Korean domestic scene offering whatever advice and assistance that may be appropriate.

Anti-Americanism in Korea, to be sure, is confined to only a small segment of the students today. A vast majority of the Koreans appreciate the U.S. role during the Korean War and they consider the presence of the U.S. forces essential to their security. The United States has also been projected in the past as a staunch supporter of democracy in Korea. But the Kwangju incident and subsequent actions by the Reagan administration cast doubt on U.S. motives in Korea.

As you will recall, President Chun was one of the first to be invited to the Reagan White House, and it took place not very long after the martial law command brutally suppressed the student uprising in Kwangju. Given this background and the close relationship between the U.S. forces in Korea and the Korean military, the United States can be blamed again and anti-Americanism intensified if military involvement in civilian politics is prolonged. This is why the United States needs to pay serious attention to the Korean domestic scene and particularly the role of the military within it.

The United States' aim in Korea should be to establish a political structure that would assure long-term political stability. The new structure, which I hope will last well past the year 2000, should be based on as wide a consensus as possible incorporating the interests and perspectives of all major socio-political groups.

Given these aims, I should like to make several specific recommendations:

First, the United States should encourage the Korean leaders to amend the constitution as soon as possible. Both the Government

and opposition parties agree on the need for an amendment, but the difference on timing has created a political confrontation. Considering the approach of 1988 when Seoul will host the International Olympics, it is necessary to eliminate the source of instability as soon as possible.

Second, the United States should encourage the Korean leaders to adopt a political structure that would attain a maximum degree of consensus and promote creativity. These requirements cannot be fulfilled unless the freedom of the press is restored and the role of the legislature elevated.

Third, the United States should provide whatever assistance necessary so that the military elements would not be tempted to interject themselves into civilian politics while in uniform. Here, I emphasize "while in uniform."

Fourth, the United States should encourage the institution of local autonomy in Korea. This would reduce the responsibility of the central government, provide a training ground for political leadership, permit diversity and creativity, and dissipate the political energy concentrated in the capital.

Fifth, the United States should also encourage the maintenance of judicial independence from politics. The courts have lost much respect during the past several years contributing to rising cynicism among the people toward the entire political system. Judicial independence is the first step toward the protection of human rights.

Sixth, the United States should encourage the Korean leaders to improve the condition of the urban poor. Political stability cannot be obtained if a large segment of the population has no stake in its preservation.

The Republic of Korea is an important ally of the United States. It is a country where many Americans shed their blood in the name of defending democracy. It is a dynamic country that can make important contributions to the maintenance of peace and prosperity in the Pacific region, and is an important trade partner of the United States. I hope its leaders can lead the country to a stable democracy that will win the respect of their own people and that of the world. I strongly urge that the United States render whatever assistance that is necessary to bring this about.

Thank you very much.

[Professor Lee's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHONG SIK-LEE, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Republic of Korea is at a critical juncture today. It has been six years since General Chun Doo Hwan assumed power hoisting the lofty aim of creating a new society where all the corrupt practices of the past would be eradicated and mutual trust and justice would prevail. He also pledged to establish the tradition of peaceful transfer of power, and by reforming the political culture in Korea, create an environment where democracy would take root.

The Nature of Political Struggle in Korea

The attention today is focused on one of his promises, that is, the peaceful transfer of power. His opponents argue that the present constitution would not permit a meaningful peaceful transfer of power, and hence its provisions concerning presidential election should be amended before President Chun's term expires in 1988. While agreeing that a constitutional amendment is desirable, President Chun and his followers argue that it should be brought about in 1989 after a new leadership has been installed under the present constitution. The government insists that the talk of constitutional revision now would only create instability. Both sides are adamant on their respective positions and emotions run high, raising concerns that the prolonged confrontation could lead to political turbulence.

The struggle in Korea today is very intense because the two sides hold clashing views on the degree of democracy Korea should have and who should govern. The basic position of those in power has been that given the threat from the Communist north, Korea could not afford a full-scale democracy, and that only a restrictive democracy will guarantee its security and prosperity. They argue that Western style democracy will produce nothing but chaos

and disorder. They regard Kim Dae-Jung as the epitome of mob rule. This is presumably why General Chun Doo Hwan and his military cohorts intervened in 1980, instituted the present constitution, and had sentenced Kim Dae-Jung to death. That's also why the Legislative Council appointed by the martial law regime in 1980 passed so many laws restricting various forms of freedoms. Those in power are evidently determined to sustain the present structure at least until 1989, a year after installing a new leader under the present framework.

Those in the opposition argue that the Korean people are sophisticated enough to rule by themselves without artificial barriers imposed by self-appointed military leaders, and that democracy is the best defense against totalitarian communism. They point to the era of Korean war when the Korean people enjoyed much more freedom. They argue that the present leadership lacks legitimacy and integrity, and is incapable of motivating the people to work for stronger economy and defense. They also point to the very serious side-effects of military intervention in civilian politics, one of them being the widening chasm between the military and civilian population.

It should be noted that these arguments are exchanged in an atmosphere of harsh struggle. The government employed all the means at its disposal, including police power, to suppress the opposition. The press has been hamstrung by severe restrictions imposed on it. Those opposed to the government, of course, lack physical force, but an increasing number of them have been willing to risk arrest and confinement to confront the government.

How can the impasse be resolved? What lies ahead? And what should be the U.S. policy toward South Korea under this situation?

It seems obvious to me that harsh conflict will continue for the foreseeable future unless some form of compromise is reached soon. The government, of course, has the option of imposing martial law and cracking down against all those opposed to it. But such a measure would bring about only a temporary respite. South Korea has experienced too many martial laws, and the people are too sophisticated for naked force to be effective for long. A more fundamental solution is needed.

One of the most serious problems the government faces is that the

argument for restrictive democracy has become increasingly less credible. The people have long been tolerant of various restrictions imposed by succeeding governments because of the perceived threat from the north, but the consensus has been eroding as international environment has moderated; more and more people are becoming cynical about repeated pronouncements from the government, perceiving them as self-serving propaganda of those in power. This tendency is particularly pronounced among the post-Korean War generation which now constitutes a majority of the Korean population.

A more fundamental problem, however, has been that the Chun government failed to win the respect and trust of the people. President Chun and his military cohorts have not overcome the stigma of the Kwangju Incident of May 1980 when a large number of demonstrators were killed. The new "just society" that General Chun had promised failed to materialize. In fact, there have been numerous grand scale scandals under the Chun regime. While President Park had gained respect and popularity through the record-breaking pace of economic development, President Chun could not repeat such a feat. As the 1985 general election for the National Assembly has indicated, the voters clearly want a change. Increasing number of people are becoming more sympathetic to the students who have been presenting more and more radical slogans.

Socio-Economic Context

The government's arguments for restrictive democracy has lost its force also because of the tremendous socio-economic change that South Korea has experienced since the 1960s. South Korea is no longer a typical underdeveloped country where the military constitutes the best educated, best organized, and best trained in managerial skill. Korea boasts one of the highest ratio of college graduates per capita in the world, and the population as a whole is fairly well educated. Skilled managers are everywhere to be seen. The days are past when the government monopolized the best and the brightest and could overwhelm the rest of the society through prestige and power.

The country has been exposed to numerous electoral campaigns since its liberation in 1945, and the people have become politically sophisticated. They now take government pronouncements with a grain of salt, having expe-

rienced the fall of the Rhee and Park governments which were followed by an outpouring of exposures and denunciations. The country is also permeated with all forms of news media, including television and radio. While the Chun government did impose a very strict control over the mass media, the people began to read between the lines and give more credence to rumors.

In short, Korea has passed the stage where the military could assert the right to "guide" Korea's democracy. The country has lived under two generals for a quarter of a century since 1961, and the majority of people are ready for a change. In my opinion, any attempt to sustain the present form of government will prolong instability and may even create turbulence.

I believe what Korea needs now is a leadership which can stimulate creativity and build consensus rather than control and direct. The country is too developed and its economy too complex for any leader to rule by fiat. It needs to devote more of its energy to eradicating social problems introduced by the growth-oriented economy rather than being absorbed by strife for power. Although one could produce a long list of social problems, I should like to mention only one, i.e. the growth of a large body of urban poor who feel alienated from the rapidly developing economy. This problem, of course, is not unique to Korea, but nonetheless it is a problem that deserves special attention in assessing political stability in Korea and the United States' relations to it.

Prospects of Democracy in Korea

How well will democracy function in Korea when restrictions are lifted? This is a question that does not render itself to an easy answer. There are two factors to be considered, one with respect to political parties, and the other with the role of the military.

Political parties in Korea have only a fragile foundation in part because of the restrictions imposed by various regimes. Parties in South Korea are a mere conglomeration of those who aspire to power. Personal and group rivalries are intense and ruthless. There is a very low degree of tolerance for rivals and opponents, and the rights of the minority are often ignored. The politics in Korea have been a zero-sum game, the winner taking all and granting none to the defeated. In the Korean context, where the

government plays a very large role in its economy, this constitutes a serious problem. Even those in the opposition today share many of these traits.

The people, on the other hand, loathe political wrangling among political personalities and groups. The memory of the democratic interlude between the student revolt of April 1960 and the military coup of May 1961 is still fresh in the minds of the people. Being suddenly thrust into poer in 1960, the Democrats openly engaged in unseemly intraparty struggles during that period. This is also why a large number of Koreans tolerated President Park's dictatorship even when he committed some excesses. The people have high respect for strong leadership even if the leader could not be called democratic by Western standards. Unless the opposition leaders manage to avoid the errors of their predecessors of the early 1960s, they will quickly lose people's support once they are installed to power.

The problem is particularly serious because of the recent history of military intervention in civilian politics. As the military coups led by Generals Park and Chun clearly indicated, a significant number of professional military officers hold the civilian politicians in contempt and question their overall qualifications to be national leaders. Temptations will remain high for military officers to intervene again, particularly if the government under a civilian leader flounders.

Thus, the success of democracy in Korea will depend very much on its ability to produce effective leaders who command and sustain the respect and support of a wide segment of the population. If Korea is to avoid military coups and establish a tradition of peaceful transfer of power, the system must also be flexible enough so that a floundering leader can be replaced by another person before self-appointed leaders take the matter into their own hands.

U.S. Aims in Korea

The Koreans alone, of course, should decide the future of the political system in Korea. But it is a matter that should concern American political leaders also. Given the close alliance relationship between Korea and the United States, political stability in Korea is a legitimate concern for

American leaders. But since the Kwangju Incident of May 1980, many Koreans implicated the United States with various actions of the Korean military, giving rise to anti-Americanism among certain segments of the Korean population. President Reagan's unqualified support for President Chun also created the impression that the United States is impervious to whatever injustice the Korean people may suffer as long as its security and business interests are protected. The arson incident at the USIS in Pusan (March 1982) and the occupation of the USIS Library in Seoul in May 1985 must be seen in this light. Repeated assertions by U.S. representatives to the contrary have had little effect so far. This is why I believe the United States should play a more active role in the Korean domestic scene offering whatever advice and assistance that may be appropriate.

Anti-Americanism in Korea, to be sure, is confined to only a small segment of the students today. A vast majority of the Koreans appreciate the U.S. role during the Korean War and they consider the presence of the U.S. forces essential to their security. The United States has also been projected in the past as a staunch supporter of democracy in Korea. But the Kwangju incident and subsequent actions by the Reagan Administration cast doubt on U.S. motives in Korea. As you will recall, President Chun was one of the first to be invited to the Reagan White House, and it took place not very long after the martial law command brutally suppressed the student uprising in Kwangju. Given this background and the close relationship between the US forces in Korea and the Korean military, the United States can be blamed again and anti-Americanism intensifed if military involvement in civilian politics is prolonged. This is why the United States needs to pay serious attention to the Korean domestic scene and particularly the role of the military within it.

The United States' aim in Korea should be to establish a political structure that would assure long-term political stability. The new structure, which I hope will last well past the year 2,000, should be based on as wide a consensus as possible incorporating the interests and perspectives of all major socio-political groups.

Recommendations

Given these aims, I should like to make several specific recommendations:

1. The United States should encourage the Korean leaders to amend the constitution as soon as possible. Both the government and opposition parties agree on the need for an amendment, but the difference on timing has created a political confrontation. Considering the approach of 1988 when Seoul will host the International Olympics, it is necessary to eliminate the source of instability as early as possible.

2. The United States should encourage the Korean leaders to adopt a political structure that would attain a maximum degree of consensus and promote creativity. These requirements cannot be fulfilled unless the freedom of the press is restored and the role of the legislature elevated.

3. The United States should provide whatever assistance necessary so that the military elements would not be tempted to interject themselves into civilian politics while in uniform.

4. The United States should encourage the institution of local autonomy in Korea. This would reduce the responsibility of the central government, provide a training ground for political leadership, permit diversity and creativity, and dissipate the political energy concentrated in the capital.

5. The United States should also encourage the maintenance of judicial independence from politics. The courts have lost much respect during the past several years contributing to rising cynicism among the people toward the entire political system. Judicial independence is the first step toward the protection of human rights.

6. The United States should encourage the Korean leaders to improve the condition of the urban poor. Political stability cannot be attained if a large segment of the population has no stake in its preservation.

The Republic of Korea is an important ally of the United States. It is a country where many Americans shed their blood in the name of defending democracy. It is a dynamic country that can make important contributions to the maintenance of peace and prosperity in the Pacific region, and is an important trade partner of the United States. I hope its leaders can lead the country to a stable democracy that will win the respect of their own people and that of the world. I strongly urge that the United States render whatever assistance that is necessary to bring about this situation.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Professor Lee. We will now hear from Mr. Baker.

Your statement will be included in the record in its entirety, and I do hope you will summarize lest the Presidential elections in South Korea be completed by the time you are finished. It was, I must say, a very comprehensive statement and we are grateful to you for putting as much time as you did into it. I would like to have some time for the questions.

Mr. BAKER. Sure. Can you hear me?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, very well.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. BAKER, PROFESSOR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. BAKER. Coming as the fourth witness has the disadvantage that the time limit is apt to be enforced against me, since those who have gone first have been able to speak a little bit longer. But it also had the advantage of having had many of the things that I would like to say already said.

I would like to point out that I agree with a great deal of what Professor Lee has said and what Congressman Foglietta has said, and that I disagree with a good deal of what Mr. Allen has said.

My prepared statement consists of 12 answers to written questions, the same questions that Mr. Allen responded to and I may summarize some of those if I have time. But I want to make a few points first, some of which are not in my statement but which I think are relevant to the matters being considered by these subcommittees.

I would like to point out that the constitutional amendment drive is calling for a number of changes in addition to the provision of direct election of the President, and some of them are very important. One is symbolically very important. Putting it into the constitution may not change things but it would be very important to have the constitution clearly state that the military was institutionally prohibited from participating in politics.

Another very important provision in this proposal is the establishment of a vice presidency. We all recall that in 1976 President Park said that if the citizens voted in a referendum against the Yushin Constitution he would resign immediately. This affected the outcome of the vote because it was not at all clear what would happen the day after President Park resigned.

Another provision in this proposed revision of the constitution is the abolition of the proportional representation system. This system has allowed the government party to control 55 percent of the votes in the National Assembly with only 35 percent of the popular votes. This is clearly an extremely important proposed change.

I have gotten some recent information which I was not able to incorporate into my statement. I received it from members of the distinguished delegation of New Korea Democratic Party, led by Mr. Kim Dae Jung, some of whose members are present in this room today. Mr. Kim informs me that there are at least three additional large rallies scheduled, one of them in the city of Taejon on April 19. April 19 is, of course, the anniversary of the 1960 student

revolution and a very important day in Korea. This should be something to watch.

I am also informed that to date there are 600,000 signatures gathered on the petition, that they hope and expect to reach 1 million by end of the month, and that their goal is to have 5 million signatures by August 15 which is National Liberation Day, the day that Japan surrendered at the end of World War II.

I have also learned that 43 Chun Nam University professors have issued a statement endorsing the constitutional amendment. This makes the fifth group of university professors to take a public stand. In recent years, Korean university professors have very rarely—except for a certain small group of individuals willing to go to jail—taken this kind of stand on any political issue.

I am informed also that of the people taken in in connection with the crackdown on the petition campaign 200 of the 235 students who were arrested are still being held, and there are 15 other citizens who were not students still being held in connection with that crackdown.

Congressman Foglietta mentioned the problem of censorship of the Armed Forces Korea Network. I would like to point out that, after Peter Jennings made his report on March 28, on the April 9 the Today Show interviewed Kim Dae Jung and interviewed Cory Aquino. This program was shown in its entirety by AFKN in Korea except for the Kim Dae Jung interview. People here called people in Korea and said watch the Today Show because Kim Dae Jung will be on it. Everything else was there, Kim Dae Jung was not.

I think that this censorship poses a real problem. First of all, the Americans who should be most concerned about what is going on in Korea are the ones who are there, and they are being deprived of this news on the ground that it is sensitive to the host country. I think that this is a deprivation of American citizens' right to know.

And, also, I think that this practice fosters anti-American feeling. It has been noted by several witnesses that the Korean people are well-educated and sophisticated. A great many of them have been abroad to study or live in the United States. If we are talking about the intelligentsia, it is a very high percentage. And these people know that when something big happens in Korea it makes the news in the United States. When a rally of 100,000 people occurs in Kwangju, they know that it was covered by the American reader. And they also know that the footage did not appear on AFKN.

The conclusion they draw is that this is being censored for the purpose of giving maximum support to the Chun government. This is not at all good for the United States. I would hope that this committee, or another committee if it is more appropriate, would pursue this matter and ask the administration to explain why this is being done.

I would also like to speak to the question of a resolution calling for the promotion of democracy in Korea. When the Asia Watch Mission went to Korea in the summer they were told by opposition figures that a Presidential statement would be much more effective, and I think that is probably true. But Asia Watch favors a Congressional resolution on the ground that this would help make it clear that important political forces in the United States wished

to see a U.S. policy which was more supportive of democracy in Korea.

I would note that yesterday there was a panel discussion between members of the opposition party delegation and several members of the Senate. Senator Kerry there spoke of the resolution he has sponsored along with others in the Senate—and which I believe is also being sponsored in the House by Congressman Feighan and Congressman Dixon of California—which calls for the replacing of the current climate of intimidation with a kind of national reconciliation, for restoration of the political and civil rights of Kim Dae Jung and all others whose rights are restricted, and the peaceful and fully democratic transfer of Presidential power in the Republic of Korea in the 1988 elections which should be open to all who are committed to the democratic process. When Senator Kerry spoke of this statement and his statement was translated, it clearly pleased the members of the delegation and they obviously regard it as helpful.

I would like to turn to one particular human rights abuse case that I think is extremely important to the United States as well as one of inherent interest to anyone who is concerned about human rights. A group of Koreans who studied in the United States have been put on trial for and convicted of espionage in January. Two of these young men who studied at Western Illinois University are under death sentence, two others serving life sentences and the other people have been sentenced to up to 15 years.

Western Illinois University is where Prof. Lee Jai Hyun, who was a very important witness in the Ethics Committee and Subcommittee on International Organization's investigations in 1977 and 1978, teaches journalism and he knew these people.

As far as we can tell, the only offensive thing that these people did was they attended the showing of a documentary film put together by Christian groups on Kwangju from news reel footage, Japanese, American and, I believe, German news reel footage. There may be other evidence but it has not been made public. There is a long history of espionage cases in Korea where the Government does not produce any evidence, and it is widely believed that these are prosecuted for purposes of political intimidation.

Now, the reason I think this is of particular importance to the United States is that, like the Chen Wen-Chen case in Taiwan, this is going to have, and is already having, a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression in the United States by Korean students studying here, and by Americans who are concerned about Korea and who have friends there or who may want to go there for academic or other reasons.

I have seen the film in question, I have shown it to groups and I have been asked by a Korean council general not to show that "North Korean film." That was before these people were sentenced to death. I think that this prosecution makes an unreasonable interference with the academic freedom and freedom of expression in the United States. And I think it has been quite deliberately done to chill discussion in the academic community.

I have a lot more to say, but I have used a lot of time already. I would like, if I may, ask a question of Mr. Allen.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, around here, Mr. Baker, it is usually the Members of Congress who ask the questions.

Mr. BAKER. I see. I am sorry.

Mr. SOLARZ. However, since Mr. Allen is very accommodating I am sure after the hearing is over he will be happy to answer any questions you have in person or writing.

Mr. BAKER. OK.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is that the end of your testimony then?

Mr. BAKER. Yes; it is.

[Mr. Baker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. BAKER, PROFESSOR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

Thank you for holding these hearings, Chairman Solarz and Chairman Yatron. I welcome this opportunity to testify on the issue of human rights and democratization in the Republic of Korea. My name is Edward J. Baker, and I am Assistant Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. I have been a student of Korean affairs since 1966, when I served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Korea. I appear today on behalf of the Asia Watch, a human rights monitoring group on whose Executive Committee I serve.

The testimony which follows was prepared in response to specific questions posed by the Subcommittees.

1. Should the Congress approve the Administration's $230 million request for FMS credits to Korea?

The coming year is an extraordinarily important period for the future of democracy and stability in Korea. The United States should link any military assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK) with public statements indicating that democratization is integrally related to Korean stability and security, and is thus of paramount importance to U.S. national security interests. This Committee is familiar with the role played by the Korean armed forces in the coup of 1980 and their brutal suppression of popular resistance in the city of Kwangju in South Cholla Province. The ROK armed forces were used to stage a military coup by former President Park Chung Hee in 1961 and were used to suppress student demonstrations in 1971 and in 1980. It is widely believed in Korea today that soldiers from the Metropolitan Garrison Command -- wearing civilian clothes -- are used to break up student strikes and demonstrations.

Before providing security assistance to the Chun Government in the coming fiscal year, the United States should obtain an explicit guarantee that military forces will not be used to suppress peaceful political activities and the military will not intervene in the political process. If the military intervenes in politics or acts to suppress legitimate democratic activity, the U.S. should immediately suspend delivery of military articles. Similar conditions should be placed upon the $2.2 million in International Military Education and Training funds proposed for Korea.

Public expression of the United States' support for a peaceful, democratic transition of power in Korea and its expectation that the military will not intervene in such a process would go far in encouraging the efforts of Korean democrats, and in countering the growing anti-American sentiment among Korean students. The Congress could make a particular contribution in this area by linking U.S. military assistance to such conditions, and by calling upon the executive branch to publicly and regularly state the same.

2. Is the Republic of Korea a democracy? The Republic of Korea is not a democracy. Although democracies differ from each other in many ways, no polity can be called a democracy unless the people have a meaningful voice in their government. The people of the ROK have no such voice. According to the ROK report in the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985:

> Korea's Constitution and statutes, as well as its traditions, concentrate political power in the President, a concentration further intensified by the support the President enjoys from the military. The president and the members of the National Assembly are the only elected officials in Korea. Under the 1980 Presidential Election Law, the President is chosen by a popularly elected electoral college of at least 5,000 members. By law, presidential campaigns are brief and candidates severely restricted in campaigning, including the amount they may spend, the number of speeches they may deliver, and the number of publications they may distribute. In the 1981 presidential election these restrictions, together with the authorities' screening of electoral college candidates, resulted in the absence of effective opposition to the incumbent President Chun Doo Hwan, who won nearly unanimously.

It is opposition to this system of indirect election of the

president which is uniting Chun's political opponents and resulting in the rallies attended by up to 100,000 people which we have been reading about in our press recently. Is this system like our electoral college? The Department of State Country Report for 1985 makes it clear that it is not. I would add that only the names of the candidates for the elector -- not the names of candidates for president -- appear on the ballots. These candidates for elector are the "candidates severely restricted in campaigning" mentioned above. In addition to being unknown to the voters in most cases, these candidates are not bound to vote for any particular presidential candidate. This allows the kind of nearly unanimous vote which occured in 1981 and explains why this issue unites all who are critical of the government. This system deprives Korean voters of any chance to express their real preference at the polls. In view of the fact that the rules governing the ROK presidential elections were drawn up without any political give and take, the 1981 result was not a surprise.

The office of the ~~executive~~ president has enormous authority in Korea. The National Assembly, under a stacked electoral system which gave the government party 55 percent of the seats with 35 percent of the popular votes in last year's election, provides virtually no check on presidential authority. The National Assembly serves no more than as a sounding board for opposition concerns. The Department of State Country Report for 1985 states:

> The election law passed in 1981 provides for a proportional representation system that reserves 92 of the Assembly's 276 seats for members designated by the parties, with two-thirds of those seats awarded to the party gaining a plurality of the popular vote.

This quote implies that the political party which receives a plurality automatically receives those 61 seats, but that is not necessarily the case. In fact, the 61 at-large seats are allotted the party which wins seats in more of the 92 districts than any other party. Each voter votes for one candidate. The two candidates in each district who get the largest number of votes are elected. Thus, if in district A there are 3 candidates and one gets 95% of the votes, the second gets 3% and the third gets 2%, the first and second are elected. Clearly even if one party gets an overwhelming majority of the votes in 91 districts while a second party gets fewer but enough to elect its candidates in 92 districts, the party with fewer votes but more elected candidates will get the 61 at large seats assuring it of 52.4% of the seats. This might suggest that an able opposition party could win a majority by trying hard to win at least one more seat than the government party. This is a theoretical but unlikely possibility, given the government's enormous advantage. This is because the limited resources and legal restrictions on fund-raising make it almost impossible for the opposition party to be as well organized in every district as the government party.

Furthermore, all government officials, except the president and the National Assembly, are appointed by the executive branch. Even the heads of villages with a few hundred people are appointed by the central government. This gives the government party a ready-made campaign team -- a team whose members have the power to decide who gets such government benefits as access to fertilizer -- in every district. Additionally, I know from

personal experience that people are not confident that the voting process is secret.

When Ferdinand Marcos called for a snap election, he faced a situation in which whoever got the most votes was going to be elected. When he realized that Mrs. Aquino had a chance to win, he condoned or encouraged cheating, intimidiation, and even killing by his supporters in order to reduce votes for Aquino. President Chun and his party face no such difficulty. They have carefully crafted a system in which they can't lose. Chun was elected virtually unanimously and his party is in firm control of the National Assembly.

The powers of the courts are limited both legally and practically. The power to judge the constitutionality of laws, which was granted to the courts by the constitution of 1963, was taken away in the Yushin constitution of 1972. It was not restored in the constitution promulgated by the Chun regime in 1980. Instead this power is lodged in a constitutional committee composed of 9 members appointed by the president (3 are nominated by the National Assembly, 3 by the Chief Justice, and 3 by the President). There has been no decision on the constitutionality of a law in the five and a half years the consitution has been in force. The Chief Justice is appointed by the President "with the consent of the National Assembly," the other Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the President on the Chief Justice's recommendation, and all the other judges are appointed by the Chief Justice. The National Assembly's role in the judicial appointment process is limited to consenting to the appointment

of the Chief Justice.

Due process for the accused, especially in political cases, is severely limited by the judges' subordination to the executive. For example, in August, 1980 five Supreme Court Justices were forced to resign just before Kim Dae Jung's trial on a death penalty offence. Judges are constantly constrained by their fear of forced resignation or reassignment to remote and undesirable posts if they make the wrong decisions. A mission of the International Commission of Jurists in May 1979 concluded that there were only about twenty lawyers in the whole country willing to handle political cases and that most of these had been harassed or disciplined as a result, that the independence of the judiciary had been undermined to the point that the courts could not give a defendant in a political case a fair trail, and that no such defendant had been acquitted of all the charges against him since the enactment of the Yushin Constitution. Unfortunately this situation has not improved under Chun. Credible allegations of torture are ignored, exculpatory evidence is ignored, and defendants are ~~convictees~~ convicted on the basis of uncorroborated confessions. Clearly no person can speak critically of the government and then vindicate himself in court if prosecuted. In fact, the judiciary in political trials is something analogous to a sentencing machine.

Underpinning this undemocratic system is the role of the military in political life, and the demonstrated willingness of the government to use military force to prevent popular participation in the political life of the country.

The most important reforms necessary to restore democratic

government in Korea are to systematically enforce constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and end torture and abuse so that public debate and participation in political life can proceed. The single most important gesture which the Chun government could make would be to allow a full and free public debate on the subject of a revision of the constitution to provide for the direct election of the president. If the constitution were so amended to permit a genuine democratic election of the president, many Koreans believe that the issues of subordinating the military to civilian authority, the independence of the judiciary, the role of the National Assembly, and basic political freedoms could be successfully addressed. The Korean people deserve the opportunity to discuss this issue fully and see it decided in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. The U.S. government should do all it can to promote such a public discussion in the ROK.

3. What are the primary human rights problems in Korea, and what has been the trend over the past year? The period from 1984 through the first half of 1985 was one of relative liberalization, which saw the lessening of police presence on university campuses, the lifting of the ban on most opposition politicians and their participation in the National Assembly elections of February 1985, a reduction in long-term political detention and diminution in torture. Unfortunately, this relaxation signified less a change of heart than a change of strategy. When "liberalization" failed to pacify restive Korean campuses, tactic was abandoned. No longer faced with constant

riot police and plain clothes police harassment, students turned to bigger issues - responsibility for the Kwangju massacre, perceived US responsibility for Kwangju and support of dictatorship, and the establishment of democracy itself. The government responded by reversing its "campus autonomy" policy and once again began to send police into the campuses without waiting for a request from the school authorities. Student demonstrators were arrested by the hundreds. Brutal torture was inflicted on a number of student leaders and others. According to the report on the ROK in the 1985 Department of State Country Report:

> Reports of torture or cruel treatment in 1985 increased significantly over 1984. The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government insists that it has issued injunctions against it and that these are strictly enforced and violations sternly punished. Nontheless, there were credible reports of torture, such as that of an antigovernment youth activist who was subjected to torture while under police detention in September and reliable reports of three senior Korean journalists who were detained and beaten by security officials for breaking a government embargo on a new story.

The government has increasingly used the Draconian national security laws to bring charges against student activists, journalists, and other opposition figures. In a case of particular concern to the U.S., two young men who studied at Western Illinois University, Yang Dong-Hwa and Kim Song-Man have been sentenced to death on charges of espionage for North Korea. Two of their co-defendants, Hwang Tae-kwon, who studied at Western Illinois and is still enrolled at the New School for Social Research, and Kang Yong-ju, who studied at Chonnam National University in Kwangju, have been sentenced to life in

prison. Eleven others were given sentences ranging from 2 years to 15 years. The two sentenced to death are alleged to have been recruited by Mr. Suh Chung Kyung, described by the Korea Herald (1/22/86) as "publisher of an anti-Seoul daily based in New York." Mr. Suh maintains that he never met any of these men except Hwang, and that Hwang had not told him his name.

Interestingly, Western Illinois University is where Professor Jai Hyun Lee teaches. Professor Lee, a former diplomat who defected to the U.S., provided much valuable assistance to the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and the House and Senate Ethics Committees during the investigation of Korean influence peddling in 1977 and 1978. According to Professor Lee, the only "offense" committed by the Western Illinois students that he knew about was that they had attended a film documentary on the Kwangju massacre assembled by church groups from foreign news footage. Whether there was any evidence of crimes is unclear, but we do know that during the summer of 1985 the Korean Consulate in Chicago was making inquiries about the 1982 documentary showing and those in attendance. The case was announced in September with great fanfare by the Agency for National Security Planning, (formerly known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) and the sentences were announced on January 20, 1986.

I suggest that this case is of particular importance to the U.S. because, like the killing in Taiwan of Professor Chen Wen-jen of Carnegie Mellon University, this case has had and will have a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of speech and assembly on American campuses by Korean students and even Americans,

especially Korean Americans, who do not wish to get their Korean friends into trouble or who may wish to go to Korea for academic or other purposes. The documentary has been shown on campuses throughout the U.S. and is still in circulation. I urge the Committee to give special attention to this case.

House arrest has been repeatedly imposed on leading politicians, including the entire opposition in the National Assembly, to prevent them participating in the signature drive for a constitutional amendment. In this country we generally hear of the use of house arrest (a practice not sanctioned by Korean law) only when it is imposed on Korea's most famous proponent of democracy, Mr. Kim Dae Jung, who has been confined more than 10 times since he returned home in February 1985, but it is frequently used against others as well.

Hundreds of books and pamphlets have been officially banned, and the government has gathered up and destroyed thousands of publications and jailed many journalists and booksellers. The Creation and Criticism Company, a well-known intellectual publishing house, was deprived of its right to publish on December 9, 1985, after it published a volume with the same name as, and a similar format to, a quarterly the company has been forbidden to publish since it and 171 other periodicals were suppressed by the Chun government in 1980. It is not clear whether it was the resemblance to the forbidden periodical, as the government indicated, or the content of several articles on the Korean economy which caused the revocation of the company's registration. However, 2,853 people -- many of them prominent in

literary, artistic, academic, media, religious, legal, and political circles -- signed a petition to the government urging reconsideration in light of "the contribution to the development of our culture which the Creation and Criticism Company has made" and the belief that culture "is fundamentally something which developes on the basis of autonomy and diversity" and that this revocation "damages that basis and causes worry that our culture will be reduced to conformity."

Leading human rights figures such as Rev. Moon Ik Hwan have been arrested and jailed recently for supporting the democracy movement. The number of political prisoners increased dramatically in 1985. The National Council of Churches Human Rights Committee reported at the end of 1985 that some 800 persons were imprisoned during the year on political charges, of whom approximately 100 had been released. In the first three months of 1986, hundreds of additional people have been jailed, most of whom were released after brief periods of imprisonment.

I have gone into considerable detail on a couple of recent cases and generalized about a number of other areas. If the Committee wishes further detailed documentation, I refer you to the Asia Watch Report, Human Rights in Korea, published in January, 1986.

4. Compare the human rights situation in the ROK with the DPRK: The DPRK is an almost completely closed society, thus it is very difficult to evaluate the human rights situation there. The Asia Watch was not able to conduct a mission to North Korea, as we did in South Korea, thus the information on North Korean

human rights contained in our recent report is based on secondary sources. Nonetheless, some assessments can be made. The principal difference between the state of human rights in the two countries is that, while the government of South Korea harshly represses independent political activity by placing controls on the press, by repressing free labor activity, by jailing students and opposition politicians and by using force when necessary to suppress dissent, no such challenges to the government of Kim Il Sung are possible in North Korea. Political rights, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and demonstration do not exist, and participation in North Korea's political system is based on involvement in government organized and controlled mass organizations for women, workers, peasants, and children. It is impossible for us to know how many political prisoners there are in North Korea, though the number 200,000 is alleged by South Korean sources.

Asia Watch does not equate the abuses of human rights in North Korea with abuses of human rights in South Korea. The abuses are different, but in both cases they should be condemned as human rights violations and not because they are more horrendous than the abuses in the other half of the peninsula. Further, neither side's abuses should be condoned because they are less severe than the other's.

5. How stable is the Chun government and what is the impact of developments in the Philippines on the political situation in Korea? The Chun government has a complete monopoly of formal political power and of the instruments of force. There exists no

armed movement which threatens Chun's presidency and such a movement is almost inconceivable in light of the size and topography of the country and the centralized, homogenous nature of society.

The government's willingness to use violence to prevent challenges to its authority from students, workers, the media, and its political opposition has achieved a certain uneasy "stability". Such stability should not be confused with legitimacy, however. Chun's military coup, and particularly the bloody suppression of the democratic uprising in Kwangju in May 1980 (in which the government admits of 200 deaths and many believe over 2,000 civilians were killed) have assured that his government will never obtain legitimacy in the eyes of most Koreans.

The Korean people's dissatisfaction with the government was clearly demonstrated by the government party's poor showing in the February 12, 1985 National Assembly election. In spite of a near-monopoly on campaign resources it received only 35% of the popular vote. Meanwhile, the New Korea Democratic Party, which was hastily organized just before the election and had the support of Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, polled 30% and the older opposition party, the Democratic Korea Party, got almost 20%.

The increasingly frequent and radical student demonstrations, which now often include rock and gasoline bomb throwing, and the students' practice of occupying Korean government buildings or even U.S. facilities are another index of popular disaffection from the Chun regime and U.S. support of it.

The withdrawal of U.S. support for President Marcos and the victory for democratic forces in the Philippines has clearly encouraged the Korean democratic opposition. In the New York Times of March 13, Kim Dae Jung is quoted as saying:

> You have many dictatorships in Asia...But only in South Korea and the Philippines do you have people actively seeking democracy. They succeeded in the Philippines, and maybe we will succeed here.

In the Boston Globe of April 6, Kim Young Sam is quoted as saying:

> I hope [Chun] will not be a second Marcos....if he keeps on turning a deaf ear to the demands for democracy, he will have to flee the country.

The Korean government denies any parallels or similarity, and the Reagan Administration appears eager to dispel the notion that such developments are possible or desirable in South Korea. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Bernard Kalb, was quoted in the Korea Herald of March 7 as saying that

> The Philippines and (south) Korea are two very different countries....President Chun has promised to step down at the end of his term, less than two years from now, the economy is booming, the military is doing a very professional job of countering serious external threat....This sort of environment makes incremental progress possible....We have encouraged further democratization in Korea and we will continue to do so. In the same article Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfwitz was quoted as saying, "I think in Korea we have a truly extraordinary record of achievements, particularly economic achievements...along with that is a very impressive record of increasing self-reliance in the security fields....[in the field of political development] there have been some very promising steps....particularly the parliamentary elections of last year which I think were extraordinary for the degree of free and open political competition that they permitted...."

There are, of course, significant differences between South

Korea and the Philippines, but the comparison is a far more useful one than the parallels the administration has recently made between the Philippines and Nicaragua. I have already noted that there is no armed revolutionary movement and none is likely. The Korean army is much larger, better trained, better equipped and, as far as we know, less corrupt than the Philippine army was. It is Chun's power base and seems firmly under his control, though developments within the institution, such as Chun's own rise to power, cannot always be predicted. South Korea faces an external threat which almost all of its citizens fear, although they do not all agree on its imminence and how to deal with it. This makes internal upheaval less likely than in the Philippines.

There are cultural differences between Korea and the Philippines. Korea has a sinicized, Confucian culture. Confucianism, which was frequently cited as the cause of Korea's economic backwardness in the 1950's and 1960's, is now frequently said to be one reason for the so-called "economic miracle". Politically, it is usually said that Confucianism leads to a hierarchial, authoritarian system. This argument fails to recognize the importance of democratic ideology under Japanese rule and in post-World War II Korea. Moreover, historically, it was the right and duty of officials to remonstrate with the king and limit his arbitrary powers, making him in the words of Harvard historian Edward W. Wagner "primus inter pares". The Korean king's powers were clearly more limited than those of the Chinese emperor and may have been more limited than those of Presidents Park and Chun.

In the political realm, President Chun is pledged to step down while President Marcos seemed to want to stay in office indefinitely. It would be very difficult to imagine President Chun simply staying in power after 1988. He has insisted so often that he will step down if he tried to stay on there would surely be a popular uprising or a military coup. That being the case, it seems strange that he insists on postponing the constitutional amendment until after the 1988 presidential election but says his successor will amend and hold a new election in 1989.

Mr. Wolfowitz drew attention to the "free and open political competition" in the 1985 National Assembly election, implicitly comparing it with the violent, corrupt presidential campaign in the Philippines. There is a great difference in the systems, however. Under the National Assembly election system which I have described in my answer to question number 2, the Chun government had no reason to cheat or intimidate at the ballot box. It was almost certain to win control of the National Assembly and it did so with 35% of the votes. In contrast, Mr. Marcos was in a situation where he had to win the most votes or lose the election which led to the abuses in the campaign.

Economically, the ROK is certainly doing better than the Philippines, even though it also has some problems, including maldistribution of wealth. However, I believe that Marcos' economic problems, particularly after the assassination of Mr. Aquino, were exacerbated by his political problems. Foreign investors became leery and Filipinos, most notably Marcos himself, sent abroad the capital which should have been invested

at home. If the ROK's political situation continues to deteriorate, it too could affect the economy.

Korea's growing well-educated middle class, larger than the Philippine middle class, is frequently said to be unlikely to risk what it has for a more democratic political system. Perhaps, but it is also true that such people know that they can and should govern themselves and that they do not need a dictator.

One last difference is that Chun has the Olympics, which all Koreans want to succeed, as a rallying point. Marcos was frash out of rallying points. The importance of the Olympics should not be overstated, however. Mr. Kim Young Sam stated in the Boston Globe of April 6 as saying "[C]hanging the constitution is more important than holding the Olympic games."

The Philippines example can have enormous positive influence on the situation in Korea if the United States supports the analogy. President Chun should be explicitly apprised of the similarities between democratic aspirations of Koreans and Filipinos, and of U.S. antipathy to the suppression of those aspirations in Korea, as in the Philippines. Fear of Philippines-style democratic developments in Korea may engender increased government repression in South Korea. Democratic Koreans need U.S. support now more than ever.

6. What is the significance of the occupation of the USIS library in May 1985? The occupation of the USIS facility last spring was the most vivid example to date of increased anti-Americanism among students. It is important to note, however,

that the students entered the building peacefully and left it peacefully. They demanded that the U.S. acknowledge and apologize for its responsibility for the suppression of the Kwangju uprising by troops released by General John Wickham from the US-ROK Combined Command for that purpose. This demand should highlight for the United States the importance with which Koreans regard the Kwangju incident, and the seriousness of what is perceived as U.S. support for the massacre.

The outcome of the trials of students involved in the USIS occupation is also significant. In spite of the U.S. Embassy's request that the students be treated leniently and the Embassy staff's refusal to testify in court against the students, the government was anything but lenient with them. The USIS incident was used an excuse for police dragnets throughout Seoul; hundreds of students were detained, dozens of campuses were invaded by police, and student publications were confiscated by the thousands. Furthermore, the government threw the book at 20 students involved in the occupation. Harsh sentences were handed down on October 3, 1985, including one seven year prison term and several three to five year sentences. This incident was a turning point in the government's abandonment of its "campus autonomy" policy and a major factor in its proposal of a "campus stabilization law" which provided for detention in reeducation camps for up to six months without trial for errant students. This law provoked such an outcry that the bill has been shelved for the time being.

The severe crackdown on universities and the stiff sentences unfortunately demonstrate that the Chun government ignored the U.S. Embassy's well-meaning private representations on the USIS case.

7. What is Kim Dae Jung's political status? The government has not pardoned Mr. Kim, and his 20 year sentence remains suspended with 17-1/2 years to serve. Thus Kim Dae Jung remains subject to reincarceration to serve the remainder of his term. Under Korean law this means that his political and civil rights remain suspended until the government chooses to restore them, a step it can take any time. The legal suspension of political rights of 800 people has ended, but Kim Dae Jung and approximately 100 others remain restricted from political participation because they are under suspended jail sentences. Kim Dae Jung has been subjected to varying periods of house arrest over a dozen times since he returned to Korea a year ago. In February, the government also cut his phone lines and prevented people from visiting him during the political opposition's organization of the constitutional revision campaign.

What would be the implications if his political rights were fully restored? The restoration of Mr. Kim's political rights would be a sign that the government really intends to move toward a more democratic political system, as it continuously says it intends to do.

How the full restoration of Mr. Kim's rights would affect the political process in Korea is a matter of speculation, but

the government is clearly afraid to try it. As previously mentioned it has repeatedly placed him under house arrest to prevent him from attending the New Korea Democratic Party Convention, participation in a rally against torture, and, most importantly, addressing the large constitutional amendment rallies which have been held in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju and Taegu.

Mr. Kim is a charismatic man still famous for his oratorical powers despite the fact that he has had very few chances to speak to crowds in his native language in his native country since 1972. After years of being kept out of the press and off the podium, he was given a brief opportunity to exercise his political rights in the spring of 1980 before President Chun had consolidated his power, and thousands of enthusiastic citizens turned out to hear him. When Kim returned to Korea in February 1985, thousands of supporters attempted to meet him at the airport, but were turned away by riot police, who blocked the roads to Kimpo airport for miles.

The only way to find out what the implication of Mr. Kim's rights would be is for the ROK government to restore them. The US government should strongly and continuously urge that this step be taken.

8. What is the status of the petition drive? When the drive to collect 10 million signatures on the petition to amend the constitution was inaugurated by the Council for the Promotion of Democracy (CPD) and the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) on February 12, the anniversary of the 1985 National Assembly election, the government immediately cracked down harshly. Top

officials of the CPD and the NKDP, including its head Mr. Lee Min Woo, were placed under house arrest or taken in for interrogation. The CPD and NKDP offices were raided in searches for copies of the petition and lists of signers. On February 12, Kim Dae Jung was placed under house arrest and on the 14th the Minister of Justice threatened reimprisonment if he did not desist from anti-government activities. He was not released from house arrest until February 24th. Mr. Kim Young Sam was intermittenly placed under house arrest, including those times when he expressed the intention to visit Kim Dae Jung.

Despite the fact that Article 25 of the constitution guarantees all citizens the right to petition the government, the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General, and the chief of the National Police publicly stated that anyone who promoted circulation or signed the petition would be prosecuted. The government even implied that the National Security Law would be used in serious cases.

The petition itself calls upon the National Assembly to amend the constitution. The government considers this call illegal under Article 129 of the constitution which provides that only the president or a majority of the members can propose a constitutional amendment. Since the government party has 55% of the seats it was hard to understand why the government is so adamantly opposed to the call for a National Assembly revision. It appears to recognize the potential power of the symbolic issue to unify the opposition.

Perhaps it is a coincidence that the crackdown began just after President Reagan indicated continuing support for President

Marcos and raised the possibility that there had been fraud and violence on both sides in the Philippines election. However, it is hard to believe that the reversal of the crackdown on February 24th was not related to President Reagan's decision to stop supporting President Marcos.

Taken in for questioning by the police one week, Mr. Lee Min Woo found himself invited five days later to lunch at the Blue House along with the other party leaders on February 24th. At that lunch, according to Time magazine of March 10th, President Chun said he did not want South Korea to become "a second Philippines". Chun indicated then that discussion of the question of constitutional amendment could proceed but amendment itself would have to wait until after the 1988 presidential election.

Mr. Chun has since indicated that whoever is elected in 1988 will be bound to amend the constitution to provide for direct election of the president and to hold another election in 1989. The government says that to amend the constitution earlier would cause instability which might invite North Korea meddling and disrupt the 1988 Olympic games.

Since early March, there has been a series of rallies to support the petition drive. The first one, in Seoul on March 11th, had 4,000 to 5,000 participants. A March 23rd rally in Pusan had 20,000 to 40,000. According to government sources there were 20,000 to 30,000 participants in the third rally at Kwangju, but the organizers estimate the crowd at 100,000 and independent observers estimate it at 50,000 to 60,000. The ~~largest~~ rally in Taegu, capital of President Chun's home

province, was attended by a crowd estimated by the Police at 7,000 and opposition leaders at 100,000. There is no end in sight, and the government is in a difficult position. If it loosens up too much, for example, and lets Kim Dae Jung address the rallies, it might lose control of the situation. However, if it cracks down too fiercely, it may provoke an uprising.

9. Does the system of indirect elections favor the government? Would direct election of the president favor the opposition? The system of indirect elections does indeed favor the government, as is clearly evident in Chun's refusal to alter the system before presidential elections when he steps down next year. Under the current constitution, the president is indirectly elected by an electoral college of some 5,000 members from the same number of electoral districts around the country. During a presidential election, the presidential candidates' name do not appear on the ballot; only the electors names appear. Under the campaign rules, electors have very few opportunities to inform the voters who they support for president and, furthermore, the electors are not bound to support a particular candidate. Thus there is no way for voters to actually express a preference at the polls.

Theoratically, it would be possible for the opposition to run their own candidates for the electoral college, but practically speaking, the campaign rules and government repression make this almost impossible in most areas of the country. For example, to be an electoral candidate, one must collect 200 recommendation signatures. Given heavy-handed

repression, as well as the favors that local government party members can offer supporters, even collecting the required signatures is a great obstacle. The advantages to the ruling party are obvious: in 1981, just a year after the Kwangju massacre, President Chun won 95% of the electoral college votes. Even in Kwangju itself, where almost the entire city had risen up in opposition to the military coup, Chun received 68 electoral votes and the opposition 8 votes. Clearly, Chun's lopsided victory was no proof of popular support.

A system of direct voting would not give an advantage to the opposition. It would remove an unfair disadvantage and give the citizens the power to actually choose their president.

10. Would a Congressional resolution supporting Korean democracy be helpful? The Asia Watch delegation visiting Korea in June 1985 asked many democratic opposition leaders if such Congressional resolution would be helpful. They indicated at that time that a strong statement by President Reagan is essential, and did not consider a Congressional resolution as an acceptable substitute. Accordingly, a congressional resolution should be viewed as a means to encourage our own president to speak forcefully and publicly in support of Korean democracy. The Asia Watch would welcome a resolution which a) supports giving the people of Korea the opportunity to freely debate, petition for, and decide for themselves whether to revise the Korean constitution to allow for direct democratic presidential elections, b) calls upon the Chun government not to use military force to interfere in politics, c) indicates that such

b) calls upon the Chun government to restore the political and civil rights of Kim Dae Jung and all others similarly restricted;

[This is the original and preferred form of the question]

interference would force the Congress to consider withholding or suspending a portion of U.S. assistance, and 8) calls upon President Reagan to make these points very clear to the Chun government and 9) instructs the U.S. Ambassador in Seoul to initiate regular meetings with leading democratic opposition figures, including Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung.

-- Kim Dae Jung or Kim Young Sam?
Would you characterize the two Kims as democrats?

11. ~~Compare Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung.~~ Who is the dominant figure in the Korean opposition? I would certainly characterize the two Kims as democrats. I have known both for many years and have had long discussions about politics with them. I have no doubt about the commitment of each man to democracy and the repeatedly demonstrated willingness of each to suffer for his commitment.

I can not say which of the Messrs. Kim is the dominant figure in the Korean opposition. Both are prominent and both are respected in all areas of the country. There are, naturally enough, regional political differences in Korea and it is safe to say that Kim Dae Jung's support is greater in his home province of Chollado and that Kim Young Sam's support is stronger in Kyungsanjdo, his home province, than it is in Chollado. I know from personal experience, as well as from what has happened in the recent rallies, that both are respected in both areas, despite the government's continuous exaggeration of, and attempts to promote, regional disagreement.

In circumstances where these two men cannot freely participate in politics it is impossible to say which has more support, although the government's actions indicate that it is

more concerned about Kim Dae Jung's support. This question can be answered only when the Korean people are given a chance to freely express their approval in a democratic political process.

12. What is the position of the business community, the church, and students on the issue of direct elections? The big business community in the ROK is quite conservative. It is primarily interested in stability and government cooperation. For example, the government's repression of labor union activity keeps labor costs down. (See the Asia Watch Report, Human Rights in Korea for a detailed discussion of the repression of the labor movement.) Some of the Chun regime's early economic decisions sent tremors of fear through the community, for example the arbitrary ordering of conglomerates to quit various lines of production and restrict themselves to other products. However, the military rulers have since involved economists in economic decisions and a working relationship with business has developed. This does not mean that the government is viewed as legitimate by the business community, only tolerated. Moreover, businessmen recall cases like that of the prominent Sam Hak Chemical Company which was put out of business in the early 1970's by the tax authorities after apparently supporting opposition candidates. This sort of thing induces caution.

In recent weeks, both the Protestant and Catholic church have expressed their support for direct presidential elections. In a sermon on Sunday, March 9, Cardinal Kim Sou Hwan expressed his support for the constitutional revision as a way to promote national reconciliation. He criticized both the government and

opposition camps for persuing their own interests and he placed constitutional revision above politics. According to the The New York Times of March 10, he said:

> Before they argue that Korea is different from the Philippines...political leaders must first show to the Korean people that Korea is free of corruption, torture, political repression, rule by a handful of families and violation of human rights, which were dominant in the Philippines.

On March 14, the Rev. Kim Jee Giel, the chairman of the National Council of Churches in Korea, an alliance of six Protestant churches, declared his support for constitutional changes allowing direct election of the president.

At most 25% of Koreans are Christians and no more than 5% are Catholics and many churches are conservative or apolitical. However, the mainstream churches represented by Cardinal Kim and Reverend Kim, have influence disproportionate to their churches' membership. Moreover, these two men and many other prominent clergymen active in the cause of democracy are widely respected in non-religious circles as well as religious ones.

Support for the constitutional revision campaign by students is evident: police/student clashes have been very frequent in the past month as police attempt to break up student rallies supporting the campaign. The role of students in Korean politics is, of course, historically of enormous significance. Student-led demonstrations against the Rhee government led to its downfall in 1960. Students played an important role in the February 1985 National Assembly elections, and were an essential element of support for the New Korea Democratic Party's efforts. Since then, students have led opposition demonstrations, which

have become increasingly radical and anti-American in tone. In the past year, they have increasingly associated with the struggles of labor unionists by participating in demonstrations and even working as blue-collar laborers in low paying factory jobs. This development has been particularly worrisome to the government, which has encouraged management to fire the university graduates or promote them into management positions to discourage their participation in organizing.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. Allen, I assume you would agree that the United States has a significant interest in political stability in South Korea. I think, in fact, you indicated as much in your testimony.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. And then, if that is your view, and it is certainly a view that I share and I think all of us share, my next question would be; at this particular point in the history of South Korea, taking everything into consideration, do you think that the prospects for political stability in the Republic of Korea would be greater in the context of continued progress toward the establishment of a genuine democracy or in the context of a continuation of the political status quo?

Mr. ALLEN. I think stability will be more likely with steady progress toward democracy, Mr. Chairman. I also believe, that that is the direction in which the Republic of Korea is heading, and I have cited some evidence to that effect.

Mr. SOLARZ. I do not want to put words in the mouths of the other witnesses, but I think that is probably a sentiment which all of you would share, namely that the prospects for stability would be enhanced if there were continued progress toward democracy rather than if the political status quo was frozen in time.

My next question is, and this is really to all of you, in terms of preserving political stability in South Korea, how much importance do you attach to some kind of an agreement between the Government and the opposition which would presumably embody and express a national consensus on how to conduct the next Presidential election, leaving aside whether the Government agrees to direct elections or the opposition agrees to indirect election but with some procedural protection that they feel they do not have now.

How important do you think such an agreement is? If there is no such agreement, if the Government insists on moving forward with a presidential election in 1987 conducted on the basis of the existing practices, procedures, and precedents, and the opposition continues to oppose it, what do you believe the implications would be for political stability in South Korea?

Perhaps we can go left to right. I am talking geographically, not ideologically here. Professor Lee, do you want to begin.

Mr. LEE. Well, I have argued that some form of agreement or a compromise is necessary between the two opposing forces if Korea is to have stability.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I assume virtually everybody would agree it would be desirable if there were a national consensus which such an agreement would facilitate. But I am interested not only in whether you think it is desirable but what you think the consequences will be if there is no such an agreement, and if the Government decides to go forward with its present plans in the face of continued protests by the opposition.

Mr. LEE. No one could really be sure of the consequences of this confrontation, of course. But there is no doubt in my mind that the disturbance will continue for quite some time unless the Government decides to crack down.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Allen?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, without such an agreement, I think you would find probably increased tensions reflected by student unrest, and increased demands and pressures from outside, particularly from outside.

However, I would find some reassurance in this scenario in the sense that the Korean leadership now, in my view, clearly recognizes the importance of taking into account outside pressures.

Mr. SOLARZ. I do not want to project my own perceptions on others——

Mr. LEE. Sometimes you do, but not today.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, it is a tendency which I try to protect myself against because I genuinely do want to get your views. I would have thought that it was fairly clear, but perhaps you disagree, that it would be from our point of view desirable if the Government and the opposition could reach an agreement on how to conduct the next Presidential election.

Mr. LEE. I do agree with that. Yes; of course. What I was referring to was the substance of such a compromise or an agreement. That is a different question.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I have not expressed any views on that. What I simply was trying to do was sketch out some possibilities.

Mr. LEE. You are quite right. I would agree with that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.

Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. Well, I think that an agreement between the Government and the opposition on how to conduct the next Presidential election is absolutely essential if there is to be stability in Korea. And I believe that such an agreement has to provide for some form of direct election of the President, because that issue has unified all of those who criticize and oppose the Government who have many other points upon which they differ.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you totally preclude the possibility of an agreement between the Government and the opposition which would provide for the next election to be conducted through an indirect system of election where the Government agreed to a series of procedural and other protections designed to ensure that the process ultimately reflected the will of the South Korean people?

For example, as Mr. Solomon pointed out, we have an indirect system of elections here that serves to reflect generally the will of the American people. One could think hypothetically of several possibilities. You could indicate on the ballot who the electors were pledged to vote for. You could conceivably obligate by law the electors to vote for whomever they were pledged to vote for.

You could reduce the number of electors if the number involved were deemed to be a problem. There are a whole series of possibilities. I have no idea whether the Government would be receptive to any of these possibilities, but if they were, do you think it is inconceivable that the opposition would be prepared in the spirit of compromise to accept some arrangements along those lines?

Mr. BAKER. No; I do not think it is inconceivable. I think it is conceivable as long as those arrangements make it very, very clear that the will of the people will be reflected. If the names of the candidates appear on the ballot, for example, and the electors are bound by law I think that that kind of compromise would work.

However, I am doubtful, extremely doubtful, the Government will readily accede to that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, let me ask each of you two questions. They are sort of flip sides of the same coin. First, how widespread do you think the desire for genuine democracy in South Korea is? By genuine democracy I mean, for instance, a genuinely free press, independent judiciary system, elections which reflect the will of the people, that sort of thing. And conversely, how widespread would you say the disaffection with President Chun is on the part of the South Korean people?

Mr. LEE. I think the people's desire for a genuine democracy is very widespread. During the last election for the National Assembly, I believe somewhere between 85 and 87 percent of the people participated in the election, out of which 35 percent voted for the Government party.

But even those who voted for the Government party do not necessarily oppose democracy. And, as I stated in my short paper, Korea has changed a great deal since 1961 when President Park conducted his coup d' etat. During the last 25 years, the level of education, level of economic development, you just name it, and Korea is now almost a developed nation. Even some of the countries like Japan feel threatened in some sectors of its economy and technology.

Korea on the whole is prepared for democracy. Now, when you ask "Do people want it", yes. When you ask "Are they prepared for it", that is another question, but how do you prepare for democracy? Were the English people in 1215; or whatever year it was when they proclaimed Magna Carta, prepared for democracy? Were the Japanese prepared for democracy in 1945 after the fascist regime ruled Japan for so long? Were the Germans prepared for it in 1945? So what criteria do you use? Economic development, educational level, political sophistication? I think Korean people are ready for democracy.

Mr. SOLARZ. And the other question was, how widespread do you feel the disaffection toward President Chun is?

Mr. LEE. That is very hard to say. But I think a majority would prefer the opposition leaders.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. From my standpoint the desire for democracy is virtually unbounded in the Republic of Korea, in private and public sectors. In the military one finds what I would consider to be essentially the same degree of interest in democracy, but not necessarily in all cases have I come to the conclusion that these people are speaking about the same thing when they speak about democracy. However, generally speaking, the desire is there.

Perhaps the word "disaffection" ought properly be replaced with the word "unpopular", and then I would say that President Chun would not be in a different situation from many other Western political leaders who experience peaks and valleys of popularity. I have no way of fully measuring this. My visits to Korea are mostly to Seoul and not elsewhere. I do not speak Korean, but from those with whom I talk, a good cross section.

I find substantial criticism of the present administration, and not so much personally of President Chun. But that, too, ebbs and

flows. In 1983, I found more criticism than I found in 1984 or 1986. So, he is a political creature; there is a political system in Korea; and there is factionalism, and I believe he responds to those conditions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. Well, I think we all agree that the desire for democracy in Korea is high and that the people are in every way ready for it. On the degree of disaffection I would say that I do speak Korean and I do travel widely in Korea. I am in constant contact with Koreans and Americans interested in Korea in this country. And I find it hard to find anyone who has a good word to say for President Chun.

Mr. Allen has suggested that President Chun's situation is not that much different from that of some Western leaders when they have hit a low point. One very important difference was demonstrated during the petition drive. When the petition drive started there was a Draconian crackdown in which everyone who signed, circulated or advocated the petition was going to be prosecuted. This sort of option is not available to Western leaders whose popularity dips. Fortunately, the crackdown has eased but that is because the Government made a political decision for international and domestic reasons to stop it, not because there was any legal challenge to it or any way that the people really could have stopped it within the system.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Baker, I was struck by the fact that in your testimony you in effect said that the Congress should condition additional American assistance, military assistance to South Korea on a willingness on the part of the South Korean Government to move forward toward the establishment of democracy. And I think that was the general criteria you used.

What struck me about that was the fact that based on my discussions on a recent visit to Seoul with opposition leaders I had the very strong impression that they would themselves be opposed to such a course of action. Not because they are uninterested in bringing about a restoration of democracy; they clearly are. But because as much as they may be opposed to President Chun or as much as they may want democracy in their own country, they remain very fearful about the possibilities of another war on the Korean peninsula and would be uneasy with any course of action. In fact, they opposed any course of action which could in any way increase the risk of another conflict on the Korean peninsula.

I have the impression that what they would much prefer to see us do is use our influence through statements, pronouncements by the President, resolutions by the Congress or whatever rather than by establishing this kind of conditionality.

And I would like to know whether you disagree with that perception, but feel, nevertheless, the opposition does not understand where their own best interests lie or what?

Mr. BAKER. Well, you are certainly right that there are many opposition leaders who would not agree with this. Mr. Kim Dong Young yesterday suggested an increase in American military aid to Korea to assure that there would not be any threat from the north.

Mr. SOLARZ. Was this Kim Dae Jung?

Mr. BAKER. No, Kim Dong Young who is the leader of the New Korean Democratic delegation that is here in this hearing room right now. However, he also suggested that Secretary Weinberger should not go to Korea and talk about the imminence of the threat, because this promotes the Government's ability to use the threat as a way to crack down or justify cracking down.

I would say that you would find a very wide range of opinion on this among people who are critical of the Government. There are lots of people among students and intellectuals and ordinary people, and I would think among some of the younger National Assemblymen who would take a different view of it. But there is no doubt that there is a disagreement on this particular point among those who would like to promote democracy in Korea.

Mr. SOLARZ. I had one more question at this time. But before I ask it Mr. Dymally is going to have to leave so I will yield to him.

Mr. DYMALLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Allen, I want to ask you just one question. Mr. Foglietta said in his testimony that the U.S. Ambassador to Korea had never met with the opposition. Like you, I have found the Ambassador a very charming, very capable, and certainly a profound scholar in Korean affairs. But I have never had many conversations with him. I visit with him quite frequently, but I have never thought to ask him this question.

Have you ever discussed with him why he has never met with the opposition or the cardinal?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Dymally, I believe that Ambassador Walker has met with Cardinal Kim. I am reasonably convinced that he has met with Mr. Kim Young Sam. I believe that he has not met with Mr. Kim Dae Jung, but I would not like to characterize or rely on my own faulty memory for a discussion of the views of Ambassador Walker in that regard.

I might add that members of the Embassy staff, and ranking ones at that, are in constant contact with the opposition, and certainly members of the State Department meet with opposition politicians of every level. I would not want to leave the impression that the U.S. Government is somehow bereft of the advice and views of the opposition. Ambassador Walker might best answer the question on Mr. Kim Dae Jung himself.

Mr. DYMALLY. Thank you.

In my visits there the NKDP and the council for the promotion of democracy hosted a dinner for me at which time the Embassy and the Eighth Army were represented, because I know the Embassy does stay in touch with the opposition.

Mr. SOLOMON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYMALLY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, you know, I was in Seoul not too long ago and the Ambassador and his top people in the Embassy had an informal dinner in which we had members of the opposition, and the majority and the minority and everyone was well represented. This seems to me to be rather absurd.

Mr. DYMALLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think it is quite true that the Embassy is in touch with the opposition and I think that is very constructive. In any country in the world, our mission has a responsibility to keep in

touch with various currents of opinion. But I think the specific question really is, and I would particularly be interested in your view, Mr. Allen, do you think it would serve American interest for our Ambassador to establish some personal relationship with Kim Young Sam or Kim Dae Jung?

Mr. ALLEN. We are speaking now about Korea, but this also applies generally: I do not think it is the obligation of an American Ambassador to establish a personal relationship with opposition figures in any country, as long as he is well-informed and the Government has the full benefit of the views of those opposition leaders no matter who they may be, from dissidents in the Soviet Union through to other forms of authoritarian and military governments.

Mr. SOLARZ. Professor Lee, what is your view on that. Do you think it would serve American interest for our Ambassador to meet personally with Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, or do you think it does not really matter so long as other high level people in the Embassy are in touch with them?

Mr. LEE. I am rather surprised that Ambassador Walker has had no contact with these political leaders. Perhaps the Government accusations against Mr. Kim Dae Jung has affected his attitude toward Kim Dae Jung. I do not really know whether he met or has not met.

But I think it will be desirable for the American Ambassador to have some form of contact with all opposition leaders.

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, let me ask each of you this question. Everybody seems to agree that we do have an interest in further progress towards democracy in South Korea and that it would serve our interest if there would be some kind of agreement between the Government and the opposition on how to conduct the next election.

Given the enormity of the interest which we have there, I would like to ask you how you feel we can best go about promoting our interest in political stability and progress toward democracy in South Korea in general.

Specifically, what would your view be of a congressional resolution that was very carefully and thoughtfully drafted which reaffirmed our security commitment to South Korea, highlighted our shared sacrifices in the past, paid tribute to the Government for the enormous economic progress which has been made, took note of the fact that there is now a growing Korean middle class and a very well educated population, and stated that the Korean people are really prepared for democracy and desire it.

And then, without indicating whether we are for direct election or indirect elections, and certainly without endorsing one candidate or another, one party or another, express the hope that there can be continued progress toward the establishment of genuine democracy. Perhaps, the resolution could express the hope that a way can be found to reach an agreement which will facilitate Presidential elections in 1987 and reflect the genuine will and wishes of the South Korean people.

Would a resolution more or less along those lines serve any useful purpose, would it be counterproductive, would it really have not much of an impact at all, and is there anything else we could

do as a country particularly to advance these interests which we all seem to agree we have. Professor Lee?

Mr. LEE. You have already drafted the text of that resolution. I guess it is ready to go.

Mr. SOLOMON. There are those that think we might be sticking our nose into other peoples business too. So we would like your educated suggestion.

Mr. LEE. Given the language that you are using, given the general nature of it, in a way this hearing alone perhaps has performed the function or the purpose you are aiming at. That is to say, the Congress of the United States is very seriously interested in promoting democracy in Korea.

So, it depends very much on the content of that resolution and the kind of support that particular resolution gets in the Congress. Koreans are very closely watching every move, every vote, and the Government is aware of the sentiment of the U.S. Congress. I do not think it really matters whether it is passed or not as long as the sentiment of the Congress, as reflected in this particular hearing, is very strong for promoting democracy in Korea.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I would say that a resolution of support for the Republic of Korea and favorable action on the FMS and using such instruments as political party contacts, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and its counterpart, the Republican Institute on International Affairs, contributes to economic prosperity and contributes to movement toward democracy.

I am not so sure that we should be in engaged in the business of passing such resolutions, however, because where does it stop? Should not we also then have a resolution on North Korea so that North Korea would come just as far, or the PRC or Thailand or Indonesia?

Mr. SOLARZ. By the way, it just may be. I do not think we would have a great problem getting a resolution out of this subcommittee on North Korea. And I certainly would be prepared to work with my good friend from New York in sending a message to Kim Il-Sung.

Mr. SOLOMON. I think it would be an amendment to that resolution, as a matter of fact, attached to it. That is an option.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, that is an option. It would all depend on the drafting of such an amendment and careful assessment of how it would be appraised and considered in the Republic of Korea.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, that was what I was hoping to get your judgment on, though obviously, one has to see the precise language before taking a position. But as you undoubtedly noticed, I am talking about a resolution which gave both sides a piece of the apple, as it was.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, if the resolution, were drafted by your fine hand and along the lines that you have just discussed, and if you were to seek the advice of Congressman Solomon and other members of the minority of this committee in a balanced fashion, which I know you would, and if you seek the advice of outside people of all persuasions, I think that you would be onto something. But how far it would get on the full House or Senate I am

not entirely certain. I also do not know what the administration's position would be.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, we have a general rule. Anything which comes out of this subcommittee is sacrosanct on the floor of the House. We live for democracy abroad, but when it comes to the resolutions that come out of this subcommittee we brook no interference. [Laughter.]

Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. Well, I think that a resolution such as you have outlined would be very helpful. You started by reaffirming the United States security interest in Korea. And in light of that, I would like to clarify Asia Watch's position on military aid.

The suggestion is not that military aid be turned on and off on the basis of monitoring the human rights situation on a daily basis. The suggestion is that military aid be conditioned on an agreement or a promise by the Korean Government—it does not have to be an explicit written promise, but a clear indication from the Korean Government—that the military will not intervene in the political process as it did in 1980.

I think that I was very careful in drafting my statement, not to call for a constitutional amendment or a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment to provide for direct elections. I think that that is clearly a decision to be made by the Korean people and they are quite capable of making it. I suggest only that the United States offer as much support as it can to the process which would allow the Korean people to debate and decide for themselves what the content of any amendment should be.

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, can I just interject on this one? I am very much against using the security question and military aid as a lever on the human rights issue. Several years ago, we had a situation where people advocated the withdrawal of United States forces, ground troops, from Korea, to punish President Park and to improve human rights condition in Korea.

And I was accused to being a reactionary because I opposed the use of that security lever to improve the human rights condition in Korea. And I still feel that way. And I would like to explain.

I think human rights in Korea and democracy in Korea requires a United States commitment. And that United States commitment for the security of Korea should not be used for any other purpose other then the security of Korea and mutual security of United States and the Republic of Korea.

However, I do not condone the violation of human rights. And we are, of course, in a dilemma. Some people attacked me in the past by saying, if you do not use that lever what lever are you going to use to improve human rights condition? And, of course, that is a dilemma. I hope that the two countries are close enough that such pressure will not be necessary to improve human rights condition and to persuade the present leadership.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Yatron. Thank you for your indulgence.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Allen, what are the elements of support for President Chun? How flexible are his supporters, and how antagonistic would they be to a more democratic government?

Mr. ALLEN. It is very clear that the military is a principal source of support for President Chun because, after all, that is his heritage. The military has always played an important role in Korea, as it has in other nations. The private sector, by in large, expresses support for President Chun, although it is not always happy with his policy decisions. Therefore, I would not consider the private sector to be—in the Chairman's words—disaffected simply because he had not taken positions consistently in support of those private-sector interests.

But I have heard criticism of the President himself and of his administration and its policies. Beyond that, it is difficult for me to measure because, although I am frequently in Korea and have watched this problem for 20 years, but those members of the middle class I have met, although not completely content with the administration of this President, nonetheless tend to go along because they value the stability factor.

Stability or security should never be used as a cloak to hide gross violations of human rights. What I mean is that Koreans value stability in the context of the good life. Many people in Korea enjoy that kind of stability and are willing to forego certain of the other aspects of democracy right now, in the hope that they may emerge as part of the process that stability yields.

So, without attempting to analyze all of the sources of President Chun's support, it seems to me that he has the elements that are necessary right now to rule and to continue the 2 years of his administration, on the clear understanding that he will step down then and there will be no attempt to prolong his term.

I have spoken with him on a number of occasions and with many others around him, as well as with the opposition. I simply cannot believe that there would be an attempt to extend his term.

Knowing that 1988 is a watershed year in the history of postwar Korea, not only because President Chun's term ends and someone else's will begin, and that the Olympics will project Korea into an era of the unknown. No one can forecast with confidence what is going to happen. My guess is that people who do support him will not easily be disaffected and will not trade what they have now for the uncertainty that some form of chaos or unrest may bring.

Mr. YATRON. Do you have an indication that the South Korean military or a selective group within the military, would be receptive to civilian reform? What indicators are there concerning the morale, loyalties, and the mood of the military?

Mr. ALLEN. By my observation, the military establishment would, as in institution, accept and support reform. I take it you mean by "reform" Constitutional reform or progress toward democracy. Sometimes it is difficult to get military establishments in any country to accept reform, as you know very well, Congressman.

But many of the members within the military with whom I have met are openminded to that extent. I do not see them posing an obstacle. They are principally concerned with loyalty toward their country, the integrity of their country's security, and are determined at all costs to maintain friendship with the United States because we are the most important factor in Korea's international life. They recognize, in my view, that economic stability and prosperity can be the best contribution to political stability.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Professor Lee, how much emphasis is being placed on the issue of restoration of local autonomy in the Republic of Korea by the Korean opposition and the Chun government?

Mr. LEE. Local autonomy is an issue that is mentioned once in a while over there. There has not been a very committed movement toward it. I would like to see that started because it will be good for the country for the reasons I have stated.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Professor Lee.

Professor Baker, in your estimation is the press free enough in the Republic of Korea to play a significant role in the upcoming elections?

Mr. BAKER. Well, the press in Korea is as free as the Government lets it be on any given day. And so I would have to say that if the Government wishes it not to play a significant role it will not be able to. And this happens over and over again.

The fall of Marcos appeared in the largest type I have ever seen in a newspaper one day and the next day they were told to tone it down. Not that they drew parallels, but because they could not and they knew they could not. The press is guided both by verbal statements and by written guidelines. And so it is not free by any definition of the word free.

People on the other hand, the press, are anxious to be real news media people and they do go as far as they can on any given day to get as much news out as they can. So if the Government should decide to slack off, the press is there, it is well developed and ready to go.

Mr. YATRON. What kinds of external and internal pressures can combat the practice of torture in South Korea that you depicted in your testimony, Mr. Baker?

Mr. BAKER. Well, I know the U.S. Government has made quiet diplomatic representations in a number of individual cases. But I think it would be much more effective if the United States made it publicly clear that it wished its ally and close friend, the Republic of Korea, to cease this kind of activity.

It is reported clearly in the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that there were more reliable reports of torture in 1985 than in 1984. It is clear that torture is endemic in the judicial and legal process in Korea.

The other thing that would really make a difference would be if some how the Korean Government were persuaded to make the political decision to honor the provisions in the Korean Constitution which provide for the independence of the judiciary. According to the Korean Constitution, torture is forbidden, a coerced confession cannot be used as evidence, and a person cannot be convicted of a crime if the only evidence against him is his own statement. However, it happens regularly that people are convicted on a basis of no evidence except their own statement, which according to their testimony in court, was made under duress.

The judiciary is not able to throw these confessions out, except in very rare cases which are not political. So if the judiciary is truly made as independent as the Constitution says it is supposed to be, then the Korean; judiciary, which is composed of very competent legal professionals, can certainly put a damper on torture.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Yatron. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Chairman, you will have to bear with me because I was late getting back to this hearing. There was a little strategy meeting going on on the floor of Congress that dealt with the Contra aid bill, which confused a lot of the people, a lot of the press. But we got our point across. We killed the pork barrel supplemental bill and we will come back to fight another day and we will win.

Mr. Chairman, while we are on the subject of Korea, I do not think we should let it go unnoticed that my good friend, Chairman Solarz, recently figured in the prize-winning entry that was submitted to a contest held by the New Republic, a magazine that often quotes me one way or the other and the chairman as well.

It seems that Armand Hammer once referred to Stalin as being "unassuming." And the New Republic invited its readers to submit similarly inaccurate character judgments of well-known personalities. And according to the March 17 issue, that I have here, of the New Republic, the contest winner is a young man by the name of Gideon Rose.

Mr. Rose claims that a visiting speaker by the name of Steve Solarz came to the Horace Mann High School in New York several years ago and described Kim Il-Sung, the dictator of North Korea, as being "avuncular." Now, when I looked up avuncular in the Oxford American Dictionary it defines "avuncular" as being like a kindly uncle. Now, I hope Mr. Solarz has changed his mind since then.

Mr. SOLARZ. Will the gentleman yield on that? [Laughter.]

Mr. SOLOMON. I would be glad to yield to my good friend.

Mr. SOLARZ. I was told that Hitler was kind to little children and dogs. But he also was responsible, obviously, for a terrible deed.

But in all seriousness, having met Kim Il-Sung, the thing that struck me was the contrast between reality and what one might have expected from the ruler of what is probably the most repressive regime in the world, with the possible exception of Albania, and the beneficiary of a cult of personality which makes the cult of personality in China under Mao look like an exercise in national modesty.

Because given that combination, one would have expected someone who, having been the recipient of such an unadulterated diet of adulation over decades, would have lost all touch with reality, and someone who, having ruled such a repressive regime, would have been a stern and tyrannical figure. And, obviously, to rule such a society you have to be.

But what struck me was that in the 4 hours we spent together, he always had a smile on his face and he was rather soft spoken and cracked several jokes. And I was, more than anything else, struck by the dramatic contrast between what one would have anticipated and what one found.

In a way it reminded me a little bit of Hannah Arendt's comments about Adolph Eichman in her book "The Banality of Evil." I mean, here you have one of the most evil men in the history of the

world. But the thing that struck everybody about him when you just met him was how banal he was.

So I may very well have said this. But I stick by my characterization without wanting to suggest that in any way Kim Il-Sung is anybody's favorite uncle. He's certainly not mine.

Mr. SOLOMON. In other words, he looked like a true Communist; he smiled while he cut people's throats.

Professor Lee, I was taken by your statements about the economy and the progress that South Korea has made in recent years. And I just want you to know that we hope they keep up the good work. They are wonderful people. We love them, I do.

Mr. LEE. I hope so, sir.

Mr. SOLOMON. And I just want you to know that I have just sent off a note to Japan saying that after their great support for us over the Libyan issue that we much prefer South Korean cars than Japanese cars, and I do not think the American people are going to buy very many any more. I think the same thing might be said of French wine, perhaps.

Mr. Baker, or Professor Baker——

Mr. BAKER. It is Mr. Baker.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Baker?

Mr. BAKER. Yes.

Mr. SOLOMON. I beg your pardon. You come from Harvard. I never had the opportunity to go to an elite school like that. I had to go to a little school that nobody heard of up in upstate New York, and maybe that is why I am conservative and other people are liberal.

But, nevertheless, Harvard is the famous university that opposed the so-called Solomon amendment a few years ago—the Solomon amendment simply said to all the young men in this country that we have 11 million patriotic young men who have lived up to their obligations as American citizens by going out and registering for the draft.

And it said for all of the others, which are a very small percentage, like 1 or 2 percent of the American population eligible for the draft, that if you do not want to register for the draft, then you are not entitled to Federal student aid.

And that elite university called Harvard immediately put out a press release saying that they would circumvent the Solomon amendment, which has since been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States and that they would make up this aid to these young men who did not want to live up to their obligations.

The next day after that—and excuse me for going on here—I introduced legislation that would have cut off all aid to Harvard University, which amounted to about $100 million in grants and studies. All of a sudden the next day there was an apology and Harvard withdrew that statement. And they no longer make up the student aid. So I just had to get that off my chest.

Let me just say that from what I have heard here today, that if I were a Korean citizen, and if I were perhaps even a student; I would be so careful about what happens between now and 1988, because President Chun has said there will be an election in 1988. And I believe him. I think he is an honorable man. He may have

his faults like we all do. Jimmy Carter had his, maybe President Reagan has his; I have not found any yet.

But the reason I say that is, you know, the Olympics are coming. I represent an area that had the winter Olympics a few years ago. And it means so much to a community, it means so much to a country. It is an honor and a privilege to have had the International Olympic Committee vote to give the Olympics to South Korea. And they must have done that for a reason, very good reasons as a matter of fact, much of what, Professor Lee, you have talked about.

And we certainly do not want to do anything that is going to upset that. They do not want to create a situation that is going to allow the Communist Party or anyone else to upset the apple cart. They want to present the nicest image that they possibly can. Because that is going to make South Korea soar way above Japan, way above everyone else.

They are the future in that part of the world. And for gosh sakes, let us not upset that. Let us not have demonstrations, let us not have situations that are going to interfere with that. I just had to get that off my chest.

The reason I say it is: what is the rush? In other words, South Korea is moving toward democracy. It has been promised. So let us not make demagoguery, let us not say they have promised it in 1988 but that isn't good enough—move it up to 1986. They cannot do that. Let us do it the right way.

Now, let me get onto a couple of questions for you, Mr. Allen. You are not going to get off the hook, either.

Mr. BAKER. I don't get a chance to respond to that?

Mr. SOLOMON. No, you do not. [Laughter.]

If there is time afterward, I will be more than glad to meet you out in the hall.

Mr. LEE. Are we going to have a chance to respond?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes, you are, after I finish.

Mr. Allen, I am interested in your observations about the human rights situation in South Korea, but there is some history I would like to get at in putting my question to you.

You were Ronald Reagan's Chief Foreign Policy Advisor in 1980, and you served as his first National Security Advisor. Based on what I know, although I have not seen any press accounts, did you not play a crucial role in 1980 in actually carrying out a strategy that you and then President-elect Ronald Reagan devised to save the life of Kim Dae Jung, who was at that time under a death sentence?

Mr. ALLEN. It is true, Congressman, that I did, in fact, play a role. I guess it could be called an important role or a crucial role.

It is my view, succinctly put, that Kim Dae Jung has Ronald Reagan to thank for his life. During the transition period in 1980 I received an urgent call from then Secretary of State Muskie describing the situation in which the U.S. Government had concluded that grave harm was about to be visited upon Kim Dae Jung. And it is true that I took this message to the President-elect and he and I did devise such a strategy.

Mr. SOLOMON. I would like to carry it a little further. I wonder if you could just fill us in on the details of what actually happened just after the 1980 election. How did the strategy develop, who ac-

tually knew about it and how was it executed? Whom did you meet with from the Korean side, for instance?

Mr. ALLEN. It might take too long to describe in detail. But as succinctly as I can, the appeal was made from the outgoing Carter administration for the incoming Reagan administration to join forces in a denunciation of the Korean Government.

I advised the President-elect that perhaps another quieter diplomatic strategy might be developed, with which we might normalize our relationship with Korea and at the same time save the life of Kim Dae Jung. I had a number of private appeals; Mr. Kim is a Catholic, as am I, and Secretary Muskie cited this when I met privately with him.

President-elect Reagan and I concluded that it would be best to buy time because the intelligence estimates of the moment were that Kim Dae Jung would be put to death. The President-elect authorized me to begin some discussions on his behalf with members of the Korean military. I talked with the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who later became Ambassador to the United States.

A crucial role was played by an Army commander at the time, General Chung Ho Yong. An extremely important role was played by the Minister of Embassy, Minister Sohn Jong Nae, who was then working for Ambassador Kim Yong Shik.

The discussions continued over a number of weeks and the outcome was, I think, very successful for our interests, and certainly Mr. Kim's interests.

Mr. SOLOMON. Based on what you have said here for the first time in public and on the record that I have heard of, do you not think that President Reagan has been shortchanged on the credit that is due him for the incredibly successful human rights accomplishment that you accomplished there?

Mr. ALLEN. President Reagan never claimed any credit publicly, but I do think he has been shortchanged, especially by his critics. Anyone who has been interested in Kim Dae Jung's fate and in the protection of human rights would shortchange President Reagan by not giving him this kind of credit.

Of course, they could not give him credit if they did not know, but now that you bring it up it is time to give President Reagan credit for a dramatic breakthrough in the first days of his administration. And I think it ought to be more widely known; 5 years have passed, and he is certainly due the credit.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, as the ranking Republican on the Subcommittee on Human Rights, I certainly think he should be given his due.

Let me just ask you, what was the impact of all of this on Korean/American relations and did it have any impact on Korean relations with other nations at that time?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, the immediate impact, I think, was reflected in President Chun Doo Hwan's visit. That visit was criticized by a number of people, but it had a very good effect. The entire process worked to normalize, to a large extent, Korean/American relations, which had been through a very rough period during the Carter administration.

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I think it certainly laid the basis for a rectification of the relationship between Korea and Japan, one characterized by enmity going back many years. It is still a relationship that is uneasy. But great things happened as a consequence, and paved the way for the visit of Mr. Nakasone to Korea, and the return visit of Chun Doo Hwan to Tokyo.

In sum, very important consequence flowed from these actions.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, I certainly think so, too.

To your knowledge, did Kim Dae Jung or any of his supporters in Korea or in the United States ever publicly express gratitude to the President for this kind of humanitarian act? I know Kim Dae Jung has never come into my office.

I am one of the veteran members of this subcommittee and the ranking Republican on Human Rights. We were discussing earlier whether our Ambassador ought to be meeting with the minority in South Korea. I would be glad to meet with any of the minority from the Korean Assembly. They are welcome to come into my office.

But, to your knowledge, was he ever thanked?

Mr. ALLEN. I never heard President Reagan thanked publicly, but shortly before Mr. Kim went back to Korea he called on me. I then asked him why he had not thanked the President, and he asked me to convey his thanks at that juncture to President Reagan for what the President had done for him.

I think it was undeniable that President Reagan's interest in this case carried through to the commutation of the death sentence to the reduction of his sentence and to the ultimate permission for Kim to come to the United States for medical treatment. Here he had perfect freedom to make his case, and did just that.

But I have never heard him thank President Reagan publicly, I think he should.

Mr. SOLOMON. I assume that the President did not just drop the matter after meeting with President Chun and after assuring Kim's safety. Did continued persuasion from the administration play any role in Mr. Kim's sentence being reduced and being allowed to come to the United States for medical treatment, as you have just——

Mr. ALLEN. I think it did. I think it was very important.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, let me just say, in reading your opening statement, and I am sorry I was not here when you made it, that I note that you expect President Chun to step down in March 1988 at the end of his term of office. What if he were to try to prolong his term? What would the consequences be? Do you think he will?

Mr. ALLEN. I do not think he would. But were he to do so, I do not think that conditions would permit an extension of his term in any way. Were he to go back on this promise, there would be a very serious counterreaction internally in Korea.

Mr. SOLOMON. You still maintain a close relationship, I know, with the Korean people. Have you met with other opposition members in South Korea, and do you consider the opposition to be united behind a leader, an individual leader? And is there common agreement on a policy platform for Korea's future, do you know?

Mr. ALLEN. As recently as last week, I had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Kim Young Sam, and would have met with Mr. Kim

Dae Jung had he been available while I was in Korea. I was only there for a few days.

Mr. SOLOMON. This was in Korea?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. I did meet with other members of the opposition. Some of whom are present today.

I would meet with them regularly, as often as they would like to meet, if they think it useful from the standpoint of talking to a businessman, or from someone associated with the Heritage Foundation, or from the Republican Party.

I have a longstanding practice. One should meet with as many people as possible in order to try to understand the other fellow's point of view. We do not agree on everything, but I must say, we maintain a degree of cordiality. Chairman Solarz and I have even had frequent encounters in public fora, and we maintain a very cordial relationship. I have great respect for him and his views. Although I have never had a dust-up with you, but have always been basically on the same side, Congressman Solomon, I will say I am privileged to have your friendship, too.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, I am glad to hear that. And since I recently met with some supporters of Mrs. Aquino, I think if you see Kim Dae Jung, pass the word along that I would be glad to meet with him if he comes to this country again.

Mr. ALLEN. I certainly will.

Mr. SOLOMON. I do not have any further questions. But, Professor Lee, you wanted to respond in some form earlier. You are welcome to now, if you like.

Mr. LEE. Well, thank you.

I certainly appreciate the fact that you have been supporting the cause of the Republic of Korea. But you mentioned that President Chun did promise to have an election in 1988, and asked "Why rock the boat and what is the rush?"

I think they are the key questions that are debated in Korea and have aroused so much emotion in Korea. Therefore, I think we should spend a few more minutes on this.

The people in Korea, I believe, agree that Korea needs stability, and particularly by 1988. But many, many people feel that the present structure is not conducive to stability and this is something that we must really consider.

You ask why the rush? Why in 1986? But, they do not want an election in 1986. They want to have the election take place in 1988, but not under the present structure. They would like to see the structure changed now so that we will not have that unstable condition lasting until 1988.

Mr. SOLOMON. Have the opposition leaders made that statement, a public statement, that they do not want to see the elections moved up, that they want the elections in 1988 but they want to change the structure?

Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. Nobody has indicated——

Mr. SOLOMON. Is this policy platform?

Mr. LEE. That is the way I understand it, sir. Nobody has advocated that President Chun step down right now. All they want is a structure that assures a peaceful transfer of power in 1988. And they feel that if the present structure is continued, whatever political change that takes place will not be very meaningful in the

sense that it will not allow the people to express their genuine wish.

Mr. SOLOMON. Before I go on, Mr. Allen, I asked you a question, but I do not recall your answer. I asked you if there was a single individual that you felt was the leader of the opposition. Did you comment on that?

Mr. ALLEN. Forgive me for not answering your question fully. I do not believe there is a united program, and I do not believe that there is a single opposition candidate. I think that right now the loose coalescing of these forces of opposition into something that is coherent appears to be the order of the day. I am not certain that it will last. After all, there has been considerable rivalry between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam in the past.

I did refer in my statement to the fact that Mr. Kim may not be the generation of leader that young Koreans want. Nearly 60 percent of the Korean population is under 24 years of age now, and this is going to grow. Young people will be looking to new leaders for the future.

So I believe it is a mistake for the Western media to infer that Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam are the anointed leaders. I do not see it that way.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, that was interesting, because that was really the impression that I got when I was there not too long ago. It was that Kim Dae Jung is really not the leader. He is not the leader of the total opposition.

And, Mr. Baker, why don't you go ahead. I think you wanted to comment on something I was saying. If you want to defend Harvard, go ahead.

Mr. BAKER. I am not here to represent Harvard. I represent Asia Watch and myself. I will leave discussion of Harvard for out in the hall afterward.

I would like to comment on the fact that it seems to have been indicated here that Kim Dae Jung did not publicly express his gratitude to President Reagan. And that is not true. He did express his gratitude when he landed here, and he frequently expressed his gratitude in conversations that I heard him have, and in talks that I heard him give.

And many of us who have been critical of the Reagan administration's policies toward Korea have, in public petitions and in private letters, repeatedly stated our gratitude to the president for having saved Mr. Kim's life, partially because it saved Mr. Kim's life and partially for the good that that did for Korea and for the United States-Korean relationship.

Also, on the Olympics, I think it is quite clear that most Koreans want to see the Olympics be successful. It is a great thing for Korea. However, the Olympics are being used by the Government as the rallying point for all kinds of things and have been since it was declared that they would be in Seoul. I think we should take note of the fact that in the last few days Mr. Kim Young Sam was quoted as having said, "Revising the Constitution is more important than holding the Olympics." I think that, while that is probably not a particularly widespread sentiment at the moment, if the democratization process does not continue and if there is not a change which will ensure people that they will be able to choose

their own President in 1988—the year of the Olympics—then people may decide that amending the Constitution is more important than holding the Olympics. I am not predicting that that will happen, but things could move in that direction. It should be noted that the opposition has not proposed changing the year of the election.

On the question of one leader, I think it is quite impossible to tell who is the most popular opposition leader in Korea because there is no forum in which to determine it. Neither Kim Dae Jung nor Kim Young Sam was allowed to run in the National Assembly Election. There is no indication that Kim Dae Jung will be allowed to run for president, if he should choose to do so in 1988.

I find everywhere in Korea that there is a good deal of respect for both of these men. I find in Kyung Sang Do—Kim Young Sam's home province—that there are plenty of people who have high regard for Kim Dae Jung as well as for Kim Young Sam. And I find in Cholla Do, which is Kim Dae Jung's home province, a good deal of respect for Kim Young Sam. For example he was responded to very warmly by the people of Kwangju when he spoke there in the Constitutional Amendment Rally.

I think that the only way we will ever know who is more popular, or if there is yet another person who will emerge as the leader, is if a process is allowed to proceed in which the Korean people can decide who they want to be led by.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, the opposition should not feel too badly, because here in the United States the Democratic Party does not have a leader either.

Mr. BAKER. I did not say they do not have a leader.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, we have a surplus of would-be leaders. We will eventually settle on one.

Mr. Allen, having played a key role in saving Kim Dae Jung's life, I want to give you an opportunity to play a helpful role in saving his career. Do you think it would be healthy if he were given the opportunity to run for office in South Korea? In other words, if the remaining political restrictions which have been imposed on him were removed, would it be helpful for him to run for office? If those restrictions were removed then he would be free to run, presumably.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. And I think he could test his popularity at the polls. He is under a sentence. As I have noted, his full rights are not yet restored. If conditions would permit and the Government would decide to lift that ban, he could run. There would be no impediment, presumably, under those circumstances.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes. Well, that is precisely the point——

Mr. ALLEN. Would it be healthy? Anybody should be able to run in a democratic election. If the trend is toward democracy and you want to have real democracy, you simply cannot exclude some people.

Mr. SOLARZ. And, Professor Lee, in the Korean context, how significant was the statement signed by the 38 professors recently that called for direct elections?

Mr. LEE. I think it is very significant that professors at various campuses are signing these statements, because in the Korean con-

text, as you mentioned, signing a document to which the Government does not agree involves a great deal of risk. Therefore, the professors cannot sign a statement very lightly. By signing these documents they are indicating that these are matters that they stake their jobs and their future on the block.

They are indicating that they really support this, not out of a whim, but out of considerations beyond their individual welfare. Therefore, when these professors sign a statement, the Korean people on the whole pay a great deal of attention. And it affects the students and the public in general. My answer would be that it is very, very significant.

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, one question I would like to ask all of you. At the time of the Kwangju incident I think it is clear that U.S. interests were somewhat damaged in terms of how we were perceived by the South Korean people. There was an impression by most Koreans that General Wickham, who was our Commander in Chief in South Korea at the time, gave permission for elements of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces to go down to Kwangju to suppress the disturbances there.

Now, as I understand it, in fact, the units that were sent down were not directly under General Wickham's command, and that, strictly speaking, his permission was not needed for the dispatch of the units that went there.

Nevertheless, because of the command arrangements which exist in South Korea where the American commander does have operational command over a substantial number of ROK Divisions, it does strike me that there is a potential for this kind of misinterpretation in the future if there should be another incident where the Government feels obligated to use elements of its own armed forces to put down disturbances.

Furthermore, it does strike me as something of an anomaly for South Korea, which is an independent and sovereign country, to have a foreign citizen in operation command of its forces. Particularly when its forces constitute 90 percent of the forces in place in South Korea.

So my question is, Would it serve the interest of the United States, and would it be more compatible with the sovereignty of South Korea, for there to be a change in the command relationship in which the Commander in Chief of combined forces would be a South Korean, rather than an American general. Or do you think it is better, for whatever reasons you would advance, to maintain the existing command relationship between the American commander on the scene and the South Korean Armed Forces?

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to see the existing military structure maintained, and I think Koreans would, too. This is a tradition that has grown up over the years, and I do not see any particular need to change that structure.

I might add, since you brought up Kwangju, I have cited today my colleague, Daryl Plunk of the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, and I would also like to include with your permission an excellent "backgrounder" he did on "South Korea's Kwangju Incident Revisited," published just a few months ago. I think you probably have seen that already, but it is one of the best

analyses that I have seen, and I offer it for the record, Mr. Chairman.[1]

Mr. SOLARZ. Sure, without objection.

Professor Lee.

Mr. LEE. Since you are in the mood to accept documents, I have written an article about the South Korean situation in 1980, including the Kwangju incident. I published it in Asian Survey in January 1981. And the committee already has a copy of it. I think you may find some information in it that is relevant here.[2]

Mr. SOLARZ. And that is to the suggestion about a change in the nature of the command relationships?

Mr. LEE. At this late hour I am not really—my head is not that clear at this moment to think about this very, very momentous question. But regarding the Kwangju affair, the situation as you described is very complicated. And as I indicated in my prepared statement, the United States has been implicated, not for directing the army units to Kwangju to engage in the mass killing, but possibly knowing about it and not preventing the paratroopers from engaging in violence there.

And as I indicated, this creates a very serious emotional concern in South Korea against the United States, and therefore, I think it is against the United States' interest to have the army to repeat any incidents of this kind.

As far as the command structure is concerned, I once studied it but my information at the moment is not sufficient to really pass judgment on it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Baker, do you want to offer a comment?

Mr. BAKER. Yes. First, since we are submitting documents for the record on Kwangju I would like to submit the chapter of the Asia Watch Report which was published in January which deals with Kwangju.[3]

Mr. SOLARZ. I want you to know all these submissions are going to blow Gramm-Rudman out of the water.

Mr. LEE. Well, you are not paying us for expenses, so that saves the money. [Laughter.]

Mr. BAKER. Professor Lee hits the nail again.

Professor Lee is quite right, that changing the command structure is a very momentous decision. And I do not think any responsible person would want to suggest what the changes ought to be off the cuff.

I do think that the Kwangju situation the Kwangju massacre is being held, and reasonably so, against the United States. And it is, in part, because of the perception of the role of the American military in it. And I think it is clear, it is fairly clear anyway, that the American commander did not have command over the troops who committed the initial atrocities, but that he did release from his command the troops which went back and recaptured the city of Kwangju.

In May 1980 while the Kwangju incident was happening a group of us asked General Pinkney—who was I believe, head of the

[1] See app. 1.
[2] See app. 2.
[3] See app. 4.

Korean section at that time—why these troops were released, we were told that the Korean troops had to be released because permission was properly asked for and it could be refused only if the United States were willing to assert that releasing those troops would threaten the security of the Republic of Korea. It seemed to us that, since those troops were between Seoul and the DMZ in some cases, that that would have been a reasonable thing to assert. But that was the Pentagon's position.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I want to thank you all very much. I think your testimony has helped greatly to enlighten the subcommittee and to focus our attention on some of the critical questions involved in our relationship with South Korea. You have all made a significant contribution and we are grateful to you for taking so much time this afternoon.

I feel badly about the fact that we have kept our very distinguished witnesses from the administration waiting all this time. I know they have very important affairs to attend to and this is Secretary Sigur's first appearance before our subcommittee. But I do appreciate the fact that you are here today.

I want to welcome you here as the new Assistant Secretary for East Asian Pacific Affairs. I hope this is the beginning of a long and what I trust will be a cooperative and constructive relationship. I have been privileged to work very closely with your predecessors in two administrations, and I think we have had, during that period of time, some real success in hammering out broad areas of agreement on foreign policy in your region.

I gather you have a scheduling problem yourself. Your statement will be included in the record. If you just want to briefly summarize and say a few words I have a few questions I would like to ask. Admiral Baker, the same, of course, applies to you. Let me welcome you, as well, to your deliberations also.

STATEMENT OF HON. GASTON SIGUR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SIGUR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to be here. Thank you for your invitation to me to testify before your subcommittee on the administration's policy toward the Republic of Korea.

I agree with what you said about the bipartisan approach, particularly toward Korea, that has taken place under my predecessors, and I certainly look forward to a continuation of that spirit.

I think that the exchanges of views that are taking place at this hearing are very important and very significant in maintaining that kind of consensus, which is necessary for American interests and the American role in Korea. And I will do everything I can, I assure you, Mr. Chairman, to continue this process of frank discussions with members of the subcommittee and with you.

I know that a number of members of this subcommittee have visited Korea, and you yourself, of course, were there very recently. So in the interest of time, I will forego my presentation and I will take any questions you may have.

[Mr. Sigur's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GASTON SIGUR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee in connection with the Administration's policy toward the Republic of Korea.

Historical and Comparative Perspective

A natural focus of attention, both in Korea and abroad, is the drama of Korea's sometimes heated partisan politics. Accordingly, I will address current Korean domestic developments in some detail today and I look forward to your questions. Current Korean developments need to be seen in a broader perspective to enable us to make balanced judgments about the meaning of partisan competition there and about the role the United States can or should play. Whether we look at South Korean politics historically or in comparison with North Korea, there are strong grounds for optimistism.

Korea has been surrounded by larger and more powerful states through much of its history but successfully survived as a strong and culturally unique nation. A traditional agricultural society just a few decades ago and devastated by the Korean War, South Korea has progressed economically at a rate virtually unmatched in the world.

Politically, Korea was a monarchy for most of its history. In the twentieth century, Korea was subjected to Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. The unsettled period after liberation was followed by the Korean War and the need for massive reconstruction in the 1950's. In the few years of relative stability since then, South Korea has clearly established itself as a member of the Free World with an increasingly open and internationally oriented society and economy. The values of democracy and human rights which we hold dear are gradually asserting themselves in spite of the authoritarian elements in the neo-Confucianism that permeates all sectors of traditional Korean political culture.

In contrast, North Korea has chosen communism, isolation from the world and xenophobia. The cult of personality is so intense that Kim Il Sung is presented to the people as virtually a god, and his son is apparently being groomed for the first dynastic succession in the communist world. Military expenditures eat up perhaps a fourth of its gross national product, while standard consumer goods are rare luxuries for the vast majority of North Korea's people. The North Korean economy is stagnant and beset with the shortages, dislocations and inefficiencies that characterize command economies. The vast majority of North Koreans have no opportunity to exercise basic human rights nor participate in the decisions which shape their lives. The government takes such care to limit, control

and "purify" all information reaching its population that the people have no way to compare their situation to that in other countries.

South Korea's Basic Consensus

Given Korea's history and the quite different course taken by North Korea, how has the Republic of Korea been able to make such remarkable progress? Many reasons could be put forward and any answer is necessarily complex. I believe that a major factor is that South Korea has enjoyed a remarkable consensus ever since the North Korean invasion of 1950--a fundamental consensus often obscured by soaring political rhetoric.

From the experience of the Korean War, the people of South Korea became--and remain--virtually unanimous in their concern over the threat posed by the North. Thus, no major South Korean figure, either in the government or in the opposition, calls for the withdrawal of American forces, nor a reduction in US Foreign Military Sales credits nor any attenuation of the steadfast American security commitment that has successfully deterred North Korea these past decades. Both government and opposition parties support dialogue with North Korea, but are uncompromising in the belief that the South must remain part of the Free World.

There is also fundamental agreement that the market economy plays a key role in economic progress. Korea's historical poverty and the economic deprivations and dislocations of the Korean War made the Korean people desperate for economic progress. Korea's economic successes based on a outward looking and market economy since that war have transformed a fatalistic people into one of the world's most ambitious and optimistic.

Political Development

There is also a consensus in South Korea on the need for progress toward greater democracy--a goal espoused by virtually all political parties there since the Korean War. Yet the realization of this goal remains one of Korea's most vexing problems.

Political power in Korea has historically been concentrated in the ruling party. Government and opposition forces fought bitter factional disputes to wrest or maintain all the apparatus of state. Rarely was there the kind of dialogue and compromise Americans take for granted which nurtures mutual trust and transforms politics into something more than a zero-sum game. Surrounded by major powers, Korean factions became adept at seeking foreign allies to give them advantage in their domestic struggles.

Modern analogues of these traditional attitudes continue to create problems in South Korean politics and, incidentally, our efforts to encourage further democratization and greater respect for human rights. Nonetheless, we believe that South Korea is on the road to a more democratic system. In this regard, we have welcomed as a step of great importance President Chun Doo Hwan's pledge to step down at the end of a single seven-year term in March 1988. Virtually unprecedented in Korea, his voluntary action should set the stage for further progress toward democracy.

Constitutional Revision Campaign

There appears to be general agreement in Korea that President Chun will step down in 1988, and so the political focus has shifted to the mechanism by which the next president will be elected. The opposition is demanding constitutional revision so that the next presidential election will be determined by direct popular vote rather than through the current electoral college system. While the electoral college itself is popularly elected, the opposition maintains that the Korean Government can more easily manipulate the approximately 5,000 electors than an electorate of over 20,000,000. Opposition efforts in the National Assembly last year to persuade the ruling party to agree to the formation of a committee for constitutional revision resulted in a ruling

party offer to set up a committee to "study" the constitution. This proposal was rejected by the opposition.

With a minority in the National Assembly, the main opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), decided to take its case to the public through a nation-wide petition campaign. President Chun and the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) strongly opposed the petition campaign, declaring it illegal and arguing that it threatened the political stability necessary to stage a successful Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988. In his state of the nation address in mid-January, President Chun said that South Korea had formerly tried both direct and indirect electoral systems, but neither system had been sufficient in itself to bring about the political progress all Koreans desired.

The NKDP, along with the Council for the Promotion of Democracy (CPD) led by Mssrs. KIM Young Sam and KIM Dae Jung, launched a nation-wide petition campaign for direct elections on February 12. The Korean Government initially tried to prevent activities on behalf of the campaign. Government measures included police cordons around the NKDP and CPD offices, intermittent house arrests of political figures, and arrests of students demonstrating in favor of constitutional revision.

After about two weeks of confrontation, President Chun suddenly met with ruling and opposition party heads. He indicated that the measures taken by Korean police had been "excessive" and henceforth the Government would be more tolerant of NKDP petition efforts. However, he reaffirmed his view that constitutional revision could be considered only after he left office and following the Olympics. He said a presidential commission would be established and that he would support the formation of a multi-partisan Assembly committee to study post-1988 constitutional revision. After the meeting, the NKDP repeated that constitutional reform must come before the next presidential election.

Following the meeting, the NKDP launched a series of rallies in major cities to support the petition campaign. The first rally, which took place in Seoul on March 11, attracted several thousand people. Among the speakers was opposition leader KIM Young Sam who, for the first time since 1980, delivered a major public address. His colleague KIM Dae Jung, however, was prevented by police from attending this and subsequent rallies on the grounds that such activity was ipso facto "political" and would therefore subject him to re-imprisonment under the terms of his suspended sentence. The rally also featured a peaceful march through downtown Seoul. The police did not intervene and assisted with traffic control.

On succeeding weekends, similar rallies in Pusan and Kwangju drew crowds in the tens of thousands, while a rally in Taegu was somewhat smaller. The rallies themselves were peaceful, but groups of several hundred persons, mostly students, violently confronted police after the rallies had ended. Some of these demonstrators were detained by the police, who were given high marks by most observers for their restraint and professionalism. Several dozen demonstrators have been indicted, as have a number of students who engaged in petition activities on campus since the start of the spring semester.

Immediate Background to the Government-Opposition Debate

The current intensified government-opposition debate came after President Chun decided in late 1983 to pursue a more relaxed domestic policy. Virtually all prisoners in politically-related cases were released. The ban was gradually lifted from Koreans who had been barred from political activity. Students were permitted to demonstrate on campus for the first time in years. Perhaps most significantly, last year's February National Assembly election was one of the most open in South Korea's history, and the newly created NKDP beat the less outspoken, former main opposition party. The result was a generally more open political climate.

Not unexpectedly, greater opportunity to exercise freedom of expression resulted in increased public criticism of the government. In the Assembly, the opposition raised such previously taboo issues as the 1980 Kwangju incident and personal criticism of President Chun and his family. On campus, student activists engaged in non-stop debate and increasingly attempted to take to the streets, despite the government's continued ban on street protests. Student tactics became more violent: Molotov cocktails were thrown at police attempting to block student demonstrations from leaving the campuses. There was increasing vandalism by small groups of students against government offices, and some government offices were occupied as a means of protest.

Not all student occupations were aimed at government offices. On May 23, 1985, seventy-three Korean college students occupied the American Cultural Center Library in Seoul. They demanded, among other things, an apology for the alleged US Government role in the 1980 Kwangju incident. For three long days US Embassy officials talked with the students, who were finally persuaded to leave the library peacefully.

As senior Embassy officials said at a press conference following the students' departure, we do not feel that these or most other students are anti-American or pro-communist. They acted on the basis of a limited and often inaccurate

understanding of US policy in Korea. We continue our efforts to explain our role in Korea. We do not anticipate that anti-American sentiment among students or other Koreans will emerge as a significant issue.

In reaction to occasionally violent student protests and increasing criticism within the Assembly, in June 1985 the Korean Government began again to arrest demonstration leaders. Legal action was taken against dissident and youth activist groups believed to support the students. During the fall semester of 1985, police began to prevent demonstrations on campus. With the beginning of the spring semester this year, the head of the Korean police declared that no politically motivated demonstrations would be permitted on Korean campuses.

Though we heard very few reports in the previous two years about the old problem in Korea of police abuse of prisoners, reports that prisoners had been tortured increased in the fall of 1985. In one case we confirmed that a student activist was tortured; in another instance, three journalists were beaten by security personnel. We stated publicly at the time that we regard such charges with the utmost seriousness, and we continue to make our views known to the Korean government.

Prospects for Human Rights and Political Progress

While there have been setbacks, we believe Korea is still a freer place than it was a few years ago. The government-opposition debate is vigorous, as shown by last year's National Assembly election campaign, subsequent Assembly proceedings and the opposition's recent series of rallies. President Chun has reassured the nation that he will step down in 1988, and he has offered some proposals about reform that could contribute to the dialogue. Although constrained by government guidelines, the Korean press does engage in some direct criticisms of the government and it publishes considerably more indirect critical commentary.

The U.S. Role

In such a setting, what should be the American role? I believe we should continue to encourage both the government and the opposition to practice moderation, to engage in dialogue and to be willing to compromise, as these are values inherent in our democratic societies. Similarly, we should condemn violations of human rights and restrictions on political participation. It is important, I believe, that our efforts be on behalf of basic principles and practices rather than support of particular individuals or specific partisan points of view, which are matters which should rightly be left to the Koreans themselves.

We must be aware that our influence on the Korean political situation, while greater than that of other foreign countries, is nevertheless limited. We have no right to interfere directly in domestic matters. We should also appreciate that many Koreans, perhaps for historical reasons, have an exaggerated notion of our ability to influence events in Korea and have partisan reasons for urging us to do so. Because of these considerations, we need to be cautious in our public pronouncements so as not to raise expectations that we may not be able to meet.

Finally, as I noted at the beginning of my testimony, Korea is a unique place, and we need to deal with it as such. There has been public speculation both here and in Korea about so-called parallels between Korea and the Philippines and prognostications about the implications of recent developments in the Philippines for our policies toward Korea.

We believe the differences between Korea and the Philippines are more significant. In Korea, President Chun has promised to step down in less than two years and the economy is booming. Korea does not face a domestic communist insurgency but a real and immediate external threat, and the Korean military's professionalism is at a high level. We have of course encouraged continued democratization in Korea in the past, and we will continue to do so in the future. We believe that some success has been achieved. However, we should remember that ultimately it will be Korean efforts that nurture and achieve the open and more consensual political system that all Koreans desire.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, thank you very much. Admiral Baker, do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. EDWARD BAKER, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Admiral BAKER. Yes, I would be very happy to forgo reading my presentation. And, also, the questions and answers that were asked by the staff members, you can put those in the record also.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, please do.

[Admiral Baker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. EDWARD B. BAKER, JR., ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity to discuss with you and members of the Subcommittee the FY 1987 security assistance program for Korea. It is particularly significant that we address the subject of Korea today, as Secretary Weinberger has just returned from a successful visit to Korea where he led the U.S. delegation to the 18th ROK/U.S. Security Consultative Meeting. This was the sixth such annual meeting that the Secretary has attended and his presence underscores the great importance which we place on our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.

Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are not only a vital concern of the United States, but also are of global import. For it is on the Korean peninsula, and perhaps there alone, where the interests of four major powers -- the U.S., Japan, China, and the Soviet Union -- intersect. Renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula would put at risk the stability of the region and could ignite a confrontation between the major regional powers. For more than 30 years the joint efforts of the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) have deterred North Korean aggression. Our support to the ROK under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and, in particular, the presence of U.S. ground and air forces in Korea, has played a key role in this deterrence. If deterrence were to fail, these U.S. forces would be engaged immediately alongside ROK forces under the only combined U.S./allied command outside NATO. Our security assistance goal is a ROK military capability which, when complemented by the U.S. military presence, will deter

and effectively defend against an attack by the North.

Despite the fundamental importance of our security relations to both countries, those relations are not static. As Secretary Weinberger observed earlier this month in Seoul: "Our security relationship is constantly changing and maturing." Once Korea depended almost entirely on the United States for military support. Today, Korea boasts a strong defense industry and supports modern, well-equipped armed forces with minimal security assistance from the United States. The North Korean threat is not static either, however, and Secretary Weinberger reiterated our srong belief that both a continued American military presence and a continued security assistance program will be required to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

The Military Balance

Last year Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kelly told this Subcommittee that, despite devoting almost 6% of its GNP to defense, the ROK has been unable to match the massive North Korean military buildup which began in 1970. During the past year, both North and South Korea made improvements to their respective armed forces, primarily through acquisition of new weapon systems or improvements to existing ones. The military balance, however, still favors the North.

The North Korean Army (NKA) remains about 40% larger than ROK ground forces, with almost twice as many maneuver units, tanks, artillery pieces, and armored personnel carriers. Additionally, the NKA boasts possibly the world's largest special

purpose or unconventional warfare force. ROK ground forces are, nevertheless, large, well-trained and equipped, and would, with adequate warning, be very effective in a defensive war. In the air North Korea holds a nearly 2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft and has an effective defensive and creditable offensive capability. The ROK Air Force (ROKAF) is smaller, but qualitatively superior. The North Korean Navy is larger and more modern, with a 3 to 1 advantage in surface ships and a significant submarine force. The ROK Navy has a greater number of larger surface ships and a superior antiship missile capability, but lags the North in other combat capabilities.

Last year, we drew your attention to two developments which had a significant impact on the military balance in Korea. I would like to review these briefly with you, as they continue to have a profound influence on that balance and relate to developments which have occurred since last year.

First, North Korea continued its extensive military reorganization and redeployment which began in 1984 and included repositioning of ground combat forces nearer the DMZ. This forward deployment includes corps-size elements, with artillery, armor and mechanized infantry assets. When added to mechanized infantry and engineer river-crossing forces already in the forward area, this may give North Korea a first and second echelon, as well as strategic reserve, garrisoned far enough forward that extensive pre-attack or defensive troop movements will no longer be required. This would seriously complicate the warning problem for the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command.

A second development which has affected the military balance is the marked increase in mobility and firepower of North Korean forces. The North Korean Army's mechanization program, begun about 10 years ago, provides a potent direct fire support capability, as well as a very strong mobile defense and counterattack capability. The addition of self-propelled artillery has greatly strengthened North Korea's armored and mechanized divisions. Additionally, North Korean mobility has been improved by the acquisition of Hughes 500/300 model helicopters. These helicopters provide North Korea with an added airlift capability for troops and materiel. More importantly, however, is their potential use in inserting North Korean special purpose or guerrilla forces deep into the South's rear areas to attack airbases, command, control and communications facilities, and logistics centers. We now believe that the 87 Hughes helicopters acquired illegally last year are in the process of being armed. Since they are identical to helicopters which the ROK possess, their operational use in the South would greatly complicate the identification of friend or foe.

Perhaps the most significant development in the military situation over the past year has been the expansion of Soviet-North Korean relations which occurred since President Kim Il-song visited Moscow in May 1984. Last year the Soviets delivered 26 MIG-23/FLOGGER aircraft to North Korea, and we expect that additional FLOGGERs will be delivered this year, to bring the total from 35 to 45 aircraft. The Soviets have also provided SA-3/GOA surface-to-air missiles to North Korea.

In exchange, the Soviets have apparently received permission to make military overflights of North Korea, probably for both intelligence collection and strike mission simulation. These flights have been made by TU-16/BADGER reconnaissance aircraft, TU-95/BEAR G strike aircraft, and TU-95/BEAR D naval intelligence collectors. Additionally, Soviet fighter units conducted their first visit to North Korea in early May and three naval combatants -- one KARA-Class guided missile cruiser and two KRIVAK-Class guided missile frigates -- made the first such port call to North Korea by major Soviet naval combatants. These events suggest an increase in Soviet-North Korean military cooperation in the future.

ROK forces continued efforts to redress the imbalance with the North last year. The ROK's military capabilities are considerable, but they are also critically dependent on the U.S. for air, naval, and logistics support, warning, and command, control and communications.

ROK Military Requirements

The ROK's principal military needs continue to be in the areas of artillery and anti-tank firepower, ground force mobility through acquisition of vehicles and construction of lateral roads, air defense, tactical communications, fuel storage, in-country war reserve stockpiles, and indications and warning capabilities. The ROK is engaged in a major Force Improvment Program (FIP) to meet many of these needs. The current program, FIP II, includes coproduction of the F-5 and M109A2 howitzer, acquisition of the F-16 fighter and TOW missiles, upgrade of the HAWK air defense system, and production of an indigenous tank.

The ROK continues to make a very significant contribution to its own defense, allocating almost 6% of its GNP to defense. Defense spending accounts for approximately one-third of the ROK budget, or about $4.8 billion. About half of the $9 billion which the ROK will spend in FIP II during the 1982-86 period will be spent in the U.S. This amount -- about $500 million annually over and above the FMS credit allocation -- greatly exceeds in value our assistance for Korea.

Our request for $230 million in security assistance to Korea -- all of it in loans at market interest rates -- equates to only five percent of the ROK defense budget. But it is an important five percent, particularly when coupled with the softer repayment terms (10 years' grace on repayment of principal, 20 years repayment) approved by the Congress. This enables Korea to spend more on equipment purchases rather than debt service.

The principal items to be financed by FMS credits will be the F-16C fighter aircraft, AH-1S TOW Cobra helicopter, intercept aerial rocket motor, low altitude air defense radar, and STINGER air defense missile. Last year Congressional reductions in the overall level of security assistance funding had an adverse impact on our aid for Korea, even before Gramm-Rudman reductions. It is imperative that funding be returned to levels which will permit the ROK to modernize and upgrade its military equipment and begin to reduce the North Korean advantage.

War Reserve Stocks

During the past three years both the ROK and North Korea have

continued to develop military reserve stocks and resupply capabilities. The North's decided advantage in this area derives from its large war reserve stockpile base and storage capacity, as well as the relatively shorter distance to its external sources of supply. With a large portion of both its forces and supplies positioned well forward along the DMZ, North Korea has significantly greater flexibility in launching offensive operations. Warning time for ROK and U.S. forces is thus very limited, requiring a high state of readiness at all times.

In 1985 the Congress authorized $360M in U.S. stocks to be placed in the WRSA stockpile in 1986 and an additional $120M to be added in 1987. This will continue U.S. efforts to improve the War Reserve Stocks for Allies stockpile on the peninsula. The present combined ammunition war reserves in the ROK are sufficient for a reasonable period of combat, but serious deficiencies exist in several critical types of ammunition. The ROK has contributed over $500M for the procurement, storage, administration and maintenance of ammunition for its own reserve stockpiles during the 1980-84 period. In addition, the ROK has assumed responsibility for storage and maintenance of the U.S. WRSA supplies. Moreover, they are currently making significant expenditures in this area and have programmed substantial additional purchases over the next five years. Current ROK Government acquisitions of War Reserve materiel for the period 1986-1989 are projected at $794M.

Democracy, Internal Stability, and Security

The recent peaceful transition of governmental authority in the Philippines has inevitably spawned attempts to find parallels

elsewhere. Some observers have sought to compare the Korean situation with that of the Philippines. Indeed, from the perspective American security interests, there are some similarities between the two countries.

-- Both have long-standing special relationships with the United States and American forces have stood with the armed forces of both nations to repel foreign invasions.

-- U.S. security interests are engaged in both Korea and the Philippines, U.S. forces are present in both, and we have mutual security treaties with both governments.

-- Both countries face a Communist menace, although one is external while the other comes from within.

Objective analysis shows, however, that the differences between these two societies, governments, and national institutions -- and their respective political, economic, and military situations -- far outweigh any similarities.

-- Korea lacks the democratic experience which 50 years of American governance and 26 years of political democracy brought to the Philippines before Marcos declared martial law. Modern Korean political and social experience has been shaped by harsh colonial rule, war, and the threat of war, and emphasized traditional Confucian values of authority and discipline.

-- Korea is not without political problems, but the central question of peaceful transition of power is not at issue in Korea as it was in the Philippines. Whereas President Marcos intended to remain in power regardless of the means required to do so,

President Chun has announced that he will leave office at the end of his term in 1988.

-- Korea has experienced phenomenal economic growth and its prospects for the future remain bright. During 1986 Korea is expected to return to its previous economic growth rates of over 8%, while the Philippine economy under the previous regime stagnated under the weight of inefficiency, corruption, and mismanagement. Moreover, throughout the post-war period, the Korean government has continued to play an active role in broadly distributing the fruits of the Korean economic miracle. Korea's income distribution, by whatever measurement, is among the most equitable in the developing world. The absence of a similarly equitable distribution has been at the root of many of the Philippines' problems.

-- Korea faces an external Communist military threat which tends to unite its people, regardless of political viewpoint. In contrast, the Communist Party of the Philippines capitalized on domestic political, social, and economic grievances, while downplaying its own dedication to revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrines, in its efforts to divide Philippine society.

-- As a result of Korea's precarious security situation, the Korean military has played a key role as ultimate arbiter of political power and guarantor of national survival over the past 25 years. The ROK armed forces are for the most part professional and proficient, equipped and trained to employ modern weapon systems against a larger and more heavily armed conventional foe

poised on its border. They enjoy the support of the nation in their mission of national defense. There is no evidence that the Korean military's loyalty to the Chun government has eroded to any politically significant degree. On the other hand, the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been declining rapidly in both military professionalism and capability, and was ill-trained and equipped to deal with the Communist insurgency within its borders. Increasingly dismayed at the politicization of the officer corps, loss of popular support for the military, and lack of resources to perform its mission, the AFP was ripe for disaffection when the election crisis of February 1986 erupted. No similar event or series of events seems likely in Korea, as President Chun has indicated that he is serious about leaving office in two years.

While the differences beween the Philippines and Korea are clear, the Philippine situation nevertheless reminds us of the essential relationship between democracy and security. President Reagan described this relationship in his 1983 address to the National Assembly and a live Korean television audience: "The development of democratic political institutions is the surest means to build the national consensus that is the foundation of true security." In the end, Korea's security will depend as much on internal stability as it will on military preparedness. And the former depends on progress toward democracy, just as the latter depends on a strong and credible U.S. security commitment.

Conclusion

The prevention of hostilities on the Korean peninsula is an

essential element of regional peace, one for which the deterrence of North Korean aggression is fundamental. Our security alliance with the ROK has succeeded in preventing North Korea from acting on its avowed goal of reuniting the two Koreas by armed force. The peace in Korea has been uneasy -- marked by violent and at times barbaric North Korean provocations, such as the 1968 raid on the Blue House by North Korean commandos, the seizure two days later of the U.S.S. Pueblo, the assassination of the South Korean President's wife, the brutal ax murders of American servicemen, and the 1983 Rangoon bombing which killed 15 members of the ROK cabinet. Yet, peace has been preserved, and this peace has allowed South Korea to flourish, even as the North stagnates.

The ROK's achievements as a newly industrialized country have been recognized in its selection to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics. The dynamic South Korea economy, after several years of sluggish performance, is now growing again at a rate of 7 1/2-8 1/2 percent annually. The economic gap with the North is widening rapidly -- the ROK economy is now more than four times larger -- with profound implications for defense spending. Over the long term North Korea will find it difficult to equal the ROK's investment in military programs, and the South will also benefit from better access to advanced technologies.

The outlook for Korea is indeed relatively bright, especially with regard to the economy. Nevertheless, we believe that, with the Asian Games scheduled this year and elections and the Olymics

in 1988, Korea is entering a particularly dangerous period. North Korea will maintain its military advantage over the ROK for at least the remainder of this decade. The scale and breadth of the North Korean ground and naval modernization programs are so great that the South will have difficulty simply matching anticipated improvements in the North. The only way the South can overcome its numerical disadvantage is by pursuing quality rather than quantity in its forces. We cautioned last year that FIP II will not close the gap substantially with the North. The ROK beginning in 1987 will institute a five year rolling Force Improvement Program similar to the U.S.'s Five Year Defense Plan. By the early 1990's trends should begin to favor the South.

It would be premature, however, to conclude that the ROK will close the gap by then. South Korea will have considerably strengthened its forces by the late 1980's and, as the defender, will not need military parity to blunt successfully an attack by the North. Our experience in predicting North Korean behavior over the past 20 years cautions our estimates. Moreover, it is precisely this period -- with the South so successful in economic terms and able to invest more in its own defense, while the North remains politically isolated and economically languid -- in which the danger of armed conflict is greatest. Any perception of U.S. and ROK weakness may invite military aggression by the North. Likewise, it is possible that the North will see latter part of the 1980's as its last chance to gain control of the ROK. These factors -- and the consistent unpredictability of North Korea -- militate against sudden shifts in our security assistance or military presence in South Korea. The stakes for regional stability are high, and we cannot afford to miscalculate.

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Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think that it could possibly serve a useful purpose for us to adopt a resolution which, assuming it were carefully crafted, would express and reaffirm our commitment to South Korea, mention its importance to the United States, pay tribute to Korea's economic progress and progress toward democracy, but go on to say that we think it would be helpful if there was further progress, and particularly if a way could be found to resolve the differences over how to conduct the next Presidential election so that the next election could reflect the will of the South Korean people, could serve as a basis for unifying the country, and could enhance the prospects for political stability and genuine democracy?

Mr. SIGUR. The idea of a resolution is really up to you and the others here to decide. As you have described it, we will certainly be happy, after you have written it out, to look at it and give our views.

Whether we support it would depend upon what it says. But we would like to share some drafts with you and get the benefit of your thinking on it.

Mr. SOLARZ. We would appreciate that.

Now, what is your own view on this question concerning the relationship between the Ambassador and Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. I mean, is this a matter of American policy, that he should not meet with the two opposition leaders, even though other members of the Embassy staff do? Or is this just an accident oversight? What is your own view on that?

Mr. SIGUR. My understanding is that he has met with Kim Young Sam and he has met with Lee Min Woo, the head of the opposition party.

Mr. SOLARZ. When you say it is your understanding he has met with Kim Young Sam——

Mr. SIGUR. I mean he has seen and talked with him at social occasions and that is it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right.

Mr. SIGUR. But he has met with other leaders of the opposition, including the present head of the party, Lee Min Woo.

In the case of Kim Dae Jung, things have apparently not worked out for a session between the two of them, although as you know, Ambassador Walker did a great deal after the events that Dick Allen described to get the death sentence removed from Kim and other things leading to his final departure from Korea. Ambassador Walker did a great deal to facilitate that and move it along. So he has been very active in that sense.

And I would like to say that in the whole area of human rights and civil liberties, Ambassador Walker has made a number of major speeches in Korea on these issues, speeches right down the line in terms of what we believe and support.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I would have thought, frankly, precisely because of that and his previous record on these kinds of issues, that this would have been a kind of routine thing for the Ambassador to have done.

I am struck by the fact, for example, that Ambassador Barnes in Chile has commenced meetings with key figures in the opposition there. I do not think that is for the purpose of orchestrating the

overthrow of the Government of Chile, but I think he felt that this was his responsibility.

And the impression I have is that this has been very well received. It is seen as a kind of even-handed gesture.

Mr. SIGUR. That is right. But what I have said, Mr. Chairman, is that Ambassador Walker has met with many of the leaders of the opposition, including the present head of the major opposition party. He has met with Cardinal Kim on several occasions and had him to his home, as well as people who hold differing views from the present administration.

I think it is just a set of circumstances that has not jelled for a meeting. But he has no opposition to such——

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I would hope that when you have the opportunity to talk with him you might encourage him to do this. I think something that should not be an issue is threatening to become an issue.

I am sure it was not intended to send signals that the Ambassador was not meeting with him, any more than it should send a signal that he is meeting with him.

Mr. SIGUR. Well, I appreciate your suggestion, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Admiral Baker, how many men does North Korea have under arms at this time?

Admiral BAKER. The number is about 850,000.

Mr. SOLARZ. Does that represent an increase over what they had, say, 2 years ago?

Admiral BAKER. It is about the same number of men under arms as 2 years ago.

Mr. SOLARZ. And how does that compare to the south?

Admiral BAKER. The south has about 600,000.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now year after year here I have heard in administration witnesses testify on force improvement and modernization programs. Each one follows on the succession of the other, all of which seem to have a rolling timetable for the achievement of an indigenous balance of power on the Korean peninsula. As the years go by the balance does not seem to be established and the gap remains.

Would you say the gap has remained more or less constant over the last 7 years? Do you think it has narrowed, or has it increased? I am talking about the indigenous balance between the north and the south.

Admiral BAKER. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the gap is about the same as it has been in the past. There is no doubt that the ROK forces are improving and there is no doubt that the North Korean forces are improving. But the unfortunate thing is that they are improving at the same rate and we still have a gap between the two.

Mr. SOLARZ. If both sides are improving in their own terms, but neither side is improving vis-a-vis the other, because the gap remains constant, then it is clear that neither side is better off, and in a certain sense both sides are worse off because since both sides have spent more on arms and defense, they have less for other things that would create a better life for their people.

I mean, even if you look at it from Kim Il-Sung's point of view, he is no better off because the South has matched what he has done. So he has not widened the gap.

So what drives this competition? And do you see any possibility that there could be some kind of agreement, perhaps to freeze the current levels as a way of enabling both sides to reduce their military expenditures.

Admiral BAKER. Well, I think there is one factor which you did not discuss that is really driving the equation, and that is the economics of it. In the Republic of Korea they spend 6 percent of their GNP on defense. And their GNP is on the order of $80 billion per year.

North Korea, on the other hand, spends about $24 billion per year on defense, and their—I am sorry.

Mr. SOLARZ. Twenty-four percent.

Admiral BAKER. Twenty-four percent, right.

Mr. SOLARZ. They would not have anything left for anything else.

Admiral BAKER. And their GNP is about one-quarter of what it is in the south. So right now there is an equality between the defense budgets, give or take a few dollars.

This is going to change because the South Korean economy is expanding at a much faster rate than the North Korean economy. So in the future years, and by that I mean perhaps next year or the year after, the amount of money spent in the south will be greater than the north. And then the equipment gap will be decreased, rather than maintaining this constant spread between north and south.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has there been any recent configuration of the North Korean forces, any change in method or mode or location of their deployment?

Admiral BAKER. Yes, sir, there has. As Mr. Kelly testified last year, there has been a deployment down closer to the DMZ, within about 70 kilometers of the DMZ. And what this has done is decreased the warning time that we have in the south.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you characterize that deployment? They moved forces further south. How many forces did they move?

Admiral BAKER. I will have to provide for the record the actual number of forces. In fact, it may be classified, sir. I do not know that. But I know that it is a significant movement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, could you not provide that for the record? We can take these submissions on a classified basis.

Admiral BAKER. Yes, sir.

[The information was provided on a classified basis and is retained in subcommittee files.]

Mr. SOLARZ. But what are the reasons for this redeployment? How ominous a development is this?

Admiral BAKER. It is ominous in the sense that the south no longer has the warning time that they had before. There is routine movement of forces now within, roughly, 70 kilometers of the DMZ. And we cannot tell whether that is a deployment to the south or whether it is just routine.

So that decreases the time and requires the U.S. and ROK forces to maintain an alert that is much more stringent than was required before.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, before this deployment how much time did we feel we needed in terms of advance indication that they were going to launch an attack to be reasonably confident we could repel it and how much time do we need now?

Admiral BAKER. We would be able to detect movement south and that would have been the indications of warning. But now, since they are already there, we do not have that. So it is really not so much a specific time, it is more of a general concept.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, do you think that it would, in fact, be in the interests of the United States for the next Presidential election in South Korea to be conducted on a basis in which the Korean people themselves have confidence that the results will reflect their will and their wishes?

Mr. SIGUR. Oh, yes, I think it has to be conducted that way.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you see any possibility that there could be some kind of creative compromise between the Government and the opposition on the procedures and modalities for holding that election?

Mr. SIGUR. Well, I would certainly hope so. The U.S. Government takes no position on the question of an indirect or direct election. We believe that is up to the Koreans to decide.

But we certainly hope that the opposition and the Government will be able to come together on this and reach a conclusion satisfactory to both sides.

Mr. SOLARZ. On my visit there a few weeks ago, I must say I came away with the impression that there is much more at stake here than just a kind of abstract, constitutional debate over what system of electing a president would be best for the country.

In a certain sense it almost is a metaphor for democracy itself, and that if there is not a satisfactory resolution of this constitutional question, that there could be a significant potential for instability. And, therefore, we do have a significant interest in a constructive and creative resolution. Would you agree with that?

Mr. SIGUR. I agree with that. That is an issue: The broad question of just exactly how the opposition and the Government can move in the modernization process leading up to the Presidential election.

I agree with you. It is a very important issue.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think I have a pretty good understanding as to exactly why the opposition is pushing for direct elections. But it is not absolutely clear to me why the Government is resisting as firmly as they appear to be doing.

What are your thoughts on this?

Mr. SIGUR. I do not know. It is hard for me to speculate on that, Mr. Chairman. That is the way the electoral system has been set up. The Government believes, according to their spokesman, that the indirect election system will be democratic and will reflect the views of the Korean people.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have we taken any position, publicly or privately, on whether we believe the remaining restrictions on Kim Dae Jung's political activity should be lifted?

Mr. SIGUR. Yes, we have taken a public position. We believe they should be lifted.

Mr. SOLARZ. And we think that would be constructive?

Mr. SIGUR. We believe that would be constructive.

Mr. SOLARZ. What response have we received from the South Korean Government?

Mr. SIGUR. They have not lifted the restrictions, but we have made it very plain we would like to see them lifted.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right. But when I say what response, I mean what reasons have they given you?

Mr. SIGUR. As they see it, he is still convicted of certain crimes. They apparently do not want the lifting of these restrictions. We think that they should be lifted.

They apparently think his crimes were of such seriousness that the restrictions should not be lifted.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you briefly give us your assessment of the north/south talks. Particularly, do you think there is any real possibility for progress in those negotiations?

Mr. SIGUR. There certainly has not been much progress so far, Mr. Chairman. But the very fact that the talks are going on is of great significance. I think the talks will continue. Right now, as you know, they are suspended because of the Team Spirit exercise. The north has suspended them. But we expect that the talks will begin again once the exercise is over.

It is really hard to judge where the talks will go and what will happen. But they are talking. Hopefully, somewhere down the road, there will be some decisions made which will show progress. But so far we cannot say much about it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you both one question, and then I will yield to my good friend Mr. Solomon.

As we approach the transition to a new leadership in North Korea, as Kim Il-Sung presumably reaches the end of his career and his putative successor appears moving toward taking over as the new great leader—I see he has been promoted from dear leader to great leader in the last year—how do we calculate the significance of these developments for the possibility of another war on the Korean peninsula?

I mean, do we think that Kim Il-Sung is in any way more likely to launch another attack than he has been for the last 30 years because he may be reaching the end of his days and he might like to go to his grave having fulfilled his ambition of reunifying Korea under his control?

Second, how do we judge the prospects for preservation of peace once his son takes over, if he does take over? I know it is difficult to learn much out about this fellow. But nevertheless, he is fairly young and he could be the next leader and be a vital interest there.

So I assume you look at these questions and it would be helpful if you could give us your feel for them.

Admiral BAKER. The only thing that I know is that we know very little about the situation and about the individuals involved, which makes it very, very difficult. You are really talking about hypothetical, what if, type situations, and it is very difficult for us in the Department of Defense to analyze something where there are no hard facts. And with that I will turn to——

Mr. SOLARZ. But that never stops the State Department.

Mr. SIGUR. No, we always go on.

Rather than put it down to individuals I think you have to look at the overall situation. I am not sure that Kim Il-Sung's believes

he has to act before he dies or that Kim Jung-Il is coming in with a desire to do something to make his mark, so to speak.

I think there are other elements that are very, very significant: just how strong they actually are and what they could accomplish by an attack. Of course, the Seoul Olympics are coming up. How significant the North Koreans believe that is will determine whether they try to upset the Games.

On the other hand, there is perhaps the restraining influence of great powers in the region who would hold them back from such a thing as that. There are all kinds of elements involved, it seems to me. And rather than the personalities of the two people that you mentioned, I think these other objective realities will have a very great influence one way or the other on them.

Mr. SOLARZ. I will now yield to my extraordinarily patient colleague who is faithfully hanging on.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Sigur, you and I have already met and discussed many of these questions. So I will not have too many today.

I said before, you have tough shoes to fill because Paul Wolfowitz did an outstanding job, as you know, and we certainly know that you are going to do the same.

Let me just ask you gentlemen a rhetorical question. How is democracy progressing in North Korea?

Mr. SIGUR. It is not progressing at all, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. I think I would just like to make a comment because my chairman was trying to get on the record, I guess, the relative strengths of the North Koreans and the South Koreans. I had an opportunity—I cannot remember the acronym. It is a CINCPAC in Hawaii, but what is it in the Korean Command? What do you call——

Admiral BAKER. CINCUNC, Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, sir.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you. I have a terrible time with these acronyms. But I think every Member of Congress ought to have that briefing because it was by far the best briefing that I have ever had in almost a decade of serving in this house.

One of the things that struck me was the fact that North Korea has three-quarters as many artillery pieces in place along the 120 miles of the DMZ, than the United States has in the entire world.

So I think that should give us some kind of an idea. That is how dramatic it is. That is not classified. There is a lot of classified information that we cannot discuss here. That is why every Member really should make himself, avail himself to that kind of a briefing.

Let me just ask either of you about 1983, when the terrorist attack took place in Rangoon. If President Chun had been killed at that time, what is your opinion? Do you think that North Korea would have invaded South Korea at that time if that assassination had been successful and had destabilized the entire government? What would have happened in your opinion? Admiral Baker, what do you think?

Admiral BAKER. I think that it would not have. I think that there is enough stability in the Republic of Korea that the democratic process would take over and there would have been strength

there and the North would not have been able to go in and fill a vacuum.

Mr. SOLOMON. So there is a good base of democracy in South Korea? That was the point that I was driving at, because that is my view. When I was there and I talked to the party in power and talked to the opposition members, it seems to me there is a democracy there. It does not go as far as we would like it to go yet, but I have that same feeling, and it is good to hear that.

Would the current unrest in South Korea, the demonstrations and the petitions concerning democracy, be likely to dissipate if the North Koreans made some kind of menacing move against the South? Do you think because things are a little quiet there right now that perhaps because the threat of an imminent invasion seems more distant, all of this tends to build up the demonstrations as such? What is your feeling?

Mr. SIGUR. Of course everybody in South Korea, you know, opposes the North very strongly and supports the security necessities for their Government and for their people in South Korea. Nobody opposes that.

I think that the fact that there is stability in South Korea, that it is a strong, stable country and a strong, stable society in so many ways, and the economy is good and all sorts of things, that it does allow, of course, for democratic movement. I do not think there is any question about that. This is true.

Mr. SOLOMON. How serious is the—I mean without getting into the classified information—how serious is the North Korean threat to disrupt the Olympics in 1988 and will there be any North Korean participation in the—what are they, I think the Asian games that are going on this year?

Mr. SIGUR. I think there is a possibility that the north is certainly thinking about some ways of disrupting it. As you know, the talks between North and South Korea have included the Olympics and the way in which the north might be able to participate in the Olympics. No agreement has been reached on this at all.

As far as I know, the north does not intend to participate in the Asian games.

Mr. SOLOMON. Let me just ask, because I am curious, about the student demonstrations. What is the South Korean law concerning the draft, is there a universal draft in South Korea, or is it a selective draft? How effectively does the Government recruit people into their military?

Admiral BAKER. I do not know that sir.

Mr. SIGUR. There is a draft.

Admiral BAKER. There is a draft. I do not know the details but I can get those for you.

[The information follows:]

Answer. The draft is a universal system. All able bodied men are drafted for 30 months. After their active duty obligation is completed they enter the Homeland Reserve and are subject to recall until they reach 45. College students can be exempted from the draft until they complete their degree. South Korean reenlistment rates have fallen off somewhat since the 1970s but they have no substantive problem maintaining the total strength of their forces since they have a universal draft system in place.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, I think—I do not know, but I think Steve was telling me that there is a universal draft. And I just wondered if there were any morale problems in the South Korean military or if they have any problems with the draft being effective. How do the young people feel about that?

Mr. SIGUR. I think there is general acceptance of the draft and I think there is no morale problem at all in the South Korean Army.

This is what I meant earlier, Mr. Solomon. There is a recognition of the great threat they are under. Everybody accepts this and the fact that they must be prepared. They have got to be ready and they have to participate in training themselves to be ready for this. So I do not see any opposition.

Mr. SOLOMON. OK, Mr. Chairman, I have had, like I said, previous discussions. I do not think I will ask any more questions at this time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much. Admiral Baker, I want to thank you. Secretary Sigur, I want to thank you very much. Sorry to keep you here so late, but it was good to have both of you and we look forward to working with you in the future.

The hearing is recessed. We will be meeting tomorrow. And let me say to Mr. Solomon that we do have this motion on the Bernstein Brothers. I hope you can encourage some of our Republican colleagues to come because we need a quorum.

Mr. SOLOMON. Between the two of us we ought to be able to drag a quorum in here, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. I will corral the Democrats if you will lasso the Republicans. The hearing is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 5:58 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene Thursday, April 17, 1986, and proceeded with other business . . . the hearing then adjourned.]

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in open marking session at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen J. Solarz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SOLARZ. The subcommittee will come to order.

We meet today to consider resolutions concerning North Korea and South Korea.

The subcommittee will take up first House Concurrent Resolution 261, which was originally introduced on December 17 by Mr. Feighan. I ask unanimous consent to consider the resolution as read. I will offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute expressing the sense of the Congress concerning democracy in the Republic of Korea.

I think the members have copies of this before them. Let me just say that we have tried over the last week, particularly in the last day, to accommodate the concerns of the members of the subcommittee and the full committee who have taken an interest in this, as well as the administration.

I am informed the State Department has no objection to the resolution, and that the policy expressed in this resolution is consistent with what we are saying publicly and privately in connection with South Korea.

Does anyone care to comment on the amendment in the nature of a substitute or the resolution? Following the vote on this resolution, we will then take up a resolution that has been introduced by Mr. Solomon on North Korea.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Torricelli?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Let me commend you for offering this resolution today, and our colleague, Mr. Feighan, who over some time has provided real leadership on this issue, and been an articulate spokesman for what I think is a common view among many of us on the committee.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I only want to urge my colleagues to offer their unqualified support for what is a very important statement by our country to a nation that holds a special place in this

history of our country, a painful place because we have fought together, and one for which we all have great hopes in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

If there is no further debate, the vote will come on the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the chairman. All those in favor, say "aye."

All those opposed, say "no."

The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. If there is no debate, then, on the resolution as amended, the vote will come to the resolution as amended by the substitute.

All those in favor say "aye."

All those opposed, say "no."

The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the resolution is adopted.

The subcommittee will now move to the consideration of a resolution on North Korea, introduced by the gentleman from New York. Will the clerk please read the resolution?

CLERK. Resolution on North Korea, expressing the sense of the Congress concerning the improvement of human rights in North Korea and the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. SOLARZ. Without objection, the resolution will be considered as read.

Mr. Solomon, do you are to comment on your resolution?

Mr. SOLOMON. No, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank Mr. Torricelli for his earlier remarks on your substitute, and I want to thank you for your cooperation on this issue. I would move the resolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Let me just say before passing, this may be the first resolution on North Korea adopted by the Congress in three decades, so it is an achievement. I want to pay tribute to Mr. Solomon and other members of the subcommittee for working with the Chair in an effort to agree on language which is acceptable to all of us.

I think we are always more effective abroad when we are united at home. This resolution, together with the other one that was adopted, sends just the right kind of signals to both these countries, one of which is our friend and ally, the other with which we still have not signed peace treaty, and which acts in very disturbing and despicable ways.

I am pleased we could reach this agreement among ourselves, and I trust that it will commend itself to our colleagues on the full committee, and then on the floor when it comes up.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank you for those remarks, and I would just ask a question. I would hope you request both these resolutions be taken up on the floor at the same time?

Mr. SOLARZ. Of course.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I am mindful of the time, and I will be brief. I only want to commend the gentleman from New York, Mr. Solo-

mon, for his resolution. We note the difficulties of South Korea because it is a nation, is a friend of whom we have high expectations, but at the same time, it is worth noting the failures of North Korea where we have so few expectations.

Nevertheless, they should be considered on a common plane, even if they are very different nations with a different relationship with the United States.

For that, as I have commended you, I also would like to commend Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLARZ. Any further debate?

If not, the vote will come on the resolution on North Korea introduced by Mr. Solomon. All those in favor say "aye."

All those opposed, say "nay."

The ayes appear to have it, the ayes have it. The resolution is adopted.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee proceeded to other business.]

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open markup session at 10:33 a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman) presiding.

[Whereupon the committee proceeded to other business.]

Chairman FASCELL. The next item of business is House Concurrent Resolution 345, which the chief of staff will report.

Mr. BRADY. House Concurrent Resolution 345. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress concerning democracy in the Republic of Korea; and——

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, further reading of the resolution will be dispensed with, and it will be printed in the record, in full and open to amendment.

[The full text of H. Con. Res. 345 follows:]

99TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. CON. RES. 345

Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning democracy in the Republic of Korea.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 3, 1986

Mr. FEIGHAN (for himself, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. TORRICELLI, and Mr. UDALL) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning democracy in the Republic of Korea.

Whereas over three decades ago United States troops fought shoulder to shoulder with the armed forces of the Republic of Korea in defense of Korea's freedom, and over 50,000 Americans gave their lives for that cause;

Whereas the United States continues to have a vital interest in the security of the Republic of Korea, as demonstrated by provision of more than $12,000,000,000 in economic and military assistance since 1953, the current stationing of over

40,000 American troops on the Korean peninsula, and the existence of a bilateral treaty of military security;

Whereas the Republic of Korea, a friendly country allied with the United States, has made remarkable strides in promoting widespread economic prosperity and educational progress;

Whereas the security of the Republic of Korea is best ensured by deterring an attack by the forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

Whereas one element of deterrence is the internal stability of the Republic of Korea, which is best promoted by rapid progress toward full democracy;

Whereas the Korean people are clearly desirous and capable of participating in a genuinely democratic system without endangering the security of their country;

Whereas the February 1985 National Assembly elections constituted a significant step in the establishment of democracy in the Republic of Korea;

Whereas President Chun Du Hwan has repeatedly declared his intention to honor the constitutional restriction limiting him to only one 7-year term, which would lay the foundation for a peaceful transition of power;

Whereas free and fair presidential elections in late 1987 or early 1988 will provide an opportunity to realize the democratic aspirations of the Korean people;

Whereas a petition campaign calling for direct presidential elections has been permitted to go forward, and the Government of the Republic of Korea has indicated a willingness to consider constitutional revisions before the presidential elections; and

Whereas in spite of Korea's remarkable educational and economic progress, the Government of the Republic of Korea continues to restrict fundamental rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as well as restricting the right of individuals to engage in political activity, and has resorted to the incarceration and in some cases, according to credible reports, torture of some of its political opponents: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the interest of the United States in political stability and human rights in the Republic of Korea would best be served by rapid progress toward a full democracy, specifically by—

(1) a dialogue between the government and the opposition, in a spirit of reconciliation, designed to resolve their differences and to facilitate the establishment of genuine democracy in the Republic of Korea;

(2) the peaceful and democratic transfer of the Presidency of the Republic of Korea through elections which are designed, by agreement among the political parties, to give the Korean people confidence that the outcome of those elections reflects their will and wishes;

(3) guarantees for all citizens of the Republic of Korea of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and due process of law; and

(4) release of all political prisoners and the restoration of political rights for all those for whom such rights have not yet been restored.

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●BCON 345 III

Chairman FASCELL. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me, first of all, pay tribute to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Feighan, who introduced this legislation.

I also want to pay tribute to a very distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Yatron, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, which has jurisdiction over this legislation. Mr. Yates, who has expressed his strong support for these resolutions, has very graciously agreed to permit us to bring these bills up without the necessity of them being taken up before his subcommittee.

In brief, what this resolution does is to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to the security of South Korea in the face of the continuing threat to its territorial integrity and political independence from North Korea.

It takes note of the enormous economic progress which has been made in the Republic of Korea over the course of the last three decades, as well as the significant educational progress that has been made in that country. They have an almost 100-percent literacy rate.

At the same time that the resolution pays tribute to the Government of South Korea for the economic and educational progress that has been made, as well as some of the political progress, which has resulted from the recent elections to the Parliament and from the decision on the part of the Government to permit the democratic opposition to proceed with its petition campaign for direct Presidential elections. The resolution also takes note of the fact that there is a need for additional progress if genuine democracy is going to be established in South Korea the resolution calls for the removal of the remaining restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and other forms of political activity.

Specifically, in the resolving clause, the resolution calls for a dialog between the Government and the opposition in South Korea in a spirit of reconciliation in the hope that through such a dialog a compromise can be reached that will permit a Presidential election in South Korea which will reflect the will and wishes of the South Korean people.

We deliberately refrained from endorsing a particular form of elections; we would certainly refrain from endorsing a particular candidate, or party. We do make it very clear, however, that, given our interests in political stability and democracy in South Korea, we have a vital interest in a Presidential election in that country that will result in the establishment of genuine democracy—a condition for political stability in that country.

I think it would really be tragic if the Government and opposition in South Korea could not reach an agreement which would make possible such an election because, without it, the prospects for political instability are very great. Should there be political instability, there would always be a possibility that Kim Il-sung would miscalculate that the time had come to launch another war in his effort to unify the Korean Peninsula under Communist control. With 40,000 American troops in South Korea and a mutual defense treaty between our two countries, we could very easily find ourselves involved in another conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

If that is to be avoided, and if we are to fulfill our commitment to help the Korean people in their desires to establish genuine democracy in South Korea, I think this resolution can be very helpful.

Let me just say in conclusion that I very much appreciate the cooperation of my good friend from New York, Mr. Solomon, in working out language on this resolution which would not only address some of his concerns but which was also compatible with ours. His cooperation has made possible another resolution which we will take up immediately after this concerning North Korea, which I think will enable this committee and the Congress to make a balanced statement about the need for progress on human rights in both parts of Korea while at the same time making it clear that South Korea is our friend and ally, whereas North Korea is a country with which we have had hostile relations in the past.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, there are bells ringing, and perhaps we can finish this before we go and vote.

I would simply echo everything the chairman has said and stress that both of these resolutions represent, I think, a summary of the feelings of Congress and the American people. The resolutions are consistent with Administration policy, and I would urge their adoption, and compliment both the distinguished chairman and the gentleman from New York, on his resolution.

Mr. SOLOMON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. I would like to also thank the gentleman for cooperating. I think the language in the resolution is certainly acceptable from all viewpoints. I would like to point out that just this week President Chun of South Korea has already met with Lee Min Woo, the leader of the new Korea Democratic Party, to establish the dialog for constitutional amendment, which is what we were all looking for.

I have just one question, if I might, of the gentleman from New York. On page 3 of his resolution, in the resolved clauses, he states that a dialog between the Government and the opposition, and I would just like to point out and get a clarification, that in the lines preceding it talks about human rights in the Republic of Korea and a rapid progress towards a full democracy.

Well, we all know that communism does not in any way project "full democracies" or "human rights," and I am sure that in the language that he resolves, a dialog between the Government and the opposition does not mean that we are urging him to sit down and negotiate with the Communists, but with the legitimate opposition parties in the country.

Mr. SOLARZ. Of course. There are no Communists in South Korea. They are all anti-Communist.

Mr. SOLOMON. I just wanted to get that clarification. I commend the gentleman on a good resolution.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank you for bringing this resolution so quickly to the full committee and I would particularly like to thank the chairman

of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, for his very consistent, very responsible, and I think very productive involvement on this issue, not just on this resolution but over a long period of time.

As the subcommittee chairman has indicated, this resolution is primarily an attempt to encourage an agreement among the political parties in South Korea to establish a system, a long-term system, for Presidential elections that will reflect the will and the wishes of the Korean people.

As was indicated, this resolution had joint referral to the Subcommittee on Human Rights, chaired by Mr. Yatron, whose statement I have, and would ask unanimous consent to submit it for the record.

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Yatron had, in the interest of time, waived the authority of his subcommittee for holding hearings on this legislation, although they were scheduled for this week, and I echo the comments of the gentleman from New York in appreciation to the chairman of the Human Rights Subcommittee.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to add as cosponsors both Mr. Yatron and Mr. Dymally, and ask an opportunity of several days for other Members to submit statements for the record.

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, the statements will be received.

As far as cosponsors are concerned, that is a different function, not of this committee.

[The full text of Mr. Yatron's statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GUS YATRON, JUNE 23, 1986

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support House Concurrent Resolution 345, expressing the sense of the Congress concerning democracy in the Republic of Korea. Acknowledging the serious human rights situation in this Asian country, and determining what measures our Government should take are actions which are timely and warranted.

Congress plays an important role in promoting U.S. concern for human rights by evaluating the human rights record of recipient countries when considering allocations for economic and military assistance. But monitoring human rights and encouraging democratic political structures throughout the world is an ongoing process which always factors into Congress' view of U.S. foreign policy. Resolutions such as this one indicate that we are serious about free and fair elections, that we respect freedom of speech and freedom of press, and that we will not ignore abridgements of these rights no matter where or when they occur.

The republic of Korea has made some improvements in its democratization process. However, despite guarantees of rights in the constitution and president Chun's proclamations about defending and strengthening freedom, South Korea is neither fully democratic nor free from repression. The opposition, once comprised of students and laborers, now includes many mainstream Koreans, as well as several leaders of the Catholic and Protestant churches.

While the South Korean Government has legitimate concerns for the internal security and protection of its people against North Korean aggression, these concerns should not override its responsibility to uphold domestic and international human rights law. The U.S. Government has definite security interests in South Korea. It is this bond that has linked our two countries in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. But we have an even stronger tie with the South Korean people. Together we have fought against communism and oppression, and now together we must realize the fruits of our efforts—liberty and justice.

I would like to commend Mr. Feighan, the gentleman from Ohio, for his leadership and perserverance on this issue. He has done a great service for not only the

South Korean people, but the American people as well. I would also like to commend the gentlemen from New York, Mr. Solarz and Mr. Solomon for their efforts regarding House Concurrent Resolution 345.

Chairman FASCELL. The request has been made to consider 345 and 347 en bloc and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon, reserving the right to object on that unanimous-consent request, will make a statement.

[The full text of H. Con. Res. 347 follows:]

99TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. CON. RES. 347

Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning the human rights situation in North Korea and the reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 4, 1986

Mr. SOLOMON submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning the human rights situation in North Korea and the reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Whereas the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter in this resolution referred to as "North Korea") is a one-party Communist dictatorship, in which there is a comprehensive denial of fundamental human rights—freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of the people to select their political leaders;

Whereas North Korea is a garrison state, allocating approximately 25 percent of its gross national product to military purposes;

Whereas the North Korean regime seeks to control every aspect of its people's life and thought;

Whereas the Government of North Korea is a Communist dictatorship based on a pervasive personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung and his family;

Whereas opponents of the North Korean regime are deprived of due process of law and subjected to harsh punishment, reported to include torture and confinement in labor camps;

Whereas North Korea has demonstrated unrelenting hostility towards its neighboring country, the Republic of Korea, including the forward deployment of large numbers of troops in offensive formations near the demilitarized zone separating the two countries;

Whereas North Korea has tried repeatedly to penetrate the demilitarized zone, including the secret construction of tunnels and the deployment of commandos in the Republic of Korea;

Whereas North Korean security personnel attempted to assassinate the President of the Republic of Korea on October 9, 1983, killing 17 other persons in the process, including four members of the President's cabinet;

Whereas the United States has a vital interest in preserving peace on the Korean peninsula and in preventing an invasion of the Republic of Korea by North Korea; and

Whereas the United States is committed, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea signed on October 1, 1953, to take all appropriate measures in defending the Republic of Korea against aggression: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the Government of North Korea should cease its clandestine and reckless attempts to subvert the Republic of Korea;

(2) the North Korean regime should agree to measures that will reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, including a more cooperative approach to the dialogue between the North and South, the genuine demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone, the mutual and equitable reduction of military forces, family visitation and family reunification, and trade;

(3) the North Korea regime should take steps to reduce its international isolation by favorably considering the cross recognition of the two Korean governments by other countries and dual membership in the United Nations; and

(4) the North Korean regime should take steps to cease its abuse of human and political rights and deprivation of individual freedom.

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Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Chairman, on my resolution on North Korea, the resolution addresses the human rights situation on the other half of the Korean Peninsula. I offered it as a companion piece to the resolution concerning South Korea because of my concern that we take into consideration the complete context in which the human rights situation on the Korean Peninsula must be viewed in toto.

In particular, no discussion of the contemporary situation in South Korea is really complete without considering the very serious threat that South Korea faces from its neighbors to the north.

Mr. Chairman, Communist North Korea has one of the most thoroughly repressive and militaristic regimes that has ever existed in the modern world, to the degree that it is unprecedented even in Communist countries.

The North Korean political and social systems resolve around one man, one all-pervading personality cult surrounding the person of Kim Il-Sung. The denial of essential human rights in North Korea is so complete, so comprehensive as to practically give new meaning to the word "totalitarianism."

Aside from the grim realities of everyday life with which the people of North Korea must cope, there are many estimated to be at least 100,000 political prisoners languishing in Kim Il-Sung's jails and labor camps, and any notion of due process of law is dismissed out of hand.

It should come as no surprise that any such regime would be a destabilizing force in whatever regime of the world it is located; and, true to form, North Korea operates in a condition of total military mobilization with as much as one quarter of the country's gross national product devoted to the military.

The so-called demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas is in truth the most heavily fortified national frontier in the world; and North Korea, a country of 19 million people, maintains three-fourths as many artillery pieces along that DMZ line.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that Mr. Yatron's statement be submitted for the record, which does waive his record——

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection.

Mr. SOLOMON. And I thank you.

[The full text of Mr. Yatron's statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GUS YATRON, JUNE 23, 1986

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 347. Human Rights in North Korea are practically nonexistent, and yet, the flagrant violations of this Asian government continue to be ignored. Why is it that this Communist dictatorship can deny freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and free elections without incurring constant pressure and scorn from the international community?

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, I believe it is, once again, time to hold this North Korean regime accountable for its oppressive policies. It is up to the U.S. Congress to say to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that we know what you are doing—to your own people, to your neighboring country, South Korea, and to the prospect of preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula. The mere fact that this is a Communist country where grievous offenses are systematic and inbred does not lessen our responsibility to speak out against them.

Just as the United States must acknowledge and address the human rights violations of those countries with which we are aligned or have some shared interests,

we, too, must not ignore the threat of aggression from those countries which perpetrate the downfall of Democracy and the denial of individual liberty. House Concurrent Resolution 347 gives us an opportunity to make a significant statement to both the Government of North Korea and the outside world.

I would like to commend the gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon, for his interest in the human rights situation in North Korea. As ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Mr. Solomon has continually demonstrated his dedication to the preservation of human rights throughout the world.

Chairman FASCELL. The question is, then, on the adoption of House Concurrent Resolution 345 and House Concurrent Resolution 347.

All those in favor, signify by saying "aye."

[A chorus of ayes.]

Chairman FASCELL. All those opposed, "no."

[No response.]

Chairman FASCELL. The ayes have it, and the two resolutions are agreed to.

[Whereupon, the committee proceeded to other business.]

APPENDIX 1

"South Korea's Kwangju Incident—Revisited;" Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, Number 35; Published by the Heritage Foundation

SOUTH KOREA'S KWANGJU INCIDENT – REVISITED

INTRODUCTION

South Korean university students occupied the United States Information Service Building in Seoul for four days this May, demanding a U.S. apology for its alleged complicity in what is known as the "Kwangju incident" of May 1980. The Kwangju incident was in fact a major civil uprising in the Republic of Korea (ROK) that resulted in the death of 191 Koreans.

The student action at the USIS building reveals that even after five years, the violence in Kwangju continues to haunt South Koreans. In fact, the uprising has become a powerful political weapon for opponents of the current government of President Chun Doo Hwan. During the National Assembly session this June, for instance, the opposition New Korea Democratic Party demanded an official investigation of the incident. Despite explanations by the government, many critics continue characterizing the Kwangju incident as a brutal and premeditated massacre of civilians by the government. Critics accuse the Chun Administration of a coverup, claiming that the official death toll of 191 is vastly underestimated.

Yet a careful investigation of the facts reveals that the Kwangju uprising has suffered from great exaggeration and distortion, including the allegations of a U.S. role in the matter. The Kwangju tragedy left deep scars on the psyche of all Koreans. Unintentional or deliberate hyperbole, however, cruelly and needlessly prolongs the national grief. It is time that the incident be evaluated freshly and dispassionately.[1]

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[1] This paper is based largely on personal interviews during June and July 1985 with South Korean government officials, National Assembly members, military officers, Kwangju residents, and Kwangju Citizens' Committee members.

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

SOURCES OF THE TROUBLE

The regime of President Park Chung Hee, which had begun in 1961, unexpectedly ended in October 1979 when he was assassinated by a disgruntled aide. Martial law was declared, Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha became interim president, and the stage was set for an intense political struggle. While the ruling Democratic Republican Party wrestled with the problem of purging corrupt members who had exploited their positions, the opposition New Democratic Party was racked by bitter infighting between former party chief Kim Dae Jung and the new leader, Kim Young Sam. By April 1980, it became clear that Kim Dae Jung lacked the support to recapture the leadership post. He announced he would seek his political base elsewhere.

Political uncertainty intensified as South Korea's economic situation began to deteriorate. For the first time in 16 years, the economy stopped growing. Tensions heightened when university classes resumed and students took to the streets demanding an end to martial law. On April 16, Kim Dae Jung, in violation of martial law, addressed a huge student rally in Seoul. Earlier, a mine workers' protest resulted in the death of a policeman. On May 15, another policeman was killed during a student riot in Seoul, and large-scale demonstrations erupted in several other major cities. On May 16, student association representatives met at Ewha University in Seoul and endorsed a resolution calling for nationwide demonstrations on May 22.

In response to the rising level of violence, President Choi imposed a heightened state of martial law at midnight May 17. Universities were closed, and political activity was prohibited. Kim Dae Jung was arrested and charged with inciting riots by funneling money to student demonstrators and conspiring to overthrow the government. The government explained these steps were necessary "to restore public peace and order."

The extension of martial law included the deployment of troops to major cities. As part of this plan, the 33rd and 35th Battalions of the 7th Airborne Brigade were moved into Kwangju from an area north of the city. Kwangju, with a population of about 800,000, is the capital of South Cholla Province, the home district of Kim Dae Jung. The demonstrations that had rocked South Korea for weeks ended quickly in most areas of the country. Rioting in Kwangju, however, continued.

CONFRONTATION

On the morning of May 18, several hundred rock-throwing students clashed with troops at Kwangju's Chonnam University. That afternoon, the students marched into downtown Kwangju where confrontations with the authorities continued. Violence escalated the next day, when the demonstrators vandalized police property and two television stations and set fire to a number of vehicles.

This initial stage of the trouble was characterized by fierce hand-to-hand fighting between police and military authorities and the demonstrators. Many demonstrators were armed with rocks and iron pipes and were extremely hostile and aggressive. A number of observers charged the policemen and troops with excessive brutality, but other eyewitnesses noted that "for the most part, the army avoided an open fight with the rioters."[2] There were many injuries on both sides, but only two rioters were killed during the first two days of the confrontation.

Regional tensions played an important role in the escalating violence. Many citizens of Cholla Province, located in the southwestern section of the peninsula, feel their region has suffered discrimination by the central government for hundreds of years. Some claim that the late President Park, a native of neighboring Kyungsang Province, deliberatedly neglected Cholla's economic development while fostering progress in his home region. The arrest of Kim Dae Jung and the clashes between troops and Kwangju citizens fueled local speculation that the extension of martial law was aimed specifically at Cholla Province.

On the first day of the riots, the rumor spread that soldiers of Kyungsang Province had come to kill the Cholla people. There were reports that as many as 40 people had been killed during the first day of strife; in fact, no one had been killed. Some residents were told that Kim Dae Jung had been executed. The most bizarre rumor was that, to make them more fierce, the troops had been starved for several days and given drugs before coming to Kwangju.

Some of these tales were believed by residents, prompting many nonstudents to sympathize with the rioters. In addition, the specter of troops and police battling and arresting young people on the streets of Kwangju quickly turned public opinion against the authorities.

By May 20, thousands of students and other citizens had taken to the streets. Rioters torched City Hall and a television station. Commandeered busses and taxis sped wildly through the streets. At the Provincial Government Building, four policemen were killed when a car crashed into a police barricade. The situation rapidly was getting out of the authorities' control.

The violence continued into early morning May 21. Events took an ominous turn when rioters attacked an army reserve base and seized rifles, ammunition, and other weapons. About 9 a.m., an automobile factory was sacked, and several hundred cars were stolen along with a number of armored personnel carriers. Other military and police facilities were raided in nearby villages and hundreds of firearms were taken. A large amount of TNT was seized from an explosives manufacturer.

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2 Time, June 2, 1980, p. 37.

During the afternoon rioters installed a machine gun on the roof of a downtown building and fired on troops. On the outskirts of the city, meanwhile, soldiers guarding the Kwangju Prison were attacked by waves of well-armed rioters in armored personnel carriers and fire trucks. Apparently aimed at freeing the prison's inmates, the attacks continued until the next morning. In the face of a large-scale insurrection, the troops were forced to withdraw from Kwangju at 6 p.m. on May 21, leaving the entire city in rebel hands.

Some of the student leaders who initially had organized the demonstrations were stunned. They had lost control of events to much more radical and violent elements. Said one university student: "This is something we never intended."[3] While popular support for the demonstrators at first was widespread, most Kwangju citizens were shocked by the escalating violence. On May 22, a Committee for Settling the Kwangju Turmoil was formed by a group of about 60 Kwangju civic leaders, including doctors, lawyers, journalists, and religious figures. The group offered to negotiate between the authorities and the rioters. The Committee also called on all armed citizens to surrender the 5,008 rifles, 395 shotguns, 288,680 rounds of ammunition, 526 hand grenades, and 3,000 boxes of dynamite believed to be in the public's hands.[4]

By May 23, the Committee seemed to be making progress. Relative calm settled over the city. Some weapons had been turned over to the authorities, and 34 armed rioters had surrendered to the Martial Law Command.

The following day, the situation worsened dramatically. At a large downtown rally, some rebels proclaimed that, if they could hold out for several more days, the ROK government would fall. Scattered fighting occurred along the troop perimeter around the city. Another large demonstration took place the next day. Although the Committee continued its negotiation efforts, it had reached the limit of its influence.

On May 26, martial law troops made several advances toward Kwangju, encountering fierce and well-organized resistance. The "citizens army" was tightening its grip on the city and developing a systematic command structure. In response, martial law authorities decided to act.

Given the extent of the insurrection, the retaking of Kwangju by martial law troops was a well-planned and well-executed operation designed to minimize casualties and property damage. Using aerial reconnaissance photographs and intelligence gathered from

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3 Ibid., p. 38.
4 Korea Herald, June 9, 1985, p. 1

agents inside the city, the authorities pinpointed rebel strongholds. On May 27 at 1 a.m., when most citizens were asleep, the troops moved in. Using small units and carrying out surgical strikes, the mission recaptured the city in a few hours. Only 17 rebels were killed.

Throughout the confrontation, the ROK government and the Martial Law Command vigorously sought a negotiated settlement. On May 22, for example, the Prime Minister came to Kwangju appealing for order, as did President Choi on May 25. Leaflets calling on citizens to put down their weapons were scattered throughout the city. Helicopters, planes, and vehicles equipped with loudspeakers broadcast appeals. Martial law authorities cooperated with the citizens' committee. Five times during the incident, the authorities met with rebel representatives using the Committee as mediator. To show its good faith, the Martial Law Command on several occasions released groups of demonstrators who had been arrested. Although a number of rebels surrendered and some weapons were turned over, the negotiations were largely unsuccessful.

THE AFTERMATH

The most controversial issue concerning the Kwangju uprising is the number of casualties. The official death toll announced after a ten-day investigation was 191--comprising 164 civilians, 23 soldiers, and four policemen. A total of 852 were injured, 122 seriously. Yet these official figures have been ridiculed as too low. This stems from reports by some foreign press sources and critics of the ROK government. News accounts frequently cited the official number but stated that "others say the figure actually was much higher."[5] Some reports said bluntly that "at least 1,000 people were killed."[6] Others claimed that "no reputable source puts the death toll. . . at under 1,000 and many estimates are closer to 2,000."[7] These claims rest on speculation and are completely unsubstantiated.

Unlike other aspects of the complex and highly emotional Kwangju issue, the facts of the casualty rate are clear. When the incident ended on May 27, members of the citizens' committee involved in negotiations were invited by the Martial Law Command to participate in counting the dead and performing autopsies. A group of 49 civilian and military doctors, religious leaders, lawyers, and other Kwangju citizens was involved. A Christian minister and long-time resident of Kwangju, who acted as chairman

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5 Washington Post, May 24, 1985, p. A21.

6 Sanford J. Ungar, "A Korean Exile's Long Journey Home," New York Times Magazine, December 23, 1984, p. 32.

7 Christopher Hitchens, "Going Home with Kim Dae Jung," Mother Jones, May 1985, p. 13.

of the citizens' committee, told The Heritage Foundation that he participated in the death count and stressed that the reported toll of 191 deaths is correct.[8]

Most casualties in Kwangju resulted from fierce fighting between two heavily armed camps and not from innocent citizens being cut down in the streets by troops. At the Kwangju Prison, for example, more than 50 armed rioters were killed during the numerous assaults against the government-held facility.

In the tragedy's aftermath, the government, together with a Kwangju-based relief organization, gave about $16,000 to the families of each of the dead. The government also paid medical expenses for all those wounded. Nearly $2 million was spent on emergency food and fuel for needy citizens, and assistance programs were initiated to help bring Kwangju back to normal. Grants were given to Kwangju citizens to reconstruct destroyed houses and businesses.

Of the 2,522 citizens arrested during and immediately following the uprising, 404 were tried in military courts. The most serious charges resulted in death sentences for three and life terms for seven. All these penalties subsequently were reduced. The remainder of those tried in military courts received varying prison sentences or conditional releases. All eventually were released and granted amnesty. No one arrested in connection with the Kwangju uprising remains in prison.

THE ALLEGED U.S. ROLE

Critics of the ROK government's handling of the Kwangju riots recently accused the U.S. of complicity. This charge stems from the unique relationship between the ROK military and the 40,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, which function as a joint force under the United Nations Command (UNC). The U.N. Commander in South Korea is an American general who concurrently commands U.S. forces in the ROK. Some interpret this relationship to mean that the South Korean government must secure formal permission from the U.N. Commander prior to using any ROK military forces. This has prompted supposition that the U.S. approved the use of ROK troops in Kwangju.

This supposition is incorrect. Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen explains that, as long as the use of ROK troops creates no "threat to national security," Seoul need only "notify" the U.S. of its actions.[9] During the Kwangju uprising, the ROK government took care to inform the U.S. of its decision to redeploy its 20th Division and to insure that its

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8 Interview, July 16, 1985.
9 Interview, August 26, 1985.

actions did not compromise national security. Ultimately, the ROK government's right to use those forces was a function of its sovereignty. The U.S. does not and, indeed, should not have absolute authority to command the ROK military. U.S.-ROK joint forces agreements and the UNC itself are designated specifically to guard against provocation or invasion by communist North Korea or any other external threat. The South Korean government has the authority to use its military for domestic purposes.

As a matter of historical record, Ambassador Gleysteen told The Heritage Foundation that the U.S. Embassy was not aware of the seriousness of the Kwangju situation until "roughly two days" into the riots.[10] On the last day of the crisis, the retaking of Kwangju was accomplished by elements of the 20th ROK Army Division based near Seoul. Ambassador Gleysteen accepted the decision, calling it a "highly sensible action," given the fact that these troops were well-trained and experienced in riot control.[11] The U.S. Embassy's acceptance of the troop redeployment did not constitute "approval" or complicity.

CONCLUSION

The events of May 1980 were not a deliberate plot by the ROK government to massacre innocent civilians in South Cholla Province. Nor was the U.S. involved in the incident. Given the extent of the insurrection, the death toll was remarkably low--a fact that reflects the ROK government's efforts to minimize casualties. Those who continue to distort what happened at Kwangju should have their motives questioned. They seem determined to prevent the wounds from healing and to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the Korean people. The ROK government, by contrast, has been trying to put the Kwangju incident to rest and to heal the country's physical and emotional wounds.

Daryl M. Plunk
Policy Analyst

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10 Ibid.
11 Shin Dong-A Magazine, Seoul, Korea, July 1985.

APPENDIX 2

"Our Stand on the Constitutional Revision;" Statement of the Republic of Korea's Democratic Justice Party

BACKGROUND

Our party has maintained a basically constant attitude that the Constitution should be kept intact, while the opposition has called for its revision. However, it is not our intent to keep the current Constitution forever. As was made clear in the address by the party chairman delivered at the last regular sitting of the National Assembly as well as during the constitutional amendment debate that took place in the Steering Committee of the National Assembly during the same session and in the new year policy address delivered by the party president before the legislature, the party's constant position has been that the constitutional issue should only be taken up after the Asian Games in 1986 and the Summer Olympics and a peaceful transfer of power in 1988.

Referring to the constitutional issue at a luncheon he hosted for representatives of the three major parties at the presidential residence, Chong Wa Dae, last February 24, President Chun Doo Hwan tried to accommodate the opposition's views by saying that while an amendment should not be passed until 1989, it was possible to immediately establish ad hoc committees to study the constitutional issue in the National Assembly and at Chong Wa Dae but that the committees should follow prescribed procedures and accurately reflect public opinion. As for the contents of a revision, he said that it might be any type of power structure -- a direct presidential election system, an indirect presidential election system, a cabinet system or a formula combining the presidential and cabinet systems.

In a plenary session of the Central Committee on March 8, our party pledged to implement the proposal made by President Chun at the Chong Wa Dae luncheon of February 24. The reason that the party has called for keeping the Constitution is to ensure a peaceful transfer of power in 1988. We have not opposed a constitutional revision after that. Accordingly our party's viewpoint regarding the Constitution remains essentially unchanged. We anticipate that there will have to be constitutional changes to adapt to changes in the political and social conditions after there has been a constitutional transfer of administrations following a single presidential term.

The Timing of Revision is not Right

The current constitution is well-suited to the 1980s and this stage of our political development. The consensus following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979 was that there must be a peaceful transfer of power. Nobody doubted that such a precedence, if established, would constitute a major democratic breakthrough.

The Constitutional Amendment Deliberation Committee, which was comprised of 67 leaders from various walks of life, prepared the draft of a new constitution incorporating public opinion to the maximum. The proposed constitution was approved by an overwhelming vote of 91.6 percent in a nationwide referendum in which 99.5 percent of the eligible voters voted.

The opposition distorts the outcome of the general elections of February 12, 1985 by asserting that they represented a popular demand for a constitutional amendment in favor of a direct presidential election system. In fact, the general elections resulted in the New Korea Democratic Party winning a fair proportion of the votes and a respectable number of seats in the National Assembly but it is an irrefutable fact that the Democratic Justice Party won a majority of the votes and the seats.

Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the present election system, as opposed to a direct election, was chosen for legitimate reasons and was not intended to prolong anyone's hold on office or to prevent anyone from winning office.

The next several years will be challenging for the Republic and when the national tasks of 1988 have been successfully accomplished, the Republic will have reached a new level of political development. In 1988, President Chun will transfer the government to a newly elected president and will become an ordinary citizen. That will be the first peaceful transfer of power in our constitutional history and thus will be an especially significant achievement of which the Korean people will be able to be proud. Furthermore, it will create a major change in the political and social atmosphere.

In addition, the success of the Seoul Olympics will change the world view of the Republic. Our relationships with not only the Third World but also with the Communist world will improve greatly. North Korea, being no longer able to cling to a policy of communizing the peninsula by force, will reconcile itself to peaceful co-existence with us on the peninsula. Based on such a future outlook, 1988 should herald a completely new start in the history of the Republic.

Twenty- and thirty-year-olds will soon account for 60 percent of our population. The young generation's values are quite different from those of the older generation. Their political views are becoming more and more progressive and liberal. We hold that even the idealistic political views and concepts of the younger generation should be embraced.

Whatever the reasons, the constitutional issue has emerged as a political issue because of the opposition's demand for an immediate revision. It cannot be denied that some citizens are in favor of the opposition's demand. If we can only resolve this point of contention peacefully, we can build a glorious era for the nation in the 21st century. Once the major national events of 1988 are accomplished, we will advance to a stage where we will no longer engage in wasteful political bickering on issues of power.

A Peaceful Transfer of Power is Imperative

A peaceful transfer of power in accordance with the provisions of the current constitution is imperative, and to achieve this, there must be stability. If during President Chun's remaining term of office, public opinion becomes excessively divided over the issue of a constitutional amendment and the election system and everyone becomes preoccupied with that issue, the government and social structure would be subsequently weakened by the confusion giving rise to the beginnings of anarchy. The danger is that this could lead to a suspension of constitutional administration or make it impossible to transfer power on schedule. It goes without saying that this would be a retrogression.

Under all circumstances, politics must take reality into account and cannot be based simply on lofty and idealistic terms. Accordingly, we must look squarely at the cold, hard realities of our political situation to promote political development. We thus need a prudent and mature attitude.

Successful Hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics is a Prerequisite

The '86 Asian Games and the '88 Olympics must be successful. Although the opposition has tried to deny the fact, their significance to the nation goes way beyond that of mere athletic events. The Asian Games will elevate Korea to a frontrunner of the newly emerging Asian-Pacific era and, in particular, will contribute greatly toward improving our relations with the socialist countries in Asia. Furthermore, the Summer Olympics in 1988 will provide a decisive breakthrough for improved relationships with East European countries, which have been a dry spot in our diplomacy, by attracting many of them to Korea. In addition, the countries of both the East and the West are expected to participate in the forthcoming Olympics for the first time in 12 years. If such is the case Seoul will impress the world as a symbol of international reconciliation and subsequently, world confidence in the Republic will solidify. The successful holding of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics will be a catalyst for the development of society as a whole.

Realistically, it would be impossible to carry out the two major events, which will provide a new impetus for the rise of the nation, in an atmosphere made restless by a debate over a constitutional amendment. Moreover, the Communists in North Korea are feared to take advantage of any internal confusion with various forms of sabotage and disruption. Even now they resent the fact that Seoul is to host the

two international events and are bent on disrupting them. Kim Il-sung, in a mass really in P'yŏngyang, said North Korea would not sit idle during the Olympic Games in Seoul, which he termed as not a mere sports event. They are anxious to see the arguments about a constitutional revision become overheated and expanded and the Republic plunged into chaos as a result. Having full knowledge of this, should we ourselves nurture the soil in which they can plant the means of obstruction?

The Opposition's Timetable for Constitutional Amendment is Impracticable

The opposition first attempted to alienate the people from the government by spreading a rumor that President Chun would revise the Constitution without fail to prolong his power. As most citizens are now convinced of his intent to achieve a peaceful transfer of power, the opposition is now saying that a constitutional amendment adopting a direct, popular presidential election system is the only way to guarantee the democratization of the country and that the fulfillment of a single presidential term is of no significance.

The members of the opposition party are divided against themselves. One of the opposition leaders, who repeatedly declared in the United States that a direct, popular presidential system should be avoided as it would pave the way for dictatorship, is now even calling for blood to be shed to realize a constitutional revision in favor of a direct presidential election system. Another opposition leader, who used to assert that a new constitution providing for a cabinet system would offer a rational solution, has now suddenly shifted in favor of a direct presidential election system. Oppositon lawmakers in private discussions debate among themselves what kind of an amendment would be best. Concealing such confusion, the three opposition leaders have announced a constitutional amendment timetable primarily calling for a direct presidential election system. They made this demand public without even going through democratic procedures within their own party. Because of their impatience and the resultant irritation it caused in

the party, the constitutional revision timetable has undergone a series of quick reversals.

They first called for the president to step down and for an election management cabinet to be formed and then demanded that the Constitution be amended by the spring of 1987. Apparently trying to take advantage of the Philippine situation, they now say that the constitutional revision must be made before the autumn of 1986, and that a presidential election must be conducted under a new constitution and a new administration inaugurated by the autumn of 1987. The timing of a constitutional amendment, a presidential election and an inauguration of a new administration have thus undergone repeated changes. The opposition's political program is obviously extemporaneous, and irresponsible. We cannot dance in tune to such music.

The opposition's timetable for a constitutional amendment is first of all unrealistic and impractical. The current constitution provides that an amendment to the constitution requires the support of no less than two-thirds of the duly-seated national assemblymen. No constitutional amendment can be made without a compromise between the government and opposition parties. The fact that the opposition, despite their full knowledge of this constitutional provision, has been continuously calling for an amendment to the constitution betrays their real intention of seizing power through unconstitutional, violent and revolutionary means. They are trying to generate popular resistance and force the government and the ruling party to consent unconditionally to their demands.

While presenting such an impractical timetable for constitutional revision, the opposition falsely alleges that the ruling party's proposal to change the basic law in 1989 is just a plot by which the president can be reelected in 1989. This is ridiculous. They first said the President wouldn't resign in 1988 and now that the President has made it known that he will step down in 1988, they are saying, in a bid to alienate the government from the people, that he will try to resume power in 1989. Furthermore, they belittle the government to be formed in 1988 by claiming it should be provisional. But if it is a constitutional government, formed responsibly through a peaceful change of administration, then there is no reason it should not fill out its term.

Let us examine coolheadedly the opposition's constitutional amendment timetable to see if it is rational.

To begin with, the call for amending the basic law by this coming autumn, when the Asian Games are to be held, is tantamount to an attempt to disrupt this major international event. With only half a year left until the autumn, how can they expect to complete the process of amending the Constitution and all the other necessary procedures involving the revisions of relevant laws including the Presidential Election Law in such a short time? As President Chun stressed at the Chong Wa Dae luncheon of February 24, the proposed new constitution should be one that would remain intact until the country is reunified. Thorough consideration should be given

to a proper form of government, either a presidential or a cabinet system or one combining the two. This would require a considerable amount of time. Should we heed the demands of the opposition for a revision of the basic charter by this coming fall and the election of a president in a direct, popular vote by autumn of the next year, our national government would be thrown into chaos and the very base of the nation shaken. The whole country would be plunged into a whirlwind for over a year, making it difficult to take advantage of such external factors as the depreciation of the dollar, falling oil prices and declining interest rates in the international financial market. Furthermore, our security capabilities would suffer seriously. There would also be the danger of North Korea taking advantage of such developments to disrupt the rear areas or launch a war.

The Democratic Justice Party is not unprepared to amend the constitution nor is anyone trying to prolong a hold on the reigns of government. Moreover, there have been no scandals such as fraudulent elections. The opposition, however, is trying to compare our domestic situation with that of the Philippines and is trying to instigate popular riots in an attempt to pressure us into revising the Constitution. We can only conclude that this all stems from an imprudent attitude on the part of some opposition leaders who are blinded by avarice for power.

Conclusion

Our party intends to take all issues, even minority interests and views, to the National Assembly and solve them in a democratic way through dialogue. This we believe is the basic function of parliamentarism, which we are pursuing.

A series of actions the opposition has recently taken with regard to the constitutional issue represent an attempt to capture power through revolutionary means, rather than by democratic procedures. Should they desire genuine democratic development, they should try to solve all political issues at the National Assembly through democratic means, rather than illegal and revolutionary means.

If the New Korea Democratic Party were to assume power, it is hoped that it would emerge as a sovereign political party, both in name and fact, that assesses public opinion correctly, that considers the future of the country rather than its own self-interests, and that does what is best for the public.

A peaceful transfer of power in 1988 is not an issue confined to the government and opposition parties, but a matter of national concern. The New Korea Democratic Party has gone so far as to even say, without hesitation, that it will boycott the presidential elections in 1988. This would be a betrayal of the trust that the voters placed in the party and would encourage violent revolution.

Any discussion of the Presidential Election Law should be separate from discussions of a constitutional revision.

Some people have denounced the current constitution as being similar to the Yusin Constitution. They do so because they have never read the present constitution thoroughly.

APPENDIX 3

"SOUTH KOREA IN 1980: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW AUTHORITARIAN ORDER," BY PROFESSOR CHONG-SIK LEE; PUBLISHED BY THE ASIAN SURVEY; JANUARY 1981

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SOUTH KOREA IN 1980: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW AUTHORITARIAN ORDER

Chong-Sik Lee

DURING THE YEAR FOLLOWING the assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 25, 1979, South Korea went through a kaleidoscopic change consisting of intense and open competition for power, student upheavals, a military takeover, a gruesome massacre, and the emergence of a new authoritarian order. The new military leader, reported to have sworn to avenge President Park's death, uprooted the power elites that had supported Park's power structure and built a new power base. Increasing inflation and the overall economic decline coupled with widespread cynicism toward politics presented a less than auspicious beginning for the new authoritarian order.

The Background

Since President Park had concentrated virtually all political power around himself, his assassination created a political vacuum. First of all, one of his main pillars of power, the director of the presidential security forces, was assassinated at the same time, and the director of the other major political instrument, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), was quickly arrested by the martial law command for assassinating Park. In addition, the National Assembly, one-third of it presidential appointees, had been rendered impotent by the Yushin ("Revitalization") Constitution imposed by President Park in 1972. And Choy Kyu Ha, premier under President Park and elected president in December 1979 by the rubber stamp electoral college (The National Conference of Unification), had no independent political base, largely because he had been a career bureaucrat without political experience.

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The military lurked in the background, but was less than a solidified force, which became evident when General Chun Doo Hwan's successful coup within the army on December 12, 1979, revealed the possibility of a split among top-ranking army officers.

The removal of President Park and the pillars supporting him not only created a political vacuum but also left South Korea with the inappropriate Yushin Constitution of 1972. It had been designed for President Park, and no one else wielded power of the sort it required. President Choy Kyu Ha reaffirmed the need for a new constitution in his inaugural speech of December 21, stating that a new constitution supported by a majority of the people would be adopted within a year and that a fair general election would be held soon afterward. His government, thus, was to be a transitional one to usher in a new political structure. Even before his inauguration, he as acting president had abolished Emergency Decree Number 9, proclaimed by President Park on May 13, 1975, which had outlawed all forms of criticism against the Yushin constitution. Several hundred individuals serving prison terms or being investigated on charges of violating that decree were released on December 8. One of those benefiting from the removal of the decree was Kim Dae Jung, the inveterate foe of President Park, who had been under house arrest and whose civil rights were to be restored on February 29. Also affected were student activists who had been arrested after staging campus demonstrations.

Politics in South Korea in 1980, therefore, revolved around the framing of the new constitution and to this end various study missions were dispatched abroad for new ideas, numerous hearings were held, and pundits filled the media with their opinions. The more critical issue, however, was the schedule for adopting the new constitution, since the Yushin constitution would remain in force in the interim. The principal opposition party, the New Democratic Party, under Kim Young Sam, advocated concluding the process by August 15, but it was not until June 12 that President Choy even announced the deadlines of the end of October for a referendum on the new constitution and the end of June 1981 for the establishment of a new government.[1] This issue of scheduling was to lead to a major student upheaval in May, followed by a military takeover.

Political Realignment

In the meantime, the country underwent a brisk process of political realignment. Although President Park had organized and headed the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in 1963 to mobilize mass support behind his regime, he discarded it as his instrument by 1972 when he imposed the Yushin constitution and relied mostly on control mechanisms of the state. As a result, the DRP had only a nominal existence at the

1 *Dong-a Ilbo*, June 12, 1980.

time of Park's death, and it was incumbent upon the new president of the DRP, Kim Jong Pil, to revive it. The DRP had suffered a disastrous loss in the December 1978 election for the National Assembly when it obtained only 30.9% of the popular vote. With President Park gone, and without the strong backing of those in power, the DRP's future looked precarious. This situation led to a call for "rectification" (*chong-p'ung*) within the party, which meant the removal of certain top leaders who had attracted notoriety for illicit wealth and undemocratic political behavior. One of the targeted leaders, evidently, was Lee Hu Rak, former head of the Presidential Secretariat (1963–1969) and of the KCIA (1970–1973). In a March 24 press conference, Lee denounced Kim Jong Pil for occupying the party presidency without following proper procedure and for betraying President Park after his assassination. His remarks created a situation characterized by the nation's leading paper as "a live volcano."[2] Obviously, the party was headed for a serious disruption. The other leading politicians mentioned as targets of rectification evidently were Kim Chin Man, the former speaker of the National Assembly, and Pak Chong Gyu, former director of the Presidential Security Forces.[3]

The New Democratic Party (NDP), the principal opposition party, also had its share of problems, since it had just gone through a bitter power struggle between former president Lee Chul Sung and new president Kim Young Sam, the latter defeating the former by 11 of the 745 votes cast at the May 1979 national party conference. Kim's tenure was for three years, so his position would have been secure had not the government under President Choy restored Kim Dae Jung's civil rights in February. Kim Dae Jung had been the NDP's presidential candidate in 1971, and even though he had been out of the political arena for seven years, he commanded a large political following. His return to the NDP, therefore, would have seriously altered the power alignment within the NDP and affected the choice of the candidate for the anticipated presidential election. Since the NDP was expected to win the forthcoming election by a wide margin, the presidency of the republic was at stake in the negotiations for Kim Dae Jung's reinstatement. And the issue was not only readmitting Kim himself but also reallocating to his followers seats in the NDP's presidium of the Central Committee that determines party policy. In the end, negotiations broke off, and on April 7 Kim declared that he would no longer seek to rejoin the NDP.

A deep chasm also existed between the incumbent leaders of the NDP and the forces represented by Kim Dae Jung. Although Kim Young Sam and his supporters had waged a fierce struggle against President Park toward the end of his rule,[4] many in leadership positions in the NDP had tended to be accommodating to the Park regime, avoiding

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[2] *Ibid.*, March 25, 1980.
[3] *Ibid.*, March 21, 1980.
[4] See my coverage of the events of 1979 in "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition," *Asian Survey*, January 1980, pp. 63–76.

confrontations. Kim Dae Jung and his followers, on the other hand, represented the active dissident students, intellectuals, and progressive Christians who had engaged in direct struggle against the Park regime, thereby incurring arrests, dismissal from their positions, and even imprisonment. The "*chae-ya se-ryok*" ("forces in the field") thus were more radical in orientation.[6] Kim Dae Jung himself told the press in April that the NDP had been naive about the political situation and had wasted the six months since Park's assassination, providing time for the Yushin (or Park) forces to regroup and counterattack.[6] In short, Kim and his group wished to expedite the process of restoring democracy even if it meant forcing the hands of President Choy and those behind him.

While professional politicians were engaged in the struggle for realignment, college students were restless for action. Student activism was to be expected in light of the strong and numerous student protests during the Park regime, including the demonstrations of September 1979 that precipitated President Park's assassination in October, and especially because of the reinstatement of politically active student leaders released from the jails and prisons in December 1979 as a result of the abolition of Emergency Decree Number 9. The government and the opposition party alike, therefore, paid close attention to the direction of the student movements.

The students were initially concerned with campus affairs. As soon as the new semester opened in March, students on various campuses began to demand the removal of professors who had had close ties with President Park's regime and of university owner-presidents who had amassed fortunes by operating their institutions. They also demanded autonomy of universities from government control. The students held rallies and on-campus demonstrations, and in some cases occupied college offices. As a result, many university presidents resigned.

In early May, however, the students' slogans began to change. They were impatient with the government's "delaying tactics" that prolonged the Yushin constitution and martial law, and angered by General Chun's assumption of the directorship of the KCIA on April 14 in addition to his already awesome position as the commander of the Defense Security Command. They demanded that martial law be lifted immediately, and the "remnants of the Yushin system," including General Chun, be removed. Their demands also extended to socioeconomic issues such as the guarantee of labor rights, removal of "compradore capital," and the protection of farmers' rights.[7] The students' concern with social issues was more poignant because of the four-day (April 21–24) large-scale miners' riots in Sabuk on the east coast and another riot of steel mill workers in Pusan on April 29. Student demonstrations

[5] About the forces in the field, see Yi Kun-song, "Chae-ya seryok" (Forces in the Field), *Wol'gan Chung'ang* (*The Central Monthly*), June 1980, pp. 154–170.
[6] *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 25, 1980.
[7] *Ibid.*, May 5, 1980.

had been confined to their campuses when the issues raised were of intra-institutional matters, but soon began to spill out into the streets. On May 8 Minister of Education Kim Ok Gill, a university president for 17 years and a strong advocate of campus self-government, issued a letter to the university communities urging student restraint and warning that their acts might hamper evolution toward full democracy, but the demonstrations continued until the 12th. On the 13th the students suddenly ceased their demonstrations, an action attributed largely to the news on the 12th that some 60,000 North Korean troops at the truce line had been relocated, which raised the possibility that North Korea might be preparing an attack.[8] But as the news was denied by American sources, student demonstrations erupted with renewed force in Seoul and elsewhere on the 14th when some 50,000 students poured into the streets of Seoul, with some student leaders charging that the rumors about North Korean troops were started by the government to frighten them into halting their agitation.[9] On the same day, troops carrying rifles and backed by armored vehicles were deployed in downtown Seoul. In other major cities such as Kwangju, Taegu, Chonju, and elsewhere, thousands of students flooded the streets.[10] The massive show of force continued until May 16, when Premier Shin Hyon Hwack promised in a televised speech that the government would attempt to speed the process of adopting a new constitution.[11] President Choy shortened his Middle Eastern trip by a day and returned home on the evening of May 17.

The students' show of force paralyzed the nation and sent the politicians and government leaders to their council meetings. The opposition leaders were expected to support the students' demand for setting a definite time table for democratization, but even the Executive Council of the DRP, the "government party," was reported to have decided to call upon the government to release a detailed and advanced schedule, and to lift martial law "as soon as possible." According to an unconfirmed report, Premier Shin Hyon Hwack offered his resignation to the president upon his return and advised the president to remove General Chun.

Military Takeover

Whatever counsel the civilian leaders may have offered President Choy, the position of the military prevailed. By this time, General Chun had consolidated his power within the military and was ready to act. Starting from his key position as the head of the Defense Security Command, he had already replaced the Army Chief of the Staff with his cohort in December, and had taken the command of the KCIA in April. Thus, General Chun had full control over the nation's "instru-

8 *Miju Dong-a (Dong-a Daily in America)*, New York edition, May 15, 1980.
9 *New York Times*, May 15, 1980
10 *Philadelphia Bulletin*, May 15, 1980.
11 *New York Times*, May 17, 1980.

ments of violence" and control, and was not willing to accede to the students demands.

It is easy to surmise the arguments presented by the military: lifting of martial law and accelerating the return to democracy would plunge the nation into chaos as had happened after the downfall of the Syngman Rhee regime in 1960; if the government yielded to the students' demands at this juncture; no one would be in a position to restrain them again; the restoration of democracy in May would have meant the ascendance of Kim Dae Jung, the nemesis of President Park; and yielding to the students would have meant the removal of General Chun, whose fate under Kim Dae Jung would have been precarious. So in practical terms, the choice before President Choy was between Kim Dae Jung and Chun Doo Hwan. The student action made a compromise solution impossible.

General Chun's methodical and speedy actions after May 17 clearly reveal that he had been ready with a well-laid plan. On that day, riot policemen were sent to arrest 110 student leaders from various colleges and universities who were meeting in the campus canteen of Ewha Women's University to plan future strategies. Effective at 2400 hours of the same day, martial law was extended throughout the nation (including Cheju Island at the southern tip of Korea), and new Martial Law Decree Number 10 was issued. That decree closed down the colleges and universities, and prohibited all political gatherings indoors or outdoors. All publications and broadcasts were to receive prior censorship, criticism of the incumbent and past presidents was outlawed, and manufacture and spreading of rumors were forbidden.

General Chun's plan aimed not only at quelling demonstrations but also at destroying the power base of all existing political figures and groups. He evidently decided to make a clean sweep of the entire political arena where a new structure would then be built.

The arrest of Kim Dae Jung and other arch enemies of President Park was to be expected as soon as the military stepped in on May 17. But the arrest of Kim Jong Pil, Pak Chong Gyu, and Yi Hu Rak, who had been considered the pillars of the Park regime, came as a surprise to most people. As heads of the KCIA (Kim and Yi), premier (Kim), chief presidential secretary (Yi), and chief bodyguard (Pak), these figures had emerged as the most influential personages under President Park, and since General Chun was a loyal supporter of President Park, the action was totally unexpected. In any event, these three and seven others were released on June 18 after "volunteering" to donate all of their properties, totalling 85.3 billion won (US$170 million), and to retire from public life.[17] Seventeen lesser figures, including high officials of the DPR, were also similarly charged on July 18. "These persons befouled the political atmosphere and damaged social discipline by committing all sorts of irregularities and corrupt conduct by using political power and influence," the Martial Law Command said.[18]

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[17] *Dong-a Ilbo*, June 18, 1980.
[18] *New York Times*, July 20, 1980.

The purge of the three key underlings of President Park was undoubtedly General Chun's shrewdest political move. The wealth accumulated by these men, who had been junior army officers of no independent means before the 1961 military coup, had been a source of embarassment to President Park because he had led this coup espousing the elimination of corruption. Through their intricate and powerful network of political and financial power, these three leaders could have seriously hindered General Chun's pursuit of independent power. In one stroke, General Chun not only gained considerable popularity among the people but also eliminated one of his obstacles.

The Kwangju Uprising

General Chun's hard-line policy, however, led to a confrontation in Kwangju, a city of 600,000 people 170 miles southwest of Seoul and the scene of an uprising and bloodbath between May 18 and 27. What actually transpired in that city during those days and why it happened the way it did is likely to remain a subject of controversy for years to come, but the Martial Law Command's account is very suggestive. The Kwangju uprising—or the Kwangju massacre—deserves to be discussed in some detail because it is likely to be regarded as an important landmark in the struggle for democracy, in heightened provincial hostility, and in the beginning of the rise of anti-American sentiment in Korea.

According to a report issued by the Martial Law Command, the sequence of events was triggered by student demonstrations on the morning of May 18 in defiance of the new edict. It started with some 200 Chonnam University students, but by 2 P.M. the rank of demonstrators expanded to some 1000 and the city police were unable to control the crowd. Thereupon, at about 4 P.M. the Martial Law Command dispatched special paratrooper forces. As the students and "hot blooded young soldiers" confronted each other the citizens joined in, the latter emotionally driven by "rumors evidently spread by impure elements" that the "soldiers of Kyongsang province origin came to exterminate the seeds of the Cholla people" and that "only the soldiers of Kyongsang origins were selected for the mission." And, "as the soldiers arrested the students in front of the masses" and "as the soldiers handled the arrested students somewhat roughly in the face of attack by students,"[14] the air became more charged. Rumors spread more widely on the 19th, according to the same report, and "mob psychology swept through the city." On the 20th, some 10,000 people demonstrated in the city and young people took over some 200 vehicles from a factory. On May 21 the Special Forces were withdrawn and the city was left to the rioters. On the 22nd the "rioters" collected the corpses in the plaza in front of the Provincial Government and "mobilized" the citizens for a memorial service, which was postponed to the 24th, when 15,000 citizens were present. An effigy (undoubtedly Chun Doo Hwan) was burned there. On the 25th 50,000 people gathered in a rally where a

[14] For the Martial Law Command's report, see *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 31, 1980.

resolution calling for the abolition of martial law and the release of Kim Dae Jung was adopted. The citizens then marched through the streets. A committee of leading citizens was organized on May 23 to try to settle the impasse, but "impure elements" and "maneuverers behind the scene" allegedly obstructed an effective solution. Another rally of citizens took place on the 25th. And on May 27 at 3:30 A.M., an army division, after circling the city for three days, launched an attack and squashed the revolt after light skirmishes. By 4:45 A.M. it was all over. The army arrested 1,740 rioters, of whom 730 were detained for investigation.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above account. It is clear that the uprising started with student demonstrations. The Martial Law Command then dispatched assault troops rather than riot control police or troops trained for riot control, and the paratroopers' behavior—they were obviously given orders to shoot at the demonstrators—angered the citizens who had not participated in the initial student demonstrations. According to later reports of the Martial Law Command, 170 persons were killed, including 22 soldiers and 4 policemen; of the 144 civilians killed, only 17 died on the final day of assault. And, regardless of who spread the "wanton rumors," they were evidently credible enough to prompt the gathering of 50,000 Kwangju citizens.

General Chun, touring the city later, told the people of Kwangju not to make an issue of what had happened, but to take a lesson from it. But the Kwangju uprising is not likely to be very easily forgotten. For one thing, it deepened the chasm that had existed between the Kyongsang provinces from which President Park and General Chun originated, and the Cholla provinces of which Kwangju is a capital and from which the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung came. The government charge, issued on May 22, that Kim Dae Jung planned "mass agitation, a popular uprising, to overthrow the government, and attempted to turn campus unrest into a popular revolt by strengthening his ties with universities,"[18] tended to keep the memory of the Kwangju uprising alive. Some observers also note an intensification of the adversary relationship between the army and the people because of the Kwangju uprising. This relationship had already begun to deteriorate when the military leaders interjected themselves into civilian politics on May 17, but the Kwangju uprising is said to have aggravated the situation. The role of the United States also became a subject of controversy because General John A. Wickham Jr. had released South Korean troops from the U.S.-South Korean joint command to end the Kwangju rebellion.

The Junta Council

Having suppressed the Kwangju uprising with brute force, General

[18] *New York Times*, May 23, 1980.

Chun further tightened his grip on the government. Premier Shin Hyon Hwack's government had resigned on May 20 and he was replaced by acting premier Pak Chung Hun, a retired air force general who had been active in promoting trade. But the military was not content with reshuffling cabinets. On May 31, the Special Committee for National Security Measures was created for the ostensible purpose of "aiding the president in directing and supervising martial law affairs and to examine national policies." The 25-member committee was headed by the president and included principal cabinet officers, chiefs of staff of various service branches, and nine generals of General Chun's cohort, but this committee was not to be the supreme organ of power. Rather the affairs of state were to be controlled by the 31-member Standing Committee of the Special Committee whose membership was announced on June 5. This committee, headed by General Chun himself, included 18 field-level officers on active duty plus 12 high-level government officials. Only four members of the Special Committee also served in the Standing Committee, namely, General Chun, General Ch'a Kyu Hon (deputy chief of staff of the army), General Ro T'ae Wu (commander of the Capital Security Command), and General Chung Ho Yung (commander of the Special Forces). These committees were, in any event, to have the authority to pass laws and make all decisions affecting the state until a new National Assembly came into being. The Standing Committee, it might be noted, was in fact a junta council reminiscent of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction created by President Park in 1961 after the military coup. The "Kuk-po-wi," as the Special Committee was known, reportedly aroused deep fear and awe among the population since one of the 13 subcommittees was in charge of "cleansing" society and the polity and was a law unto itself.

General Chun Assumes the Presidency

Having assumed total control of the arena with no resistance, General Chun proceeded to take over constitutional authority with lightning speed. On June 2 he retired from the acting directorship of the KCIA, appointing General Yu Hak Song as the new director. On August 5 Chun had himself promoted from lieutenant general to full general in preparation for retiring from the army on the 22nd. On the 16th President Choy Kyu Ha resigned from the presidency "in the spirit of patriotism and taking broad perspective of the situation," and on the 27th Chun Doo Hwan was elected president by the National Conference of Unification by 2,524 votes of the 2,525 votes cast. The single vote was invalidated for some unknown reason.

The goals the new president presented at his inauguration on September 1 were lofty ones: He aimed at the creation of a new society where all the corrupt practices of the past would be replaced by mutual trust and justice. In order to accomplish this, he planned to remove old politicians from the scene; only those certified as "clean" would be permitted to participate in the building of the new order. He was intent on

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establishing the tradition of peaceful transfer of power, and by reforming the political culture in Korea, create an environment where democracy would take root. In the economic field, he intended to do away with excessive protection of industries and encourage creativity. Increase in employment would be facilitated, and cooperation and coprosperity between labor and management would be brought about. The income of farmers would be increased as well by continuing the "new community movement" launched by President Park.[16]

The new constitution: One of President Chun's promises on inaugural day was the promulgation of a new constitution and a national referendum. On September 29 the government announced the draft of a constitution that in many ways is the most democratic South Korea has ever had—except for the supplementary provisions. Its guarantee of people's democratic rights is absolute, including the right to privacy in communications and the prohibition of torture, and the inadmissability in court trials of confessions obtained by force. The president, who was to serve a single seven-year term, was given strong powers, including the right to dissolve the National Assembly, which in turn could bring down cabinets but not the president. In the event a constitution was amended to extend the president's term of office, such changes were not to be applied to the incumbent. The document received overwhelming approval of the voters—91.6%—at the national referendum held on October 22.[17]

The constitution, however, is a "promissory note." Until the New National Assembly is elected and inaugurated—to take place by June 30, 1981—the National Security Legislative Council, to be appointed by President Chun, is to enact all laws. A supplementary provision in the constitution also called for the dissolution of all existing political parties. In effect, by offering to erect a democratic government by June 1981, President Chun obtained a mandate to change the political landscape in whatever form he chooses. All actions taken by the Legislative Council are to be final and not subject to retroactive appeals or litigation. All in all, it is an ingenious document placing South Korea under a constitutional dictatorship from October 1980 to June 1981.

The purge: President Chun pushed his campaign to weed out corruption and corrupting elements with zeal, and according to some observers, he and his cohorts were driven by a spirit of vengeance. While the politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, and senior generals in Seoul and elsewhere were enjoying the fruits of rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, the younger generation of officers had been forced to endure austere lives in the front lines. The army itself had been corrupted by money and politics under President Park. General Chun's class

[16] For the text of the inaugural speech, see *Dong-a Ilbo*, September 1, 1980.
[17] *Dong-a Ilbo*, October 23, 1980.

at the Korean Military Academy was the first in Korean history to undergo four years of regular training and, according to this line of argument, he and his classmates (Generals Ch'a Kyu Hon, Ro T'ae Wu, Chung Ho Young, etc.) were determined to wipe the slate clean. Ironically, a virtually identical situation had existed in 1959 before Major General Park Chung Hee carried out his coup.[18] The irony here is that the "corrupt" situation stifling the opportunities of young officers was created under President Park, a former army officer and the product of a poor rural family.

The clean-up campaign began in May when Kim Jong Pil and others were forced to give up their wealth and retire from politics, and was followed in June by the dismissal of some 300 senior KCIA agents allegedly "so corrupt and alienated from the people that it was coming to resemble Savak, the Iranian secret policy agency under the Shah."[19] In July, 232 senior officials, including former cabinet officers, were dismissed on corruption charges and the ax fell on 4,760 low-level officials in the government, state-invested firms, and banks with the proviso that they may not be rehired by such firms within two years.[20] The Martial Law Command arrested 17 prominent politicians of both the government and opposition parties for investigation and removed some 400 bank officials including four bank presidents and 21 vice presidents,[21] and the government announced the dismissal of 1,819 officials of state-financed enterprises and affiliated agencies, including 39 (25%) of the presidents and vice presidents of enterprises and banks and 128 (22.5%) of board directors.[22]

The "clean-up campaign" was not limited to government officials and public employees but also extended to the mass media. On July 31 172 periodicals that allegedly caused "social decay and juvenile delinquency" were summarily abolished, among them some of the finest intellectual magazines of liberal inclination and prestigious journals for general audiences, resulting in, according to one source, the dismissal of some 10,000 journalists and workers.[23] The daily newspapers not affected by the purge were also directed to weed out "corrupting"—that is, liberal—writers, so that by August 10 well over 200 journalists from all branches of the media, or about 10% of the country's total, were out of work.[24] In November, the decision by the Korean Newspapers Association and the Korean Broadcasters' Association "voluntarily" de-

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18 See Conlon Associates, Ltd., "United States Foreign Policy: Asia," Studies prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, No. 5, November 1, 1959 (Washington, 1959), p. 115.

19 *Dong-a Ilbo*, June 21, 1980. *New York Times*, June 21, 1980.

20 *New York Times*, July 10, 1980 and July 16, 1980.

21 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 19, 1980.

22 *Korea Herald*, July 23, 1980.

23 *Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 1980.

24 *Joong'ang Ilbo* purged 30 reporters. *Han'kook Ilbo* removed 29. *Dong-a Ilbo* sacked 25, while *Kyunghyang Shimun* purged 40. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 15, 1980, p. 16.

ciding to eliminate competition resulted in the absorption of the two privately operated major broadcasting companies by the government-operated Korean Broadcasting Company. The Christian Broadcasting Company, which had been operating as a commercial station, was restricted to broadcasting on purely religious matters.[25] The government also removed many soap operas, comedy shows, song and dance programs, and other "decadent" programs from the visual media,[26] and numerous writers and publishers of comic books were arrested for producing "cruel, obscene, violent, and degrading comic books."[27]

Since the building of the "new and wholesome society" could not be accomplished by eradicating past evils alone, the government launched a massive reeducation program for the nation's elites. Beginning on September 2, high officials of government, judges, prosecutors, business executives, college professors, and their wives--32,000 persons in all—were brought together for an intensive three-day training program at New Community Training Centers in Suwon and elsewhere. The training regimen included morning exercises, cleaning up the environment, lectures on the New Community Movement, and discussion sessions on "the proper way of life."[28] This training program had been initiated under President Park's regime, and eventually is to be extended to the general public. In August, also for the general public, the government launched a massive propaganda campaign, organizing "Bright Society Rallies" in major cities where tens of thousands of citizens were mobilized to hear speeches. In addition, "Cleansing Committees" were established at all levels of government down to the local ward (*ri* and *dong*) level.[29]

The Legislative Council: It was in this atmosphere that on October 29 President Chun appointed 81 members to the Legislative Council for National Security to act as the interim legislature under the direction of the president until the new National Assembly was constituted. The presence of nine chairmen of functional subcommittees of the Standing Committee of the "junta council" plus the chief liaison officer of that council in the legislative body is undoubtedly designed to steer the latter in the "correct direction," but the council also includes a significant number of former NDP leaders of the second echelon (11 in number) as well as academics, lawyers, religious leaders, and leaders of other functional organizations How much independent voice the non-junta members will have in enacting laws remains to be seen.

The Legislative Council's first action was the adoption on November 3 of the law to purify political culture. The law established a nine-

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25 *Dong-a Ilbo*, November 15, 18, 1980.
26 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 3, 1980.
27 *Korea Herald*, November 21, 1980.
28 *Korea Herald*, September 5, 1980. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 3, 1980.
29 *Dong-a Ilbo*, August 8, 18, 1980; *Korea Herald*, August 17, 27, 1980.

member committee, to be appointed by the president, which is to ban from politics until June 30, 1988, various elements who are "recognized to have been responsible in a significant way in bringing about political and social corruption or fermenting confusion."[30] Under this law, the "Purification Committee" designated 835 politicians and intellectuals,[31] including virtually every politician of note and most of President Park's former aides. Under the same law, 569 individuals requested a review, of which 268 were relieved.

The second item to receive the attention of the Legislative Council was the Law on Political Parties whose intent was to limit the number of political parties by requiring a party to maintain local branches of at least 30 members in at least one quarter of the electoral districts.[32] As the Martial Law Command lifted the ban on indoor meetings for the purpose of creating or operating political parties on November 22, various politicians cautiously began initial moves for realignment. Between November and December, 16 political parties began organizing, including two established by those considered to be pro-government.

Student Unrest

While all these events were taking place under martial law, the students remained one of the greatest concerns of the military leaders, which was only natural given earlier events. On August 19 at a conference of college and university presidents,[33] General Chun emphasized the need to prevent student demonstrations, and on October 8 delivered another speech defining student disturbances as acts benefiting the enemy.[34] On the same day, the Minister of Education warned college and university presidents that any institution closed down for student disturbances might find itself closed for a long period.[35]

But not all students were docile even under these stern warnings. On October 8 some 150 students at the Korean Theological Seminary engaged in on-campus demonstrations after distributing leaflets asking others whether "they would stand on the side of the falling people or to become hand-maids of the one who is brandishing his sword standing on top of the people's dead bodies."[36] All 150 students were quickly arrested and the seminary closed down. On October 17 some 200 students at Korea University engaged in demonstrations leading to the arrest of some 40 students and the closing down of the university. Students at Song'gyun'gwan University and Sukmyong Women's University

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30 For the text of the law, see *Dong-a Ilbo*, November 3, 1980.
31 *Ibid.*, November 13, 1980.
32 The full text of the law is in *ibid.*, November 19, 1980.
33 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 20, 1980.
34 *Dong-a Ilbo*, October 9, 1980.
35 *Ibid.*
36 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 18. For the text of the leaflet, see the *New Korea Times* (Toronto), November 1, 1980.

demonstrated on November 6,[37] and some 100 students at Yonsei University also staged demonstrations on November 18.

Although the seminary and Korea University were allowed to reopen on November 6, the government imposed harsh punishment on Yonsei University, demanding the resignation of the president, vice president, deans of three undergraduate colleges, dean of student affairs, and dean of academic affairs, and calling the three faculty advisors considered responsible for "guiding" the student leaders before the university's discipline committee for punishment.[38] The Ministry of Education had informed the university that unless all these individuals were properly punished, the three colleges in the university would be prevented from receiving freshmen in March.[39] This policy, according to the Ministry, was "necessary in order to secure an ideal academic atmosphere at the university and to protect the majority of innocent students from a small number of agitators."[40] After the punishments were meted out, the university's board of directors, officers of the alumni association, and representatives of students and parents met and adopted a resolution pledging that they would make every effort to "normalize" the situation on campus.[41]

The handling of the Yonsei University case accurately reflects the gravity of the government's concern. Once martial law is removed—a necessary condition for the elections—the students may become more difficult to control and create obstacles for President Chun's new society program. The president clearly needs to persuade the students of the legitimacy of his actions, but at the end of 1980 it appeared he had not succeeded in this task. The students, thus, remain as one of the volatile elements in South Korea's future.

Economic Problems

While politics dominated the news in South Korea, the economy continued to decline during 1980, presenting a serious challenge to the new president. Since many of Korea's economic problems were inherited from the previous regime, it is difficult to predict their impact on the new leader's future, but it is not likely that the new regime will be able to gain legitimacy and support on the basis of economic performance during its first year or two. This situation magnifies the importance to President Chun's future of the success of the purification campaign, which ironically caused much confusion and instability in the country's economic and financial institutions and contributed to the downturn of the economy during the year.

Statistics reveal the seriousness of South Korea's economic prob-

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37 *Miju Dong-a*, November 7, 1980.
38 *Korea Herald*, November 23, 1980.
39 *Ibid.*, November 22, 1980.
40 *Ibid.*
41 *Ibid.*, November 25, 1980.

lems in 1980. By the end of October, consumer prices were up 32.7% from a year earlier.[42] The continuing increase in the prices of oil and oil derivatives—reflecting the rise in world prices but also the effect of government policies—led the way of inflation. The price of oil was raised 59.4% in January,[43] and 11.3% (27.24% for gasoline) again in November.[44] Because of poor weather, agricultural production declined by 9.5%, and food prices, which usually decline in October, rose by 5.7% that month, the prices of rice and barley increasing 13.2% and 26% respectively.[45]

Not only did inflation continue at a dangerous rate, but so did economic stagnation. During the first nine months of the year, the GNP declined—for the first time in 16 years—by 3.1%, contrary to the forecast in July of a 3% increase.[46] As world demand for Korean products decreased as a result of continuing recession, Korean manufacturers' inventories rose 43% from the year before, and the use of production capacity fell to 58% for heavy industries and 72% for all industries combined. Auto plants operated at only 33% of capacity.[47] The unemployment rate rose to 6%, and 310,000 of the 820,000 unemployed workers lost their jobs during the first half of the year.[48] To prevent further unemployment, the government prohibited discharging workers, adding a burden to managements already suffering from increased prices of resource materials. The floating of the won in February had raised the dollar exchange ratio by 34% from 485 won to a dollar to 648 won to a dollar in October, adding another burden to the enterprises heavily dependent upon foreign capital. While floating the won temporarily strengthened the hands of exporters, it adversely affected inflation in an economy that depends heavily on foreign oil and resource materials. At the end of 1979, 259 of the 334 major enterprises in South Korea owed US$5.66 billion to foreign investors, and the rise in the dollar exchange rate meant a significant increase in the cost of operating their enterprises.[49] The morale of the businessmen, therefore, is reported to be very low.[50] The cabinet under Premier Nam Duck Woo, appointed on September 2, attempted that same month to rescue the industrialists by offering concessionary credits to exporters and export oriented manufacturers and by lowering the lending interest rate by 2% to 23.5%,[51] but these measures are not expected to bring about major changes.

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42 *The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly* (hereafter *AWSJ*), November 17, 1980.
43 *Dong-a Ilbo*, January 29, 1980.
44 *Korea Herald*, November 19, 1980.
45 *Dong-a Ilbo*, November 1, 1980.
46 *Korea Herald*, July 20, 1980.
47 *AWSJ*, September 22, 1980.
48 *Dong-a Ilbo*, July 3, 1980.
49 *Ibid.*, October 25, 1980.
50 *Ibid.*, November 21, 1980; "Temporary Recession or Structural Stagnation?" *Wol'gan Chungang* (*Monthly Chungang*), July 1980, pp. 70–101.
51 *AWSJ*, September 22, 1980.

President Chun's problems in the economic sector are enormous. It is obvious that exports need to be increased both to narrow the trade deficit (estimated to be US$5.3 billion in 1980) and to stimulate the domestic economy. But the increasing demand for oil and rising oil prices make this a formidable task. As prices and wages spiral within Korea, the country's competitive edge in the world market is fast diminishing. Hence, he must control inflation and encourage the industrialists to produce higher quality products suited for the world market. The Korean economy is suffering from President Park's daring policy of reorienting Korea's export industries to heavy and chemical industries, and it is expected to take time to make adjustments. President Park's belated attempt at slowing down the rate of economic growth in late 1978 created a severe recession, and Premier Nam, who had spearheaded the rapid growth policy between 1969 and 1978 as finance minister and deputy premier in charge of economic planning, again took measures in November to reorient the economy to faster growth,[82] but this policy risks continuing inflation. The opening of new markets and the production of new commodities by Korean industries will require industrialists' creativity and initiative as President Chun stressed at his inauguration, but they will also need the support of a scientific and engineering infrastructure that South Korea still does not possess. Within the short range, therefore, the future of the South Korean economy depends heavily on the upturn of the world economy that will absorb Korean manufactured goods.

The Kim Dae Jung Affair and Foreign Relations

General Chun's takeover and his attempt to eradicate all opposition from the political arena severely strained South Korea's relations with its allies, particularly the United States and Japan. While the U.S. repeatedly reaffirmed its defense commitment, and no mention was made of withdrawing or reducing American troops in Korea, the U.S. government has been critical of the South Korean army's involvement in politics, and intermittently issued expressions of concern ever since General Chun led the coup in December 1979. General Chun's assumption of the KCIA directorship in April and the army's role in the Kwangju uprising precipitated further adverse criticisms. When Kim Dae Jung was put on trial in July on charges of sedition, a U.S. State Department spokesman characterized the charges as "farfetched." As a result of these events, the annual policy consultative conference scheduled for June was indefinitely postponed, and President Carter and

[82] Premier Nam's remedies included the reduction of interest rates to 21.5%, lowering of special consumption taxes 30% on several categories of durable consumer goods, advancing the start of color television broadcasts to December 1, expanding credit for consumer purchases of selected durable goods and of raw materials and construction materials by end-users, establishment of a new system of financial support for debt-ridden companies, and so on. See *AWSJ*, November 17, 1980.

Secretary of State Muskie sent personal letters to President Chun in August presumably urging the South Korean leader to moderate his policy.[53]

General John Wickham's press interview with the *Los Angeles Times*, conditionally endorsing General Chun as new president, received wide publicity in Korea as an expression of U.S. support for General Chun, but both the State and Defense departments disavowed the interview.[54] The government under President Chun, in any event, in anticipation of Ronald Reagan's election, ignored protestations of the U.S. government under President Carter.[55] A statement of warning by an unidentified aide of the president-elect on November 19 against execution of Kim Dae Jung considerably dampened what the *New York Times* characterized as "a sordid celebration in South Korea,"[56] but the South Korean government is nevertheless anticipating a new phase in U.S.-South Korean relations under the new president. In order to emphasize U.S. concern over Kim Dae Jung's fate but without making any public statement to that effect, Defense Secretary Harold Brown on December 13 visited Seoul and discussed the future of U.S.-South Korea relations with President Chun. The South Korean press hailed this visit as an indication of U.S. support for South Korea's defense. The U.S. government's response to the trial and sentencing of Kim Dae Jung—consisting of pleas and warnings but no actual threats of retribution, perhaps to avoid provoking a hostile reaction from General Chun and his cohorts—contrasted to the major crisis the case precipitated in Japanese-South Korea relations.

The Kim Dae Jung issue was potentially embarrassing for Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party because Kim had been kidnapped from a Japanese hotel in August 1973 by South Korean agents. Even though the Japanese government had strongly protested the Korean government's violation of Japanese sovereignty and laws, the two governments had settled the issue politically by July 1975. Therefore the Japanese government paid particular attention to the content of prosecution charges against Kim but at the same time refrained from commenting on the trial, evidently because it was not ready to jeopardize its annual $10 billion trade with South Korea. In addition to public loans (US$89.1 million in 1979, or 8.8% of all public loans to Korea), Japanese private firms invested US$495.5 million between 1972 and 1979, which constituted 63.2% of total foreign private investment in Korea during the same period.[57] Japanese military ties with South Korea have also been on the rise. Former Japanese defense minister Kanemaru Nobu visited Seoul in August and reportedly encouraged

53 Reports concerning U.S. statements are too numerous to list. See *Korea Herald*, June 10, 1980, for the postponement of the annual consultative conference.
54 *New York Times*, August 15, 1980.
55 *Ibid.*, November 19, 1980.
56 Editorial of November 20, 1980.
57 Hapdong News Agency, *Korea Annual*, 1980 (Seoul, 1980), pp. 156–158.

General Chun to take over political leadership.[88] Former Premier Fukuda paid a three-day visit in September to engage in private conversations. And even though the Japanese government postponed an intergovernment cabinet meeting scheduled for September, Premier Suzuki declared on September 25 (eight days after the martial law court in Seoul convicted and sentenced Kim to death) that Japan would not interefere in Korea's domestic problems and would strengthen its ties with South Korea.[89]

But the death sentence set in motion another wheel that was to result in confrontation. On the evening of September 17, the day the death sentence was imposed, while more than 10,000 people demonstrated against the conviction in Tokyo's Hibiya Park,[90] the Japanese government officially notified the Korean ambassador that the court decision would have a grave adverse influence on Japanese policy toward South Korea. And when Kim's appeal was denied by the appelate martial law court on November 3, Premier Suzuki confronted the Korean ambassador on November 21, expressing his concern and reportedly relating to the ambassador that Kim's execution might prevent the Japanese government from providing further support to Korea's economy and strengthen the demand within Japan for improving ties with North Korea.[91] The left-wing labor union, Sōhyō (General Council of Trade Unions), declared on November 27 that it would launch a boycott of South Korean goods and might refuse to handle cargo to and from Korea.[92]

The South Korean government chose to release Premier Suzuki's remarks of November 21 through the government-controlled press, and a massive anti-Japanese campaign was launched throughout the country. Countless rallies were held and numerous newspaper articles were printed to denounce Japan's "blatant interference with Korea's domestic legal process," ignoring of rudimentary international law, discrimination against Korean residents in Japan, and "new Japanese imperialism." The Federation of Korean Trade Unions announced on November 29 that the Korean side would retaliate by boycotting Japanese goods.[93] The verbal war between Japan and South Korea was on. As of this writing, the fate of Kim Dae Jung is to be decided by the Supreme Court in Seoul and, if the Supreme Court upholds the decisions of the martial law courts, by President Chun. Whatever the court and President Chun decide, the relationship between Japan and South Korea has been gravely damaged. One of the first victims is likely to be the South Korean economy since Japanese trade constitutes ap-

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[88] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 15, 1980.
[89] *Ibid.*, September 26, 1980.
[90] *Ibid.*, September 18, 1980.
[91] *Ibid.*, November 26, 1980.
[92] *Ibid.*, November 27, 1980.
[93] For an example, see "Profit Motive Seen Behind Tokyo Stand," *Korea Herald*, November 29, 1980.

proximately one-third of total Korean trade. And since late 1979, Japanese corporations have been reluctant to invest in South Korea and the number of Japanese tourists visiting South Korea has been sharply reduced.

North-South Korean Relations

Representatives from North and South Korea met at Panmunjom intermittently between February and April to arrange for a conference of the premiers, but the two sides failed to agree on an agenda. After the ascendance of General Chun, *Nodong Shinmun* (*Labor News*), the organ of the Korean Workers' Party, strongly denounced him as a "cancerous being," and made it clear that the northern side would not participate in any negotiations with the south.[64]

Conclusion

The assassination of President Park in October 1979 appeared to open a way for South Korea to restore democracy, but instead the country was placed under a military dictatorship which briskly purged all the established politicians and principal elites and took the first steps toward building a "new society." President Chun's announced goal is to establish the roots for a democracy where social justice will prevail. At the end of 1980, the new leader appeared to have aroused the enthusiasm of some of the new generation of elites whose ascendance has been accelerated by the action of the military, but the measures he has taken have permanently alienated a significant proportion of the population whose enmity can be controlled only by force. The "clean" government and society he promised may not be as easy to deliver as he hopes. As the experience under President Park has shown. President Chun can accrue popular support only if he can deliver economic progress, but he has managed to alienate the country that had played a major role in making the "miracle" of the Park era possible. South Korea must also expect far more competition in world trade during the coming decade than ever before. And because President Chun is starting with a less than congenial international image, and with little experience in diplomacy and economics, he faces a formidable task.

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[64] *Nodong Shinmun*, August 14, 1980.

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APPENDIX 4

"Human Rights in Korea—January 1986;" an Asia Watch Report

The Kwangju Uprising

The Events of May 1980

When it became obvious that the public's hopes for meaningful democratic reform were being thwarted by the military, any overt act of repression or brutality was likely to trigger an uprising against the regime. On the evening of May 17, 1980 squads of police and soldiers raided the homes of leaders of the democratic movement and students from Chŏnnam University (Chŏnnam taehakkyo) in Kwangju, South Chŏlla province, and on May 18, about 5,000 students clashed with police in the city. In addition to riot police (30,000 according to one estimate) 3,000 special airborne troops were sent in to quell the demonstrations. These paratroopers then carried out three days of barbarity with the zeal of Nazi stormtroopers. With rifles and fixed bayonets the troops plowed into the student demonstrators from Chŏnnam University beating, kicking and stabbing students indiscriminately.

On May 19, more trouble started when a crowd estimated at three to five thousand filled the downtown streets and clashed with police. The demonstrators threw stones, Molotov cocktails, and sticks and the police responded with tear and pepper gas.

Then at 10:30 in the morning about a thousand Special Forces troops were brought in. They repeated the same actions of the day before, beating, stabbing, and mutilating unarmed civilians, including children, young girls, and aged grandmothers. They forced both men and women to strip naked, made others lie flat on the ground and kicked them. Several sources tell of soldiers stabbing or cutting off the breasts of naked girls; one murdered student was found disembowelled, another with an x carved in his back. About twenty high school girls were reported killed at Central High School. The paratroopers carried out searches in sides streets, fired randomly into crowds, carted off the bodies in trucks, and piled them in the bus terminal. They even took the wounded out of hospitals. Ten high school students were killed in front of the Kaerim police box. The troops chased two hundred students into the Catholic Center and then invaded the building and killed over a hundred. They had virtually declared open season on anyone younger than thirty, arresting and beating any they found on the streets. A dozen students were killed on the roof of the Kumyong building and thrown off. A student was roped to a personnal carrier and dragged through the streets.

When a mother protested the teasing of her daughter by troops, both were shot dead on the spot. Eleven persons were killed in front of the Hyŏndae theater. In one famous case, the troops killed four taxi drivers for transporting students throughout the city (the drivers' union then joined the demonstrations). They even threatened and beat ordinary police who were trying to help the injured lying bleeding and

unconscious on the streets. One police officer urged people over a megaphone to return home lest the martial law troops catch and kill them.

The violence only served to inflame the feelings of the citizenry still further, and throughout the afternoon demonstrations spread all over the city. By 7 p.m. 7,000 demonstrators had gathered down on Kŭmnamno (Kŭmnam St.) wielding pipes and sticks, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, setting fire to automobiles and oil drums and pushing them into the police lines. Enraged by what they had witnessed, demonstrators burned down police boxes and tried to set fire to a radio-TV station for falsely reporting that only one person had died on May 18-19. A group of businessmen burned the government tax office; others set fire to the provincial administration garage. In two cases the people in the streets killed soldiers who had perpetrated atrocities. By the end of the day many public buildings, police boxes, and broadcasting stations were damaged or on fire. Public buses were taken over and gas stations occupied by the demonstrators.

On May 20, an angry crowd gathered downtown in reaction to the mutilated body of a laborer discovered on the street. Sporadic clashes with troops continued during the day; a rally of 5,000 was held in the afternoon on Kŭmnamno, and a major clash between demonstrators and police and Special Forces troops occurred in front of the Provincial Administration Building. The taxi drivers led a procession of about thirty taxis and a number of buses toward the provincial building in the hope of crashing through the police lines, but were fired on and blocked by the

troops. Nine occupants of one of the buses were beaten and left bloody and unconscious on the streets. Other attacks on buses and trucks of this nature occurred repeatedly. The reporters of the Dong ilbo even recorded license plates to confirm the accuracy of their accounts. When another crowd marched on the railroad station to identify three bodies stored there, the troops at the station fired at them and killed about a dozen.[22]

Sometime during May 20 the students and citizens of Kwangju began to seize weapons from abandoned police stations to defend themselves against the troops and the sound of rifle fire was heard throughout the city. The state of insurrection continued throughout the evening as demonstrators succeeded in taking over Kwangju City Hall, smashing the equipment of the KBS broadcasting station, setting fire to the MBC television station, and occupying a number of police boxes, police and fire stations. While clashes were continuing downtown the troops divided up and conducted house-to-house searches, beating and killing even more people. One account estimated several dozen killed and hundreds wounded at Chŏnnam University alone; another source estimated 200 killed and thousands wounded throughout the city.[23] One reporter personally counted 200 bodies himself, so the death rate was undoubtedly higher. He was told by a captured paratrooper that these troops had been hardened for three days by food deprivation, and just prior to their arrival were given drugged liquor. Officers told the men they were putting down a communist uprising, and chose only those from Kyŏngsang province as if to give license to discriminatory violence against the Chŏlla people

on the basis of traditional regional prejudice.[24]

At about 1 P.M. on May 21, riot troops began firing into thousands of demonstrators marching toward the provincial administration building. They had begun the march behind push-carts with three bodies of murdered civilians at 4:00 in the morning, clashing with police along the way. Throughout the afternoon, army riflemen stationed on the rooftops picked off about 70 persons. Urban warfare broke out at 6:30 in the evening when a group massed in front of the Labor Office attacked the martial law troops and police headquarters, arming themselves with captured weapons. Students mounted a machine gun on the roof of the Chŏnnam University medical school, right behind the provincial administration building. The authorities evacuated the building, and a group composed of students and ordinary citizens took it over. Others occupied broadcasting stations, which were then burned down by retreating martial law troops. Two regiments of Special Forces troops from the Twentieth Division were moved from the front lines on the demilitarized zone to engage in the fighting. As on May 19, the dead were estimated in the hundreds and the injured in the thousands. The hospitals were filled to overflowing.[25] Despite one report that the army withdrew from the city on May 22, violence broke out on May 23 when eleven students and six soldiers were killed. And on May 24, the bodies of students killed and buried by martial law soldiers were discovered at both Chŏnnam and Chosŏn universities.[26]

A self-appointed committee of religious leaders, students, academics, lawyers, and newsmen was organized to negotiate with

the Martial Law commander. After obtaining a promise from the Martial Law commander to keep the troops out of the city, the committee set about collecting weapons from the citizenry, a report confirmed by the T.V. documentary made by a West German television company on the scene.[27] A solidarity rally attended by an estimated 100,000 citizens was held on the afternoon of May 25 in front of the provincial administration building. Ordinary people contributed food, gave blood, and donated medicine for the public welfare. Meanwhile, the Kwangju committee attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement, demanding as conditions for surrender only that President Choi admit responsibility for the violence, provide reparations, and promise not to take revenge on the people. When it appeared that the army was about to attack and the students were rearming themselves, the committee marched unarmed directly to where the tanks were located, risking death to force continued negotiations. The tactic was successful, but only for a time. Discussions were continuing when in the early morning of May 27, martial law soldiers estimated in the tens of thousands invaded the city. They killed several hundred people in an attack on a park across from the provincial administration building in downtown Kwangju, and attacked and killed a number of armed students near Chosŏn University.[28]

Although the government still makes the absurd claim that only 191 people lost their lives at the time, the Kwangju city death statistics show that over 2,600 people died that month, 2,300 over the monthly average. The Korea Communique in its July 15, 1980 issue estimated 600 known deaths including missing

persons, another 600 presumed dead, or a total of over 1,000, over 3,000 seriously injured, and several thousand detained.[29] The estimate of 2,000 dead must be closer to the truth since the figures were recorded by minor officials in the city's department of vital statistics simply noting the overall number of deaths for the month. They had no special bias or commission to prove or deny the occurrence of a political massacre.

The Chun regime now portrays the Kwangju uprising as a tragic event, as if it bore no responsibility for what took place there. The question remains, however, whether the man ultimately responsible not only for that tragedy, but for the prevention of a democratic transition in 1979-80, can be trusted when he says he will lead the nation to democracy in 1988. To this day, there has been no official investigation of the atrocities committed in Kwangju, no indictments of the guilty, no dismissals of responsible officers and men.

Legacy of the Massacre

Kwangju remains as alive as ever in the public mind. It was the final act in the process of the political coup by Chun and a small fragment of the R.O.K. military in 1980, frustrating popular hopes for democracy. It began as part of the general protest against martial law, postponement of the transition to democracy, and seizure of power by Chun and the military. It turned into a massacre of unarmed and defenseless students and civilians by a ruthless force of indoctrinated (if not drugged) stormtroopers, which then produced an urban political uprising by people forced to defend themselves against violence and enraged

by mindless brutality. It indelibly stained the Chun government as a military dictatorship of naked force, a regime that might have been toppled a popular uprising had the military forces been any less brutal. Chun acted out the scenario that Park Chung Hee had described in the dinner party prior to his assassination.

The massacre has also become a symbol of U.S. support for dictatorship, since the U.S. commander of the U.N. forces with jurisdiction over Korean forces either permitted or condoned the transfer of Korean troops from the front line to aid in the suppression of the Kwangju civilians. The U.S. government has refused to acknowledge responsibility on technical and legal grounds, but real responsibility stems from the crucial military and economic importance of the U.S. to South Korea and the de facto influence that creates. U.S. responsibility was the key issue in the student occupation of the U.S.I.S. building in Seoul in May 1985.

Every year on May 18, the government braces itself for the annual memorial services and demonstrations that accompany the anniversary of the event. The memory lives most strongly in the southwest region, but the implications of Kwangju are national in scope. In recent months the government has taken to acknowledging the tragic nature of the event, but portrays it in public as an unfortunate but necessary act to preserve public order and stability in the context of the perpetual threat of military invasion from North Korea. It is hard to imagine many have been won over to the government's side. In short, Kwangju is an insurmountable obstacle to the legitimation of the current

political regime.

After the suppression of Kwangju, Kim Dae Jung was put on trial on trumped-up charges of fomenting the uprising behind the scenes. The court found Kim guilty and sentenced him to death, but thanks to a massive sympathy movement in South Korea, Japan, the U.S., and other countries, and pressure from the U.S. government, the sentence was subsequently reduced to twenty years. It is probably safe to deduce as well, that Kim's eventual release in late 1982 was the price the Chun regime had to pay for uninterrupted U.S. support of his regime.

APPENDIX 5

Responses to Questions Submitted to Department of Defense by Representative Solarz

QUESTION #1: Have there been any changes in the indigenous military balance on the Korean peninsula during the past year? If so, please specify the changes.

ANSWER: Both North and South Korea have made improvements in their respective force postures, primarily through acquisition of new weapon systems or improvements to existing weapons systems. The preponderance of improvements to date and those expected to occur in the near term result in the overall indigenous military balance still favoring the North.

Notable ground force improvements in the North center on the reorganization and forward deployment of significant numbers of units closer to the DMZ. This has the effect of reducing tactical warning time which is critical to U.S. and ROK defense plans. Recent improvements have emphasized increased mobility, firepower, and air defense capabilities.

North Korean air and air defense improvements include acquisition of 26 MIG-23 interceptors, the SA-3 SAM, as well as Soviet-designed and U.S. designed (Hughes 500 series) helicopters. We believe the 87 Hughes helicopters illegally acquired last year are in the process of being armed. Since they are identical to helicopters which the South possesses, their operational use in the South would greatly complicate the identification of friend or foe. Despite the North's acquisition of MIG-23's and prospects for acquiring more in the future, the ROKAF is likely to maintain its current qualitative advantage. The ROK Navy is much smaller than the North's and is likely to remain so. Recent ship acquisitions by both sides have not altered the current imbalance favoring the North.

QUESTION #2: You have requested $230 million in FMS credits for South Korea in FY 87. What equipment will be procurred with these funds? What will be the terms of the FMS credits? What role does our FMS program play in overcoming the major ROK deficiences in terms of equipment, manpower and training?

ANSWER: Items expected to be financed with FY 87 credits include payments against the existing order for F-16C aircraft, AH-1S TOW Cobra helicopters, air defense radar, and STINGER air defense missiles.

The FMS credits will be provided at the market interest rate at the time of the loan and are to be repaid over 30 years to include a 10-year grace period on repayment of principal.

FMS credits permit Korea to acquire more advanced weapon systems, such as those identified above, to offset quantitative shortfalls in manpower and weapons by increasing operational and tactical capabilities. The International Military Education and Training Program provides professional military education to enhance the interoperability of U.S.-ROK forces and to assist the ROK armed forces in force improvement and modernization efforts.

QUESTION #3: Has Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had any impact on the levels of U.S. military assistance to Korea in FY 86? If so, how much in funding was cut, and what impact will this have on the indigenous military balance on the peninsula? Will the readiness of Korean forces be measurably affected?

ANSWER: The reductions to FY 1986 Korea Program were due primarily to authorization/Appropriation Committee actions taken prior to the 4.3% Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestration. The impact on the the levels of U.S. military assistance to Korea in FY 86 was as follows:

	Requested	Apportioned	After Gramm-Rudman	Percent Reduction*
FMS Credit	$230.0M	$170.0M	$162.690M	29.2
IMET	1.9M	1.9M	1.818M	4.3

The military equation on the Korean Peninsula will continue to favor the North into the 1990s. The Republic of Korea will seek to maintain a near-parity deterrence level, relying heavily on the continued U.S. military presence to make up the difference. South Korea's armed forces will be qualitatively improved as F-16s -- along with indigenously produced armor and artillery -- enter the inventory. The Gramm-Rudman cuts will slow the upgrading of military equipment and, to a much lesser extent, training.

FY 86 reductions will clearly have an impact on force improvement objectives which include security preparations for the 1988 Olympics. Military equipment which would help to maintain security in 1988 but which Korea cannot afford to buy because of lack of funds includes the OV-10 aircraft.

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* Reduction in amount allocated to ROK largely caused by overall reduction in security assistance by the Congress in FY 86 CRA. Korea, since it is not a fenced country, took a larger cut than other country programs.

QUESTION #4: If an across-the-board cut of 22 percent or greater is made in FY 87 as a result of Gramm-Rudman, what impact will this have on the U.S. military assistance program for Korea? In particular, what impact will it have on the Korean Government's Force Improvement Program?

ANSWER: An across-the-board cut of 22 percent in FY 87 would have major impact on Korea's Force Improvement Program (FIP). Although the USG does not have complete access to Korea's force planning, the impact of this massive a reduction would most likely slow or result in the reduction of the F-16 aircraft or AH-1S Cobra helicopters buys. This reduction would have a significant adverse impact on other parts of the FIP also possibly causing the deferral or elimination of other programs. In addition, such a reduction could adversely affect the traditional bilateral relations between the U.S. and the ROK as we would be seen as less supportive of ROK defense needs.

QUESTON # 5: Do you believe that the likelihood of hostilities with North Korea will increase significantly as we get closer to the 1988 Olympic Games? Is there any reason to believe that the same calculations that have deterred a full-scale North Korean attack since the last war will not apply in 1988?

ANSWER: While we are confident that the U.S. commitment will continue to be the most dominant factor in deterring the North, we have seen from what North Korea has done in Rangoon what North Korea is capable of doing. We have continuing evidence of intentions that, at the very least, are deeply disturbing. At present, short of war, we feel that the threat posed by the North can be divided into two classes. First, the North might seek to create a provocative military situation along the demilitarized zone if the talks over the Olympics prove fruitless. The North Korean hope would be to force a change in venue by raising tensions. The inherent disadvantages of such a tactic -- clear North Korean complicity, the risk of uncontrollable escalation -- argue against it. It is also possible, and here we feel the likelihood is significantly higher, that North Korea might hope to disrupt the Asian games through a terrorist act, either perpetrated by North Korean agents or by third parties, in the hope that a change of venue for the 1988 Olympics would be considered. Considering the discrediting of the North Korean international image in the aftermath of the Rangoon bombing, plausible denial would be a prime consideration. Pyongyang realizes that using terrorist tactics or military provocations, even with a plausible denial, would end the North-South talks and eliminate any chance of achieving direct dialogue with the U.S. Therefore, North Korea will not likely undertake either campaign.

QUESTION #6: Why, more than 30 years after the end of the Korean War, is a U.S. General in charge of ROK forces as well as U.S. forces in Korea? Have the Koreans expressed an interest in changing the system? Isn't it in the U.S. interest to change the system, so that the U.S. is not placed again in a situation like it was during the 1980 Kwangju incident, when the U.S. was blamed for actions of Korean military units that were only nominally under U.S. control?

ANSWER: The United Nations Command (UNC) was established by the United States in July 1950 in response to a UN Security Council resolution which condemned North Korean aggression, and called upon UN members to provide forces to help defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) under a unified command under the United States. The Korean War itself was fought under the UN banner and the UN commander is the only allied signature on the Armistice Agreement. He signed the agreement on behalf of the sixteen member nations with forces in South Korea and the Republic of Korea Government. The armistice agreement, after almost 33 years is still in effect. Since there has been no peace treaty the UNC remains as our only means for dealing with North Korea on Armistice matters.

The U.S. and Korea have a defense treaty, signed in November 1954, that requires both nations to come to the defense of each other in accordance with their constitutional processes in the event of aggression against either. In keeping with this treaty, the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) was formed. The Koreans have indicated no desire for a change in the current defense arrangements.

Those who try to hold the U.S. responsible for events at Kwangju do not understand that U.S. responsibility is for the external security of the ROK. Internal security is the responsibility of the South Korean Government.

The Kwangju incident began and the overwhelming majority of casualties occurred -- when the Korean Government dispatched elements of the Special Warfare Command (SWC), one of several South Korean units never under CINCUNC/CINCCFC command, to cope with demonstrations in Kwangju. The 20th Republic of Korea Army Division, which reentered the city over a week after the SWC withdrew, was part of the Combined Forces Command. Under existing agreements, however, absent a specific situation with an increased external threat to the ROK, the ROK has only to inform the Combined Commander that a ROK unit is being removed from the operational control of the Combined Forces Command to meet an internal requirement. In May 1980, CINCUNC/CINCCFC had no choice as to whether the ROK 20th Division should be released. The release was automatic.

QUESTION #7: Since the ROK appears to be more and more prosperous, and FMS credits appear to represent a relatively smaller percent of the annual military budget, why should the USG continue to finance FMS credits at $230 Million per year?

ANSWER: We believe that continuation of FMS credits at the recommended level is in the US as well as the ROK interest. The credit program enhances the combined defense and provides for continued inter-operability with US forces. $230 million represents about 10% of the ROK Force Improvement Program (FIP), which we feel is an appropriate level considering factors such as the overall ROK defense budget, the FIP and the fact that a significant amount of ROK purchases are from US sources. The credit program also demonstrates political and military support for the ROK, which is of special symbolic importance to the Koreans. The actual cost is small, since credits are at treasury rates and ROK repayments are currently greater than its credit levels. Further, FMS credit financing helps maintain the ROK as a reliable and steady customer of US produced goods. Continued credits also serve as a symbol of ROK credit-worthiness to the international financial community, thus enhancing its ability to borrow from other sources.

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